Daily Report

East Europe

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CONTENTS

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ALBANIA

Albania: Zhulali To Host Balkan Defense Ministers Meeting *[Tirana Radio]* 1
Albania: Berisha, Party Leaders Discuss Future Elections *[Tirana Radio]* 1
Albania: Opposition Views Berisha's 'Communist Methods' *[KOHA JONE 17 Mar]* 1

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: People's Union To Nominate Zhelev for President *[Sofia Radio]* 4
Bulgaria: Zhelev-BSP Rift on FRY Relations Examined *[24 CHASA 16 Mar]* 4
Bulgaria: Pirinski Said Evading NATO Issue *[DEMOKRATSIYA 20 Mar]* 4
Bulgaria: Conflict With Romania Over Danube Bridge *[24 CHASA 19 Mar]* 5
Bulgaria: Topencharov Views BSP Attitude Toward Videnov *[TRUD 14 Mar]* 6

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Klaus Meeting With Christopher 'Very Useful' *[Prague Radio]* 7
Czech Republic: 'No Miracle' Expected From Christopher Visit *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 19 Mar]* 7
Czech Republic: Klaus on EDU Post, NATO Enlargement *[LIDOVE NOVINY 15 Mar]* 7
Czech Republic: Commentary on Role of Military *[A REPORT No 2, 1996]* 8
Czech Republic: Foreign Investors 'Faced No Major Problems' *[PRAGUE POST 20 Feb]* 9

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Foreign Ministry Rejects Russian Statements *[LIDOVE NOVINY 13 Feb]* 11
Slovakia: EU Commissioner Insists on Further Reforms *[PRAGUE POST 27 Feb]* 11
Slovakia: First Three Years of Independence Assessed *[MOSTY 6 Feb]* 12
Slovakia: Proposed Bill 'Threatens' NGO's Existence *[PRAGUE POST 27 Feb]* 13
Slovakia: Judge on Secret Service Role in Targeting Bishop *[SME 18 Mar]* 14

HUNGARY

Hungary: Privatization Minister Outlines 1996 Plans *[Budapest Radio]* 16
Hungary: Increased Popularity of Szekeres, Horn *[NEPSZABADSAG 18 Mar]* 16
Hungary: Hajos Socialists Criticize Coalition *[NEPSZABADSAG 19 Mar]* 17
Hungary: SZDSZ Refutes Hajos Group Allegations *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 20 Mar]* 17
Hungary: SZDSZ Next Electoral Performance Predicted *[MAGYARORSZAG 26 Jan]* 18
Hungary: MDNP Leader Szabo on Party's Position *[MAGYAR NEMZET 16 Mar]* 19
Hungary: Lezsak Distances Himself From Torgyan *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 19 Mar]* 21

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Sacirbegovic Voices Disappointment With Ankara Meeting *[Hanau NOVA BOSNA 19 Mar]* .. 22
B-H: Belgrade Says Izetbegovic Responsible for Camp Crimes *[AFP]* 22
B-H: Silajdzic: Peace Process Heading in Wrong Direction *[Hanau NOVA BOSNA 19 Mar]* 22
B-H: Authorities Blame Serbs for Bombings, Arson *[Hanau NOVA BOSNA 19 Mar]* 23
B-H: Conflict of U.S., Iranian Interests in Bosnia Viewed *[SVIJET 14 Mar]* 23
B-H: IFOR Occupation of Business Offices Problematic *[SLOBODNA BOSNA 12 Jan]* 24

B-H: Manager Says U.S. Troops Seized Farm, Caused Damage *[VECERNJE NOVINE 11 Mar]* 27
B-H: Joint Military Teams Launch Facility Inspections *[Sarajevo Radio]* 28
B-H: Army Issues Statement on IFOR-Led Meeting in Ilidza *[Sarajevo Radio]* 28
B-H: Spaniard Reportedly Likely To Replace Koschnick *[AFP]* 28
B-H: WEU Denies Increase of Joint Patrols in Mostar *[Sarajevo Radio]* 28
B-H: FRY Allegedly Offers Lease of Bar Port to Sarajevo *[Sarajevo Radio]* 29
B-H: IFOR Says Bosniaks Deterred From Returning to Jajce *[AFP]* 29
B-H: Zivinice IFOR Liaison Condemns Destruction in Area *[Sarajevo Radio]* 29
B-H: RS's Kasagic Seeks Guarantees on Return to Sarajevo *[TANJUG]* 30
B-H: Belgrade Weekly Views Elections in Bosnia *[NIN 2 Feb]* 30
B-H: Serbs To Deploy 1,000 Troops in Central Region *[AFP]* 36
B-H: Serb Forces Move Troops Into 'Anvil' *[AFP]* 36
B-H: Bosnian Serb Republic Army Takes Over Mrkonjic Grad *[TANJUG]* 37
B-H: Mass Graves of Serbs Reported in Sipovo, Mrkonjic *[SRNA]* 37
B-H: Many Sarajevo Serbs in Trebinje Not Registered *[Banja Luka Radio]* 37
B-H: Serbs To Remove Checkpoints Near Brcko by End of Week *[SRNA]* 38
B-H: Banja Luka Court Tries HVO Member for War Crimes *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 19 Mar]* 38
B-H: Bosnian Serbs Extend List of War Criminals *[Pale Radio]* 38
B-H: Serb Official: Prisoners' Release Possible by 23 Mar *[TANJUG]* 39

CROATIA

Croatia: Commentary Views U.S. Arms Shipments to Bosnia *[NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA 15-20 Mar]* 40
Croatia: Gen Klein's Ultimatum to Slavonia Serbs Viewed *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 19 Mar]* 41
Croatia: Local Refugee Commissioner on Serb Refugees *[Beli Manastir Radio]* 42
Croatia: Rail, Road Traffic With FRY To Resume Soon *[Zagreb Radio]* 43
Croatia: Tudjman Rejects Election of Zagreb Mayor *[Zagreb Radio]* 43
Croatia: Regime 'Victims' Hold First Session in Vukovar *[Beli Manastir Radio]* 43

POLAND

Poland: Rosati on Talks With Christopher About NATO *[Warsaw Radio]* 45
Poland: Preparations for NATO; U.S. 'Becoming Impatient' *[SZTANDAR 19 Mar]* 45
Poland: Daily Comments on Situation in Taiwan Strait *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 16-17 Mar]* 45
Poland: Sweden Offers Joint Production of Gripen Aircraft *[Warsaw TV]* 46
Poland: Multipurpose Planes for Air Force Being Considered *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 20 Mar]* 47
Poland: New Chief of Vistula Military Units Interviewed *[POLSKA ZBROJNA 19 Mar]* 48
Poland: Minister on Creating Safe Zones in Large Cities *[Warsaw Radio]* 49
Poland: Leaders of OPZZ, UP Discuss Closer Cooperation *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 20 Mar]* 49
Poland: SLD Head on PSL, UP, Catholic Wing in Party *[TRYBUNA 16-17 Mar]* 49
Poland: Trade Unionists Reach Agreement With SdRP *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 21 Mar]* 51
Poland: Walesa To Return to Shipyard, Seeks U.S. Investor *[SZTANDAR 21 Mar]* 51

ROMANIA

Romania: Melescanu on Talks With Christopher in Prague *[Bucharest Radio]* 52
Romania: Spokesman Reasserts Decision To Join NATO *[Bucharest Radio]* 52
Romania: Tinca on NATO, Troops in Hungarian Counties *[Bucharest Radio]* 52
Romania: Melescanu Views Russian, Ukraine Treaties *[ADEVARUL 14 Mar]* 53
Romania: Conference Held on Conciliation With Hungary *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 18 Mar]* 54

SLOVENIA

Slovenia: FRY Said Trying To Stop Debt Agreement *[DELO 14 Mar]* 55

Slovenia: Italian Judge on Slovene WWII Crimes *[VECER 20 Feb]* 56

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: War Crimes Committee Lists Izetbegovic as Suspect *[NASA BORBA 20 Mar]* 57
FRY: Defense Minister Concludes Visit to China *[TANJUG]* 57

Serbia

Serbia: Regime Criticized for Accepting Croatia's Borders *[Bad Vilbel VESTI 16 Mar]* 57
Serbia: Militia Chief Arkan Takes Over Radio Station *[NASA BORBA 19 Mar]* 58

Montenegro

Montenegro: Social Democrats on FRY View of Prevlaka *[Bad Vilbel VESTI 16 Mar]* 58

Kosovo

Kosovo: Serb Police Raid Homes, Plunder Albanian Firms *[KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]* 58

Albania: Zhulali To Host Balkan Defense Ministers Meeting

AU2003162396 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] A meeting of defense ministers of southern Balkan countries is to open in Tirana on 31 March. At a news conference, Defense Minister Zhulali considered this event to be the start of a dialogue to boost regional security and cooperation. Here is a report by Pandeli Shehu:

[Shehu] At a news conference given today, Defense Minister Safet Zhulali notified that Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia [the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], Turkey, Italy, as a neighboring country, the United States, which will be represented by Secretary of Defense Perry, and the OSCE [Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe] are invited to participate in the meeting.

After pointing out our country's active role in preserving peace and stability in the region, Zhulali said that the meeting aims at establishing a dialogue among regional countries on issues of common interest and profiting from each other's experience as well. The themes to be discussed at the meeting are regional security and cooperation, the increase of the measures of good understanding, military cooperation, and humanitarian aid in case of catastrophes, including military and civil relations.

This meeting, Zhulali said, which is in conformity with the basic principles and the commitments defined in the UN Charter, as well as the commitments taken on the basis of other international documents or of bilateral treaties, is based on the reciprocal respect and the coexistence between the states and nations which is achieved through political and peaceful means, thus creating the necessary atmosphere of credibility to resolve conflicts without the use of force.

Talking about regional stability as a condition for the Western movement and integration, Zhulali considered the close cooperation among the countries of the region to be necessary and natural. Zhulali stated that a part of these countries have just come out of a half-century of dictatorship. Zhulali also assessed this cooperation to be a new architecture in the regional relations to establish a partnership that will preserve our common values, encourage progress, and ensure a better life for the peoples of these countries.

By means of this meting, Zhulali said, we are reaffirming the common conviction that the preservation of peace, human rights, and the consolidation of democratic regimes are principles for all the countries of our region.

Minister Zhulali also answered many questions addressed by correspondents present at the conference, stressing once again our country's commitment to achieve peace and stability in the region.

Zhulali considered the presence of U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry at the meeting to be very important and notified that on 2 April, Mr. Perry will continue the visit that has been planned before and hold talks with our officials.

Albania: Berisha, Party Leaders Discuss Future Elections

AU2003200196 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Sali Berisha held a one and a half hour meeting with the representatives of the political forces at his residence at noon today. This consultative meeting focused on future electoral elections.

After the meeting that ended several minutes ago, the representatives of political parties confirmed that the meeting extensively discussed their proposals regarding the time elections will be held, the division of constituencies, as well as other technical procedures that are related to the registration of the population, election commissions, etc.

Berisha expressed his warranty that future elections will be free and democratic. Meanwhile, the president offered the political party representatives to submit their proposals in a written form.

You will be informed in detail about the meeting in other newscasts.

Albania: Opposition Views Berisha's 'Communist Methods'

AU2003102396 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 17 Mar 96 p 3

[Interviews with PS Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi, Democratic Alliance President Neritan Ceka, and PSD Chairman Skender Gjinushi by Joniila Godole and Enton Abilekaj, following Albanian President Sali Berisha's meeting with intellectuals in Tirana on 16 March: "Sali Berisha: 'If the Socialist Party Wins, Albania Will Move Eastward'"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

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Servet Pellumbi, Deputy Chairman of the Socialist Party [PS]

[Pellumbi] Berisha has begun the election campaign before it has been announced. Let him make speeches every day if he wishes, but the people will not give him their votes and, with every speech that he makes, he loses hundreds and thousands of votes.

[KOHA JONE] The PS heads the red front. What do you have to say about this?

[Pellumbi] There is no red front. It only exists in Berisha's imagination. We do not have different policies according to geography. Albania is on the road of democracy and the Albanian electorate wants democracy to continue and to develop, eliminating the many obstacles that the Democratic Party [PD] and Berisha are creating on the road of democracy. Our alternative aims precisely at eliminating these obstacles, so that Albania can move ahead.

[KOHA JONE] Neocommunism is neither communism not anticommunism. What is it?

[Pellumbi] We do not deal in terms of that kind. The main thing is that Albania has turned its back on communism once and for all and has no aspirations in that direction. No political force, least of all the PS, aspires toward communism. The future of Albania is on the lines of democracy. As for what Berisha calls the isolation that the PS would bring to Albania, let him see how isolated the PS is on 23 March when we start our congress.

Neritan Ceka, Democratic Alliance

[Ceka] Albania is not going anywhere. I say to the Albanians that they should watch carefully during these two months to see what Berisha has been, what he is, and what he might be for Albania, and I also call on the Albanian electorate not to vote for Berisha. Our president talks about the opposition as a present danger, but the only present danger is Berisha himself. There is no other danger to Albania. Berisha has thrown a stone in the river and I do not think it is necessary for us all to dive in after it. Speaking as an intellectual rather than as a politician, yesterday's meeting left me with a bitter feeling that communist practices are being revived and officials are being collectivized. I think that this meeting will be remembered with shame in the history of Albanian intellectuals, who are increasingly being treated as the hired hands of a state that that has put itself at the center of not only political but intellectual life. The feeling that I had immediately after I heard his speech was a sense of the urgent need for a commitment to free intellectuals from fear of the state, which is once again compiling lists of names as if in a personnel office. Of course, a fair proportiuon of the 2,500 people who filled the hall went for the entertainment. But I think that an intellectual's dignity is more valuable than such pranks. I will not go into the question of who paid for this performance. As for the choices that Berisha offered, of the West with the PD and the East with the PS, I would say that his speech really concentrated only on himself. The Albanian people chose between East and West as long ago as December 1990 and it is now no longer a question of finding an alternative, but of hastening the pace toward the West, of fair and effective privatization, creating jobs, involving people in economic and social life, and supporting the underprivileged strata of society, especially the pensioners. A communist who for 25 years made his daily bread out of fairy tales about Enver should not tell us such stories.

Skender Gjinushi, Chairman of the Socialist Democratic Party [PSD]

[Gjinushi] At the meeting the day before yesterday, we told Mr. Shehu, as the spokesman for Berisha that he is, that they think everything that appears in front of their eyes is red. As if to spite him, all the students who appeared at the studio that evening were dressed in red. However, there can be nothing redder than the policy that the PD and the president himself are following. Even the meeting with the intellectuals was one of the signs of red methods. Intellectuals were summoned like employees to listen to a party and were even expected to take notes, like youth pioneers holding a meeting at the presidency. It reminds you of those meetings that Ramiz [Alia] held in September 1990, when it was Sali [Berisha] who took notes. The latter is now following the same pattern, with lists, signatures, and people obliged to go and listen to the president. If he were to hold a meeting with intellectuals like an impartial president about problems of national dimensions, that would be something else. However, he does this at a time when he has declared himself to be chairman of the PD Campaign Committee. He had no right to use the state directly for campaign purposes. He then goes on to talk about depoliticizing institutions! Our president calls all these institutions such as the university, academic institutes, the Academy of Sciences, etc. instruments of the PD. The greatest outrage and discrimination against an intellectual is to summon him and impose your policies on him. It is one thing to hold an open meeting to which anybody can come, but it is another to order people to turn up and threaten them with Article 24/1, although it has now been annulled. This is indeed a red characteristic and a method of dictatorship. The intellectuals must have emerged from this meeting just as they did two years ago.

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If Albania currently stands between two alternatives of East or West, there is a lack of logic in the president's policies because this is an insult to all the Eastern countries that have rushed toward the West before Albania. The East used to be represented by Russia, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and it was Albania that ran after them, after a delay caused for well known reasons by Ramiz and the Albanian Workers Party. Now, East and West are moving together toward a united Europe. This is therefore a political falsification. It would be something else if some political forces were in favor of a united Europe and others were against it. We do not know of any trends in Albania that are against such a thing, at any rate officially. The PD, which shouts so much about anticommunism, does nothing but ape communist methods and show clear signs of neocommunism. This is Berisha's own policy, which is based on the cult of the individual. He has therefore inherited many throwbacks to the time of his own recent past.

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Bulgaria: People's Union To Nominate Zhelev for President

AU2003174996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Zhelyu Zhelev has agreed to the People's Union proposing his candidacy for the upcoming presidential elections. This became clear today after the meeting between President Zhelev and the cochairmen of the People's Union, Anastasiya Mozer and Stefan Savov.

Mr. Zhelev will take part in the upcoming 23 March meeting of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union Supreme Council, at which the decision on proposing his candidacy will be announced.

Bulgaria: Zhelev-BSP Rift on FRY Relations Examined

AU2003203096 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 16 Mar 96 p 8

[Article by Viktor Radulov: "Only Party Friendship Binds Sofia and Belgrade"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Zhelev is right when he complains that because of the numerous Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] visitors to Belgrade, his own visit there cannot materialize.

However, he has to remember that his visit to Belgrade could take place at any time, if he wants it to. Obviously, he simply does not want to go there. The reason is rather simple—Zhelev understands that the BSP leaders are welcome there, while any possible visit of his would take place strictly according to protocol, and would produce no benefit.

Behind the complaint of the head of state lurks his concern over the frequent visits by BSP leaders to Belgrade, and the possible consequences. In just the last three months, Belgrade has hosted Foreign Minister Pirinski, Prime Minister Videnov, Nora Ananieva, and Blagovest Sendov.

Regardless of the claim that bilateral relations are not based on a party foundation, those visits prove precisely the opposite. It is obvious that the Sofia-Belgrade affair is based on the friendship between the BSP and the Socialist Party of Serbia. There would be nothing wrong with this if our national interests were not involved. Milosevic is seeking a way out of the international isolation in which his country finds itself. During the visits by Videnov and Sendov to Belgrade, the hosts constantly repeated how nice it would be on the part of Sofia to help with the integration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] into the international organizations and financial institutions. Both Videnov and Sendov promised this. In exchange, they could demand a solution to the problems of the Bulgarian minority in Serbia, but they did not do that. Obviously led by the thought of preserving the party friendship, both the prime minister and the National Assembly chairman did not invoke the issue.

The Bulgarian and FRY Governments do not hide their wish to develop close Balkan cooperation. However, in this specific case the cooperation would be at the expense of all-European cooperation. The logic—"if Europe does not want us, we will ally"—is not the best in this case. History repeatedly shows wrong choices made by Bulgarian politicians at crucial moments. It is possible that the regime in Belgrade will change tomorrow, and the country find its way out of the isolation. It must be remembered that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was much closer to the West than we were prior to the beginning of the Yugo-war.

Obviously, this is precisely what torments Zhelev. He understands very well that if things continue to develop in the current manner, Bulgaria's best friends tomorrow will again be people like Saddam, Castro, and al-Qadhdhafi. Such friends will not bring us far, and in addition we can forget about integration into Europe.

However, the president must remember that if he is dissatisfied with the BSP's foreign policy, he could balance it.

Bulgarian politicians have obviously still not understood that foreign policy must be uniform, conducted in the name of national interests, and not be influenced by what party is in power.

Bulgaria: Pirinski Said Evading NATO Issue

AU2003155496 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 20 Mar 96 p 1

[Commentary by Milena Boyadzhieva: "Pirinski Is Hiding Because of NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Irina Bokova [deputy foreign minister] replaced her boss Pirinski and departed on 19 March for Prague, where today U.S. Secretary of State Christopher will meet 12 foreign ministers of central and east European countries. On Sunday, Irina Bokova said on the national radio that she will replace her boss because he will be busy with the visit of German President Roman Herzog. However, Pirinski is not a member of the Bulgarian delegation. It is Konstantin Glavanakov who represents him in talks with the guest.

Christopher will brief the first diplomats of the former socialist countries on Washington's position regarding

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NATO's eastward expansion. BTA recalls that today's meeting between Christopher and the foreign ministers was preceded by talks Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov conducted with the foreign ministers of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. BTA reports points out that the opinion prevails in eastern and central European countries that Moscow should not dictate the conditions regarding their admission to NATO. After the Moscow journey of our Prime Minister Zhan Videnov, it became clear that Bulgaria is the only country which takes Moscow's position into consideration. It is against this background that one should view the fact that Pirinski is trying to hide both from Christopher and German President Herzog, who will also discuss the issue of NATO's expansion. Even the regular news conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which takes place every Wednesday, was postponed, again, ostensibly in connection with the visit of the German president.

Bulgaria: Conflict With Romania Over Danube Bridge

AU2003155896 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 19 Mar 96 p 10

[Commentary by Mira Badzheva: "Even After Ioannina-3, There Will Be No Danube Bridge-2"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It appears that even after a Ioannina-3 meeting there will be no agreement as to where the second bridge across the River Danube will be constructed.

The second meeting of the foreign ministers of Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania, which took place near Varna over the weekend, could not settle the dispute on this issue between Sofia and Bucharest. Prior to the meeting, the diplomats predicted that the differences will be eliminated. The Romanians are pulling the rug in their direction, and want the bridge to be constructed in the eastern part of the river. We, on the other hand, want the bridge to be in Vidin [in the westernmost part of the river on Bulgarian territory].

The participants in the Ioannina-2 meeting said half-heartedly that the issue will be discussed again in the autumn in Thessaloniki, which will host a meeting of the ministers of transportation, construction, and telecommunications from the three countries, and who are supposed to discuss again the matter of the second bridge. However, no one has any great hopes any longer. Even Foreign Minister Pirinski pessimistically admitted that the Bulgarian-Romanian quarrel already evokes the ridicule of our European partners. The first Bulgarian diplomat said that we could even have two new bridges across the Danube, but if the construction is protracted any longer the patience of our European partners will be exhausted. If Europe really loses its patience and refuses to give money for the projects, we could forget the whole thing.

Romanian Foreign Minister Melescanu was also not in an optimistic mood after the Varna meeting. "It is very difficult to find new elements in the discussion regarding the bridge, but nevertheless, we must not stop seeking a solution and financial assistance for the project," he said to reporters. According to him, the money for the project could come from private businessmen in both countries, or along the lines of the PHARE and INTERREG II programs.

Most probably Sofia and Bucharest will not reach a joint decision. In such a case, each country would alone construct a bridge and seek money from the West for the project. This would be a very poor solution.

In Varna, precisely like last year in Ioannina, Greece promised to mediate between Bulgaria and Romania to settle the issue. Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos said that Sofia and Bucharest must overcome their differences, and promised that Greece, as an EU member, would help finance the project and contribute its know-how. Our diplomats hope that Athens will support our variant of the project, but Greece will hardly assume a clear position.

However, the support Greece and Romania expressed for our initiative to hold a conference of the Balkan foreign ministers was a clear success of the Varna meeting. If Videnov, who announced this initiative in Davos, succeeds in getting all the Balkan foreign ministers to Sofia, he will improve his cabinet's prestige. This would also help him in the endless quarrel with President Zhelev as to who should conduct Bulgaria's foreign policy.

For the time being no one objects to Videnov's idea. Turkey and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia—FYROM], which were not very happy with the Varna meeting between Pirinski, Pangalos, and Melescanu, gladly agreed to participate in an all-Balkan meeting. The other neighbors also gave a positive answer. Even Slovenia, which otherwise stands aside and claims that it is not a Balkan state, said that it does not oppose the idea and will participate in the meeting. This only confirms Pirinski's words at the meeting, namely that the Balkans should not be divided into southern and northern or western and eastern, but act in a united manner in resolving regional problems.

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Bulgaria: Topencharov Views BSP Attitude Toward Videnov

AU2103091696 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 14 Mar 96 p 9

[Interview with Professor Vladimir Topencharov, a member of the BSP Executive Bureau, by Sevda Dinovska; place and date not given: "We Abandoned Videnov Alone Against Icy Winds"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Dinovska] Mr. Topencharov, do you not have the impression that the BSP plenum on 10 March did not satisfy public expectations regarding a serious criticism toward the policy of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and Videnov's cabinet? Your fellow party members gave many interviews in which they predicted "blows" regarding the crime rate, social policy....

[Topencharov] There were "blows," but not such as certain professional critics hoped for. Many weaknesses were clearly admitted. [passage omitted]

[Dinovska] Do you agree to the prime minister's opinion that this cabinet is the one most attacked in the last six years?

[Topencharov] A cabinet that surfs atop the waves risks no criticism. It is characteristic of Videnov's style to swim against the stream. History will show how successful he has been in this. The prime minister spoke about the lax control along the borders and invoked the need to tighten financial discipline. This affected many interests. Those who lack character are not being attacked! Remember what Parkinson said: A coalition against a strong one is most easily formed.

[Dinovska] So you think that the government is not weak. How come I did not hear you saying that it is a strong one?

[Topencharov] Some of its activities really cannot be described as the activities of a strong government. It has not acted in a categorical manner on many issues—the mass media policy, the behavior of advisers, and the relations with economic groups. Those are issues about which tactful compromises are being made.

[Dinovska] You are throwing stones in Videnov's garden, are you not?

[Topencharov] Yes, and not only in his garden. We, members of the BSP Executive Bureau also are not innocent. Those are elements of weakness.... [passage omitted]

[Dinovska] Could you clarify the thesis according to which in the last year the Executive Bureau has not helped Videnov, and he has been abandoned?

[Topencharov] We all are guilty of this. We left him outside the human warmth that everyone who faces such icy and stormy winds needs. We abandoned him for several reasons. Some people were insulted because they are not members of his inner circle. Others left him alone because they did not want to waste his time.... For a certain period, I even thought that Videnov was artificially closing and isolating himself. This is not true! Simply, many of us did not understand the special sphere in which the prime minister works. Yes, we did not help him enough. [passage omitted]

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Czech Republic: Klaus Meeting With Christopher 'Very Useful'

LD2003183096 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In the course of today's meeting with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, Warren Christopher praised the Czech Republic's progress in the economy and in strengthening democracy, as well as its contribution to the peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia. Here is Vaclav Klaus talking about the meeting:

[Begin Klaus recording] The secretary of state and I discussed several aspects of foreign policy concerning not only Czech-U.S. relations, but the situation in Europe in general. We discussed the anticipated developments in Russia and the Balkans, international policy concerning our neighbors, and so on. It was a very useful exchange of views.

We met before and I think we both were pleased. As the secretary of state said: There are many things we share, and we both believe our dialogue will continue in the future. [end recording]

Czech Republic: 'No Miracle' Expected From Christopher Visit

AU2003155996 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 19 Mar 96 p 12

[Commentary by Lubos Palata: "A Clear Answer for Christopher"]

[FBIS Translated Text] No miracle is to be expected from the visit to Prague by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. He will meet here with the foreign ministers of the countries that want to join NATO, first and foremost, to put them at ease by reiterating that the decision to enlarge the alliance has not been changed. The negotiations on the future of NATO, however, will be held primarily in Russia.

An extremely varied gathering awaits him in Prague. From countries like the Czech Republic and Poland, which hope to become members of the alliance during the next few years, by way of Albania and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], which will wait much longer, to states like Bulgaria, which do not even know if they want to join NATO.

The choice of the Czech capital for the unprecedented meeting says something about Prague's status in this process. It is in appreciation for its clear approach, which has been manifested by active participation in the Partnership for Peace and the international IFOR [Implementation Force] forces in the former Yugoslavia. Intensive cooperation with the Poles has strengthened even more its hope of being among the first that the alliance will accept in its ranks.

Christopher will not come to Prague, however, to read, during dinner, the succession of new members on the list of candidates. He will want to hear for himself the view of the East European countries on the latest Russian initiative, which offers "benevolent agreement" in exchange for restricting the alliance's enlargement by new states to only political membership, and also on the attempts by the United States and Brussels to offer Russia a strategic partnership.

The head of U.S. diplomacy will hear various answers from the heads of the postcommunist diplomatic corps. The Czech one will carry all the more weight. It should be that we are continuing to strive for full membership in the alliance. At the same time, however, our side should state that we support NATO policy that looks upon Russia as a partner if Moscow wants this and if it conducts itself accordingly. If Christopher were to hear only the first part of the answer from Zieleniec, it would definitely not improve our chances of membership in the alliance.

Czech Republic: Klaus on EDU Post, NATO Enlargement

AU2003131096 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 15 Mar 96 p 3

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Stanislav Drahny; place and date not given: "The Decision on NATO Will Not Be Made in Moscow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Drahny] What ensues from your election as a European Democratic Union [EDU] deputy chairman—for you personally, for the Civic Democratic Party, and for the Czech Republic?

[Klaus] The European Democratic Union affiliates not only parties that we would call conservative, but also liberal and Christian democratic parties. This already indicates that it is not 100-percent consolidated and can never achieve such an idyllic unity as, for example, the Socialist International. The EDU is, nevertheless, a unique meeting of the European Right. It is necessary to coordinate views on certain issues. I would not like to stress my election as deputy chairman, but we should also not trivialize it. The fact that one of us could become the deputy chairman of the prestigious EDU in place of current French President Chirac would really have been hard to imagine just a few years ago.

[Drahny] You apparently said in Paris that Russia is not ready for admission to Western structures such as the EU and NATO.

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[Klaus] I was asked if I think it useful for a political party from Russia to become an element of EDU structures. The answer was yes, without a doubt. The biggest mistake would be to isolate Russia. Today, it is essential, more than at any other time, to speak to Russia. Of course, it is not being taken into consideration that it would become part of the "more firm" structures in Europe and the world. Therefore, organizations like the EDU are appropriate for this purpose. If Gaydar's Democratic Choice confirms itself as a fixed star of the Russian political scene, then, in my opinion, it would make sense for it to take part in these forums—for instance, first of all, in the category of an observer; the Union of Freedom of former Polish Prime Minister Balcerowicz became an observer in Paris. The fact that, until today, there was no Polish party in the EDU is an indication of the indecisiveness of the right wing there.

[Drahny] Russian Foreign Minister Primakov has said repeatedly in recent days that he is willing to discuss NATO enlargement toward the East, but only its political and not its military enlargement. What do you think?

[Klaus] I have not the slightest reason to react several times a week to the latest comments made by the Russian foreign minister or any other Russian politician. I am convinced that the decision on NATO membership will indeed be made somewhere other than in Moscow and that it does not make the slightest sense today to discuss the technology for deploying military hardware. There is not the least doubt that our political involvement alone in NATO is unacceptable for the alliance's member countries. We know it, they know it, and I think Minister Primakov knows it.

Czech Republic: Commentary on Role of Military

96CH0068A Prague A REPORT in Czech No 2, 1996 p 2

[Commentary by Vladimir Marek: "Time Is Working Against Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The stormy media debate on the topic of the conception of the Army of the Czech Republic has definitely abated. It would seem that those who claim that the solution of such fundamental questions should best be left to the new government that will emerge from the upcoming elections might be right after all.

What, then, actually happened? Many soldiers—professionals—are faced with new uncertainties. Yet the basic idea of the concept is certainly praiseworthy. At the moment, we are short of resources; the Ministry of Defense must set unequivocal priorities. The Army should cease being a state within a state. In other words, it should leave those functions that it need not carry out immediately to someone else. The dense network of military hospitals was conceived for an army with a different numerical status and one that was completely different in character. Military hospitals partially fulfilling civilian duties and, in order to be properly utilized, taking on more civilian patients than military patients certainly lacks justification. Also, in the area of military education, it should be made unequivocally clear as to what kind of education civilian schools can provide and what kind of education must be unconditionally left to military specialization. And we could go on this way.

But at first glance, purely administrative measures must be ranked in this category as well. The 30-billion-koruna [Kc] budget for this year includes some Kc600 million for military pensions. The fulfillment of such obligations siphons off resources and distorts the actual magnitude of the military budget. For these purposes, the Republic has established a Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. After all, our pensions are financed from social insurance, the premiums for which are regularly deducted from our wages each month.

Under these conditions, time is inexorably working against the interests of the Army. It is no secret that the Army's internal indebtedness continues to intensify. Supplies of ammunition, materiel, and technical resources that the Army of the Czech Republic inherited from its federal predecessor are being slowly, but surely, exhausted. At best, their service life is coming to an end. From the structural point of view, not only is the inventory of barracks facilities deteriorating, but also virtually all military facilities are becoming more and more dilapidated. Enormous resources are required also in solving the housing situation for career military personnel.

The solution of these tasks will surely not be a simple one. However, there is nothing worse than constantly playing catch-up with these problems and putting out whichever fire seems to be burning the most. An attempt to definitively forestall these tasks through specific measures should have to be linked even to a certain pressure from the state budget, in addition to savings within the military.

The majority of the citizens of our country would likely agree that a small, well-armed army would be best. But it is precisely such a machine, which operates at maximum efficiency, that requires substantial initial investments. One small example is characteristic of all. Our radio-technical troops continue to move their equipment on Russian Urals and ZIL's, which consume one liter of gasoline per kilometer traveled. The reason is simple; specialists have computed that the specifically

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higher operating costs will continue to be cheaper for the Army than the possible acquisition of new Tatra cargo trucks. Under these conditions, we cannot be surprised if our Army consumes more than one-half of the budget, together with salaries, subsistence, and uniform costs.

Czech Republic: Foreign Investors 'Faced No Major Problems'

96CH0055F Prague PRAGUE POST in English 20 Feb 96 p 6

[Article by Lubomir Sedlak: "Foreign Investors See Benefits and Challenges"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Despite a recent report by CzechInvest that was critical of Czech incentive policies aimed at enticing new foreign investors, some of the investors already here seem to be happy with the situation as it is.

"We have faced no major problems as a foreign investor in the Czech Republic," said Ian Ferguson, managing director of local cigarette maker Tabak, which is now a member of the Philip Morris group of companies (ranked fourth on our list). The only difficulty Ferguson mentioned is the Jan. 1 increase in the excise tax.

"We consider the increase unnecessarily large," he said. "Nevertheless, in fairness to the government, it has to be said that the final tax increase approved by Parliament was greater than the increase originally proposed by the Finance Ministry."

"We have no problems either," said George Jankovic, area vice president of Pepsi-Cola International for the Czech Republic and Slovakia (14th on the list). "Maybe taxation is one that could be mentioned, but show me an investor, anywhere in the world, that never complains about taxes."

Jankovic said his company has not encountered many bureaucratic barriers in this country, either. "Maybe there were some in the initial stages, when we entered the local market, but I was not yet here at that time," he said.

"We don't think taxes and bureaucracy are that much of a problem, either," said Jacques Sicotte, president of Independent Power Czech Republic.

"I think there are other countries, such as Mexico, China or the Philippines, to name just three, where foreign investors encounter more difficulties than here," said Peter Jones, who is in charge of operations for NRG Energy (NRGE) in this country. California-based Independent Power (IP) and NRGE of Minnesota have joined forces with Stredoceska energetika (STE), a local utility, in order to invest in Energeticke Centrum Kladno (ECK), a heating plant near Prague that also produced electricity (sixth on the list).

Both Sicotte and Jones agree, however, on one problem their companies have to deal with in the Czech Republic: "a lack of confirmed energy structure," as Sicotte put it. "What I mean is that CEZ, the local electricity maker, still has not concluded an agreement with the eight regional distributors of electrical power."

The agreement would set up a pricing structure and a revenue-sharing plan between CEZ and the regional distributors.

The plant in the city of Kladno that IP and NRGE invested in will be supplying electricity to STE, which is a distributor covering central Bohemia, said Sicotte. "We cannot very well plan our financing, because our revenues have to be based on these prices," he added.

With a hint of resignation, Sicotte said that this agreement is something beyond the control of either IP or NRGE. "I guess a certain level of uncertainty is to be found in all emerging markets," he added.

Jones pointed out, however, that CEZ and the distributors seem to be quite close to reaching an agreement.

Commenting on investment opportunities elsewhere in Central Europe, Sicotte said that the situation is much more complex in neighboring Slovakia. "This is because the (Slovak) government policy toward independent power production is inconsistent," he explained.

Tabak's Ferguson hesitated to comment on countries other than the Czech Republic and Slovakia. He did say, however, that "Philip Morris would not have entered its recent agreement with the Polish government to acquire a major portion of the Polish tobacco industry unless the conditions were right for such an investment, which, incidentally, is the largest American investment in the history of Poland."

Jankovic, who worked for Pepsi-Cola in Slovakia before moving to Prague, agrees with Sicotte that the situation in the Czech Republic's eastern neighbor is still rather unclear. "Foreign investors are welcome, but the problem is that privatization is only now in process," he explained, noting that once Slovak privatization is complete, investment from abroad will follow.

Asked whether Pepsi-Cola will cut its investment plans in the Czech Republic if sales elsewhere in the world go down (as happened some time ago with Volkswagen of Germany, which had entered local car maker Skoda auto a.s.), Jankovic answered that, as of now, his company is "right on target, and does not envisage any change of plans."

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Ferguson explained that in the case of Tabak-Philip Morris, the question is irrelevant, because "our investment obligations contained in the agreement between Philip Morris and the then-Czechoslovak government have been completely fulfilled."

Jones of NRGE said that this is not an issue for his company, either. NRGE is a very large "parent" that is doing well both economically and financially, Jones said. Sicotte added that "you can move an engine factory abroad, but not a power station."

Of their total investment commitment in the Czech Republic, IP and NRGE have already spent 1.4 billion Kc ($53.8 million). Most of it went into share acquisition of ECK, environmental studies, as well as legal and financing work that would enable them to put together the investment project.

Pepsi-Cola has invested $65 million in this country, mainly on updating a bottling plant in Prague, but also on such projects as establishing a fleet of trucks and introducing plastic returnable bottles. "As these bottles go, we beat our No. 1 competitor on the Czech market, if only by a week," Jankovic said with a smile, but he frowned somewhat while complaining that Pepsi has to import the bottles, mostly from Holland. "We would very much prefer to have them supplied by a local manufacturer," he said.

Philip Morris' financial investments, said Ferguson, focused on building a new cigarette factory in the town of Kutna Hora, east of Prague, as well as on extensive modernization of Tabak's plants in Novy Jicin (north Moravia), Hodonin and Straznice (both in south Moravia). Other investments went into, among other things, "improvement of existing products and the launch of new products."

Approximately one-third of the Tabak-Philip Morris joint venture's production is exported to Slovakia, Russia and other republics of the former Soviet Union.

Jankovic explained that 30 percent of Pepsi-Cola's production in the Czech Republic is being exported, all of it to Slovakia, where the company does not have a plant. Jankovic then pointed out that "production" is perhaps not the right word, since the concentrate for Pepsi-Cola is being imported from Ireland. "It's one of only two countries in the world, the other being Puerto Rico, where Pepsi manufactures the base for the drink," he revealed, pointing out that operations in the Czech Republic involve merely bottling and distribution.

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Slovakia: Foreign Ministry Rejects Russian Statements

96CH0057B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 13 Feb 96 p 7

[Commentary by Peter Schutz: "A New Model"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kosice—The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MZV SR) has finally crossed its Rubicon. Over the course of several days recently it actually did so twice. On Tuesday of last week the ministry rejected a statement by Kokoshin, Russian deputy minister of defense, that Central Europe should become a neutral zone. Then on Friday the MZV SR "expressed its surprise" over the statements made by Russian Ambassador Sergey Yastrzhembsky in the Czech media.

What was it that actually aroused the surprise of the Slovak ministry? The Bratislava-based ambassador of the Russian Federation had used the Czech media to note, with unconcealed satisfaction, the infinitely higher measure of understanding by Slovakia for the Russian fears based on the expansion of NATO than was the case in other Central European metropolitan areas. The following formulation can be considered as a sort of compact concentrate of his thought processes: "I would even dare say that Moscow and Bratislava have succeeded as the very first pair in the postsocialist region to create a new model of mutual relationships."

The reaction to the ambassador's words is worthy of historical entry—after all, hitherto Bratislava has reacted only to the "unpleasant" stimuli from the West. Yet the matter has its "however" side. First, the disapproving reaction primarily comments on the form of the ambassador's presentation, which it designates as being a "nonstandard effort by a diplomat...to interpret the foreign and security policies of the state...for the communications media of a third country." However, in this regard, the MZV SR misses the mark because to grant interviews to anyone and to use the interviews to express one's views is absolutely standard procedure. What is involved here, however, are precisely these views. The Slovak diplomats are not contradicting Yastrzhembsky in his thesis having to do with the quality of Russo-Slovak relationships. The latter are restricted solely to noting the "priorities of foreign and security policies of the state, including integration into NATO" and "do not grant any other country the right of the veto." However, the Russian ambassador did not cast any doubt on any of that.

But it would be an error to criticize the MZV SR for polemicizing at the level of such declarations. It could not even engage in "direct contact" with Yastrzhembsky: The "new model of international collaboration," which is developing between both of the countries, happened to be the subject of conversation at the highest levels when Vladimir Meciar was the first to speak of it last year in December.

Slovakia: EU Commissioner Insists on Further Reforms

96CH0062A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 27 Feb 96 p 4

[Article by Siegfried Mortkowitz: "EU Head Says Slovaks May Lag Behind in Membership"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Insufficient economic and political reform may exclude Slovakia from a place in the first group of Central European states to hold membership talks with the European Union, cautioned European Commissioner Hans van den Broek.

He made the warning following a Feb. 9 visit to Bratislava, where he consulted with politicians and industry leaders. Van den Broek urged "greater transparency and stability" in Slovak politics, and more "trustworthiness" in reform. He emphasized that Slovakia still lacks freedom of the press and faces troubling problems with the minorities—especially the 600,000 Hungarians—living within its borders.

His scheduled meeting with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar was canceled due to the latter's sudden illness.

Elaborating on van den Broek's comments, European Commission spokesperson Nico Wegter said the EU is "closely following" the progress of democratic reform in Slovakia, and is insisting on certain reforms. "If (Slovakia) wants to join the EU, it will have to satisfy certain democratic and economic standards."

The European Union is scheduled to start talks with applicant countries six months after the conclusion of the intergovernmental Conference of current EU members, which starts in March and is expected to run for about a year, during which time it will decide on the shape of the EU into the next century.

Wegter praised the macroeconomic progress Slovakia has achieved, and was hopeful that a bilateral treaty with Hungary would be ratified by the Slovak Parliament in March. While he criticized the lack of what he called "equal opportunities" in the Slovak media, Wegter said that it was not up to the EU to make specific suggestions or interfere in a country's internal affairs.

"We are not going around like strict schoolmasters," he said. "It is up to the Slovaks to structure their own reforms."

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Ludmila Bulakova, a spokeswoman for the Slovak government, said discussions with the commissioner had been difficult, "and touched upon problems that were less than pleasant." She admitted that "not everything (in Slovakia) is up to European political standards. But we are not trying to avoid this fact. Obviously, we also see that we need a democratic process, but we are doing all we can...to fulfill the conditions for admission to the EU."

Jan Budaj, deputy chairman of the opposition Democratic Union (DU), however, warned that the current Slovak government is violating democratic principles and obstructing the democratic transformation of Slovak society.

"Democracy is fighting for its life in our country," Budaj said. "But its chances of survival are not bad, because it has not lost the support of the public, who still believe it will be restored."

Budaj called on the Slovak government to improve freedom for the mass media, to cease the unconstitutional privatization of national property and to reinstate democratic control over the secret services.

"The people who established the secret services now control them," he said, and urged a thorough investigation of the kidnapping of the son of President Michal Kovac. Members of the Slovak secret police have been implicated in the abduction of Michal Kovac *Jr.*

Budaj went on to praise the EU for "preventing the unconstitutional expulsion of DU deputies from Parliament, and putting the brakes on certain extreme forces, such as the ultranationalist Slovak Nationalist Party."

Although van den Broek met only briefly with representatives of the opposition, Budaj said the commissioner seemed very well informed about the political situation in Slovakia.

Slovakia: First Three Years of Independence Assessed

96CH0057A Bratislava MOSTY in Slovak 6 Feb 96 p 8

[Article by Juraj Charvat: "The Pluses and Minuses of the First Three Years"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the occasion of the third anniversary of the independent existence of the Slovak Republic, the daily PRAVDA organized a public inquiry on the subject of "What Has the Slovak Republic Gained and What Has It Lost in Three Years of Independence." Some of the responses, as tends to be the case, are honest; others are dishonest.

For example, when J. Binder, director of the Water Management Construction Company, State Enterprise, who is one of the greatest experts and a fighter for the Gabcikovo Water Management Project, says that "material gains include the almost $5 billion in the foreign exchange reserve account set aside for the Gabcikovo Water Management Project," this is dishonest. In general, this is the case because specific Slovak material gains cannot show up in a period of three years. There can be no fundamental change in economic development without investments, and if we include the processing of intentions, the design phase, and technical preparation as well as financial support in the investment cycle, then that cycle is long-term in nature. This is also evident with regard to the Gabcikovo project itself, which was being designed as far back as the 1960's. Specifically, this statement is dishonest also because Slovakia could also have had foreign exchange reserves even under the federation, and the Gabcikovo Water Management Project, for the most part, was being developed under the federation and with its support.

Also dishonest is, for example, the argumentation put forward by publicists E. Boldisova or E. Vincourekova, who see Slovakia's gain in the fact that "we have lost the tutors from Prague." They suppress the fact that Slovak tutors were also functioning in Prague. Some were in positive roles, such as Dubcek; others, such as Husak, Bilak, and others, were more consistently like Brezhnev's "normalizers" than was the case with some Czechs, and they chased a large group of Czech politicians to foreign countries or underground. On the other hand, Husak, Bilak, and others took good cuts from the federal financial loaf to benefit investments in Slovakia so as to fulfill the official goal, which called for an accelerated balancing of the economic differences between both portions of the federation. In this regard, Slovak nationalists are being unfair and ungrateful to Husak.

If we are to divide the evaluation of the three years that have passed into a material and nonmaterial area, then the material area will show the shortage of funds as a specific minus quantity—funds that were hard to come by for everything. This shortage will obviously persist for a longer period of time and poses a question: Will there be sufficient resources for investments? This is the only way to ensure future prosperity. For the present, one is living on debt, and paying off this debt in the future will diminish the amount of money needed for future investments. A weaker Slovak economy always produced less money than the more developed Czech economy. When this was pointed out at the time the efforts to break up the federation were culminating, Slovak nationalist economists raised the

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counterargument that this cannot be reliably determined because the financial streams from the federation are intertwined; perhaps this is so, perhaps not, perhaps Slovakia is even paying for Czech success. Three years after separating the financial flows, it is already possible to identify how much money is where, for example, by comparing state budgets, amounts set aside for investments, the level of pensions, but also by comparing the level of profits, wages, salaries, and so forth, in the private sector.

Honest answers in the public inquiry were provided by those who, in the nonmaterial sphere—in other words, in the political area—listed as a gain the acquisition of state sovereignty or the fact that Slovakia gained a chance for a possible opportunity to prove its capabilities to itself. At the same time, they pointed out the opposite side of the coin—they referred to the way in which politics was handled; they pointed to opportunities that we are unable to utilize as a result of our own faults; they referred to amateurism, to the squandering of the creative potential, and so forth.

A specific minus in the nonmaterial area is the fact that instead of developing a full-blooded democracy, we continue to have "our own native party," a political movement that conducts itself like a Stalinist-type communist party. It secures a superior position for itself, it staffs important positions in the state apparatus, it mercilessly forces those believing otherwise out of all positions on the basis of lessons learned regarding *nomenklatura* cadres. This decision pushes the people away from the trough of privatization. It also secures ideological positions for itself forcibly. It wants to have its own institute pattern on the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (the Slovak Matica cultural organization is calling for establishment of a Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and other institutes). The party is creating its own university (at Banska Bystrica) complete with political science departments, where a number of first-year students are being enrolled, whereas at other schools, which do not have nationalistic political scientists on their faculty, first-year classes are not being offered. In line with Stalinist teachings, the party has gained control over public radio and television. It has not overlooked support for the media (as well as for school textbooks), which provides the public with nostalgic reminiscences of a state that, to the very end, had been a faithful ally of Hitler. The state office supports the newspaper of the government movement at the expense of organizations intended for the minorities, and so forth.

The majority of Slovak inhabitants have, for the present, not demonstrated in any way more emphatically that this bothers them. They are also not bothered by the abuses committed by politicians, or by the objective difficulties being experienced by the new state (where there is no money to increase pensions, social payments, wages and salaries, and so forth). Foreign trade is running a positive balance obviously also because people not only do not have any money to spend on imported (more expensive) items, but also do not even want them. The newspapers publish letters from readers proposing that the importation of one or another type of product be banned. That is why, for purposes of evaluating the three years that have passed, it is symptomatic that a strong stratum of the population (mostly the elderly, including pensioners, whose social position is the most wretched) is made up of patriots who provide effective support for the Slovak Republic by voluntarily imposing restraints on themselves, by not making demands, by being content with having their own state, and by making decisions in advance to endure. It is primarily this patriotically motivated social compact that makes it possible for the present government coalition to survive more or less contentedly. Those who are intellectually more demanding in this country have a difficult time, but they are always in the minority within the population.

Slovakia: Proposed Bill 'Threatens' NGO's Existence

96CH0062B Prague PRAGUE POST in English 27 Feb 96 p 3

[Article by Kit Kimberly: "Proposal Threatens Existence, Mission of Slovakia's Not-for-Profit Institutions"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A bill that some fear will place new financial and ideological burdens on the Slovak nonprofit sector could pass into law as early as next month, despite strong opposition.

The proposal, designed to regulate foundations in Slovakia, threatens the existence and mission of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the country, said Andrea Chorvathova of Third Sector SOS, a campaign that is garnering opposition to the bill.

"We are concerned that this legislation would restrict the existence and demonstrated positive work of NGOs in our country," she wrote in an appeal for assistance from organizations that support the "development of a civil society in Slovakia."

The Slovak Gremium of the Third Sector, an advocacy group made up of 17 elected representatives from the NGO community, organized the Third Sector SOS campaign. Members say that, although such a regulatory law is needed, the current bill was drafted with no input from the nonprofit community.

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"We are not against a new law," said Katerina Kostalova, director of the Slovak Academic Information Agency and Service Center for the Third Sector. "But we are against this particular law, which was drafted without open public discussion."

A written statement put out by Third Sector SOS lists 10 reasons why the Slovak bill on foundations is inappropriate. One of the group's main concerns, the requirement of 10 million Sk ($333,000) for a foundation's endowment, has already been dropped to 100,000 Sk, Kostalova said. The original figure, according to the International Center for Not-For-Profit Law in Washington, D.C., would have "effectively (priced) out of existence the entire foundation sector."

Another issue is mandatory year-end audits, which Kostalova said is an unrealistic demand. She noted that meticulous record-keeping is a necessary and even positive element of NGO operations, because it increases accountability for funds, and thus increases credibility for the organization. Official audits, however, can cost up to 40,000 Sk, and are out of the question for very small foundations, such as those that work to buy textbooks or athletic equipment for schools, according to Kostalova.

The bill, say supporters of Third Sector SOS, also restricts political activities and subjects NGOs to too much governmental control by requiring ministerial approval for the establishment of foundations that work in a particular ministry's area. In addition, the bill restricts how organizations can receive and spend resources. It contains no changes in current tax laws, which, Kostalova said, need revision.

"This law is about regulation and not enough about tax law," Kostalova said. Slovak NGOs "have a very limited tax-exempt status, which does not encourage corporate donors."

Currently, the tax exemption for donations to nonprofits is 2 percent for a business and 10 percent for a private individual, the same as in the Czech Republic.

The International Center for Not-For-Profit Law expressed many of the same concerns about the bill as did the Third Sector SOS. The center did report, however, that "in general, we are impressed with the thorough and comprehensive approach taken by the drafters."

There are more than 10,000 nonprofit organizations in Slovakia, which are still governed by a Czechoslovak law and civil code passed in 1990. The law, the first passed by the Czechoslovak government after the 1989 revolution, established citizens' rights to form nongovernmental civil associations to serve their members for humanitarian, educational, recreational and other purposes. The civil code laid out the parameters for a foundation, defined as an endowment of money or property, the resources of which are used to serve the public good.

Neither of these categories, however, allows for the existence of nonprofit organizations that serve the general public (rather than just members), but have no endowment. Until Jan. 1, 1996, Czech nonprofits, like Slovak ones, had to register as either civic associations or foundations. In the fall of 1995, however, the Czech government passed a law establishing a new type of NGO—the nonprofit legal entity or public benefit corporation (obecne prospesna spolecnost). The establishment of such a law in Slovakia could solve some of the nonprofit community's problems, Kostalova said.

Slovakia: Judge on Secret Service Role in Targeting Bishop

AU2003185496

[FBIS Report] Bratislava SME in Slovak on 18 March on page 5 carries a 3,000-word article by Jana Pankovcinova and Juraj Hrabko entitled "Jaroslav Svechota: 'An Important State Interest Is at Stake.'" The article, which is based on the SME editors' interview with an unnamed judge from Banska Bystrica, claims that "the attempt to discredit the church and Bishop Balaz was stage-managed and controlled by the Slovak Information Service [SIS]."

The SME article returns to the police search of the residence of Rudolf Balaz, bishop of Banska Bystrica and chairman of the Slovak Bishops' Conference, on 17 July 1995, several months after the Slovak Bishops' Conference issued a statement in support of President Michal Kovac (10 May 1995). The search was ordered by Ziar nad Hronom investigator Dana Gocikova, ostensibly to investigate the circumstances of the sale of a triptych, entitled "Adoration of the Magi," by the Banska Bystrica Bishop's Office. According to police investigators, the painting had been sold to Thomas J. Grabner, a Swiss national, for $200,000. The search of the bishop's residence resulted in the filing of a lawsuit against Jozef Hrtus, director of the Bishop's Office, on charges of "illicit use of property" (Article 258 of the Penal Code).

The SME reporters stress that "no criminal act" was committed in selling the painting, because the Bishop's Office was selling its own property and because the painting did not feature on the "List of Historic Monuments." They suspect that the whole affair was a "secret service maneuver" designed to discredit the church and the bishop, a fact that they see as "proved" by the "testimony" of a Banska Bystrica judge that the daily obtained.

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In the body of their article, the SME reporters give an extensive account of this "testimony." According to the reporters, a Banska Bystrica judge gave an interview to the daily in which he confirmed the SIS's involvement in the case. SME does not identify this judge by name, but notes that the judge is known to the criminal prosecution bodies and has already testified in the matter before the investigator.

The judge is quoted as saying: "On Wednesday, 12 July 1995, before noon, I was called upon by an SIS employee responsible for the technical aspect of an operation connected with the sale of a painting. His name is known to me. He wanted from me authorization to use information-gathering technical devices (ITP), according to the law on the SIS and the Slovak Republic Police Corps. I was the judge on duty that day. The written proposal consisted of a single sentence: A state interest of utmost importance is at stake. At the same time, this staffer presented to me several official papers—reports on the execution of an operation—worked out by an SIS commanding officer. His name is also known to me. Based on these documents, I had the suspicion that, in view of the extent of the information (it was known very precisely who had discussed what with whom and when), it may have been a case of either legal or illegal deployment of an agent, that the protagonists of the case may have been bugged, or that one of them was in direct or indirect conspiratorial links with the SIS. To be able to legally decide whether this was an operation warranting the use of listening or recording devices, I needed more information than had been made available to me. I therefore told the SIS member that the proposal would have to be supplemented, or that I would need a personal talk with the officer in charge of the operation." The judge goes on to say that a meeting with the commanding officer was arranged, but even this officer was unable to provide any more information. The judge therefore reiterated that he would not be able to decide on the SIS's request unless it was supplemented. The same evening, he was called at home by "a man who introduced himself as Jaroslav Svechota"—who, as the SME reporters explain, is a "high-ranking SIS representative"—who "asked me to authorize the use of ITP for, otherwise, I would be thwarting an important state interest. I told him that I do not know whether or not an urgent state interest is at issue, that I am a judge, and that I need sufficient documents to make a decision. He called me again the next day early in the morning, and asked me again to authorize the use of listening devices or recording by a video camera. I insisted that I would give thought to this only after the appropriate documents had been delivered to me." Even though he did not authorize the use of "ITP," the judge says, "I avail myself of information that the recording and bugging was realized. The offense of abuse of the authority of a public official was thus evidently committed." This is why, in November 1995, he lodged a complaint with the Banska Bystrica Regional Prosecutor over "abuse of the authority of a public official" (Article 158 of the Penal Code). The judge rules out that the authorization to use ITP could have been issued by some other judge. As he explains, "the SIS must turn to the judge on duty, and that was me throughout the week." He also refers to a "secret internal instruction" according to which he was the sole judge in charge of these matters "in the period in question."

As the SME reporters observe, the judge's testimony confirms earlier statements by Oskar Fegyveres, a former SIS agent who had also confessed his participation in the kidnapping of Michal Kovac Jr., the president's son, on the involvement of the SIS in "discrediting the Bishop's Office and Bishop Balaz, in particular."

The SME article also expresses doubts about the existence of the alleged buyer of the painting, Thomas J. Grabner from Dallenwil, Switzerland, alleging that this fictitious buyer of the painting may have been provided by the SIS. The reporters stress that they were unable to trace the buyer and that no person of that name exists at the address cited in the Slovak investigators' file. They also wonder why Grabner "shows no interest" in the picture, for which, according to Slovak investigators, he had paid $200,000.

The judge's testimony is also the subject of a 400-word commentary by Juraj Hrabko, entitled "Not All Judges Are the Same," published in the same issue of SME on page 4. Hrabko views the testimony as a "breakthrough" because it "proves that the SIS was involved in preparations for the 'Adoration of the Magi' operation and acted in breach of law." Hrabko wonders how the case will be handled by the prosecutor and whether the SIS will be indicted.

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Hungary: Privatization Minister Outlines 1996 Plans

LD2003154896 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0800 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the privatization minister [Tamas Suchman], 68 billion forints net revenue can be expected from privatization this year. The interest of this revenue will be spent on the reform of social insurance and health care system.

Tamas Suchman told Hungarian radio that the value of assets to be privatized was 300 billion forints, but a part of these assets would be given to local government and business shares would also be sold for compensation coupons.

The minister also spoke about bank privatization. He thinks citizens will benefit from it for two reasons: On the one hand, the state's risk in the banking business will be reduced and, on the other, privately owned companies will provide services of higher standard and security and are likely to grant more favorable loans to their clients.

Hungary: Increased Popularity of Szekeres, Horn

AU2003133896 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 18 Mar 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "The Prime Minister Has Become More Popular Since February"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Szonda Ipsos company's public opinion poll shows that the popularity points of only one politician, that of Imre Szekeres [parliamentary group leader of the Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP], changed significantly in February. Szekeres's popularity index increased by seven points which also counterbalances the previous month's four-point drop. It is also a fact that the current value of 49 is somewhat higher than the 45-46 points he had in the second half of 1995. Views on Szekeres have improved in all strata of society, by more than the average among inhabitants of Budapest, people with degrees, and among voters of the Alliance of Free Democrats. The four-point increase of Gyula Horn is also worth mentioning, even though this cannot be seen as statistically significant. The importance of this lies in the fact that the prime minister has not had this level of positive change since the parliamentary elections. Mrs. Magda Kovacs Kosa, who is again included on the list, is among the most popular politicians, just as she was in October 1995. She has a favorable image among almost all social, demographic, and political groups. She has a medium-high score even among the most critical group, which is the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party voters. Sandor Lezsak is also new on the list; he takes his place on the lower third of the list. The opinion poll was finished before the MDF's split, and he shows similar popularity score with the competitors in his party; Lezsak who was later elected chairman received 43 points and Ivan Szabo, who was defeated, got 42 from the entire adult population. Lezsak is somewhat more popular among people with a basic level of education, skilled workers, and those with graduation certificates, while people with higher degrees favor Szabo much more. Their popularity was also similar among the MDF's voters; Lezsak got 61 and Szabo 60 points. Out of the MDF members on the list, Lajos Fur's popularity is similar to that of the two politicians who competed for his position: The population gave 42 points and the MDF supporters gave 60 points to him. However, Peter Boross received a lower score in both groups, 35 from the public and 54 from the MDF sympathizers.

Standing of Politicians

	Popularity	Change	Recognition
	In Points		Percent
1. Arpad Goncz	75	+ 3	95
2. Gabor Demszky	62	+ 1	89
3. Gyorgy Keleti	61	+ 2	81
4. Gabor Kuncze	61	+ 2	92
5. Magda Kovacs Kosa	60	—	77
6. Tamas Deutsch	53	+ 1	81
7. Ivan Peto	53	+ 3	87
8. Viktor Orban	51	- 1	91
9. Zoltan Gal	51	+ 2	72
10. Sandor Nagy	50	+ 2	79
11. Gyorgy Giczy	49	+ 1	60
12. Imre Szekeres	49	+ 7	69
13. Tibor Puzessy	47	+ 2	43

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	Popularity	Change	Recognition
	In Points		Percent
14. Gabor Fodor	46	0	89
15. Jozsef Szajer	45	0	50
16. Tamas Isepy	45	+ 2	40
17. Jozsef Torgyan	45	- 1	95
18. Sandor Lezsak	43	—	72
19. Gyula Horn	43	+ 4	95
20. Sandor Csintalan	43	+ 1	61
21. Agnes Maczo	42	- 3	79
22. Ivan Szabo	42	+ 1	84
23. Lajos Fur	42	0	85
24. Peter Boross	35	0	89
25. Lajos Bokros	26	+ 3	95

Hungary: Hajos Socialists Criticize Coalition

AU2003184396 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 19 Mar 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "The Hajos Group Criticizes the Coalition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The decrease of society's confidence in the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] has to be stopped, and the coalition agreement also needs to be reexamined, the March statement of the "Hajos Socialists" declares.

The document was formulated for the party's end of March congress. Some 20 members of the Hajos Socialists held a meeting on 18 March in the deputies' office. Albert Alfoldi, Vilmos Fedor, Ferenc Kosa, Sandor Nagy, and Csaba Tabajdi were among those present. The statement they accepted says, among others, that if the current governmental practice is continued, the MSZP can get into a serious moral and political crisis, and the country can also be swept into a critical situation. "If we try to govern the country while, either under coercion or out of convenience, forgetting about our commitments, we should not be surprised if masses of electors turn away from us, or even turn their backs on us."

The Hajos Socialists suggest that the MSZP's congress should put on the agenda the issue of economic policy, social policy in a broad sense, and social peace; it should assess the coalition government's performance, and should lay down in a concrete resolution how the full implementation of the commitments defined in the coalition agreement's fourth paragraph can be ensured. Based on the experiences so far, they say: coalition, but not at any cost. They consider coalition cooperation necessary, but only in the case and up to the point that the cooperating parties observe adequate self-moderation and mutually respect each other's sovereignty. They state that coalition cooperation makes sense if, along similar goals and even with different interests, it is based on mutual trust. They emphasize that the coalition agreement shows the signs of mutual lack of confidence in many ways. For this reason, they suggest that the MSZP's congress reexamine the coalition agreement and annul the points that are unbefitting of a democratic constitutional state, limit the freedom of the legislators, or are contrary to the Constitution or the laws in force. We should declare, even one-sidedly, that the Socialists do not require any kind of right to veto, and reject such requests of any other party, too. According to the document, the Socialists and their coalition partner should also think about the reasons social support for the bigger governing party dropped by half in one and a half years while the smaller governing party might even have increased its popularity. The document also states that no one can expect the Socialists to implement the program of other parties; especially since they could govern even on their own.

Hungary: SZDSZ Refutes Hajos Group Allegations

AU2003135896 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 20 Mar 96 p 3

[Correspondent's report: "The Hajos Group Does Not Alarm the SZDSZ"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is not true that the coalition agreement is anticonstitutional and contains elements unworthy of a democratic constitutional state; nor is it true that the popularity of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] would be increasing along with the drop in the popularity of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], SZDSZ Spokesman Peter Hack told us on 19 March. On 18 March, the so-called Hajos group of the MSZP discussed the statement proposal that, among other things, declares that the coalition agreement shows signs of mutual lack of confidence on several aspects and, therefore, the MSZP Congress

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should reexamine it. According to the Hajos group, tensions have accumulated between the MSZP election program and the implementation of this program and, therefore, half of the voters who supported the MSZP distanced themselves from the party.

Peter Hack stressed that they regard the statement as the internal affair of the MSZP and the Hajos group did not cause any particular anxiety in the SZDSZ. According to Peter Hack, the majority in the MSZP think differently about the coalition than the Hajos group. Peter Hack told us that the coalition has proved to be an operational formation in the past two years, so it would be wrong to endeavor to break it up.

Monika Lamperth, deputy head of the MSZP group in Parliament, told us that she had not read the statement and, therefore, she can only refer to the information that appeared in the press. Monika Lamperth thinks that we should deal with working out the state administration reform and legislating economic laws, rather than reviewing the coalition agreement. She added that the coalition parties were carrying out the government program and, therefore, it is wrong to conclude that the MSZP is carrying out the program of another party. According to Monika Lamperth, at the same time, nobody can be fully satisfied with the implementation of the government program.

Albert Alfoldi, spokesman of the Hajos group, told us that they added professional supplements to the proposal and the MSZP deputies could sign the text beginning with last evening. Alfoldi hopes that some 50-60 deputies will sign the statement and the MSZP Congress will discuss it. Albert Alfoldi pointed out that, in his view, the fact that the coalition parties' representatives must coordinate their amendment proposals with the coalition partner is an illegal element in the coalition agreement. "Nobody can doubt that there is tension between the original MSZP program and its implementation," Albert Alfoldi pointed out.

Hungary: SZDSZ Next Electoral Performance Predicted

96CH0047A Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 26 Jan 96 p 11

[Article by Laszlo Keri and Istvan Stumpf: "SZDSZ Silence and Waiting"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In May 1994, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] emerged from the elections for the second time as the country's second strongest party. After the spring of 1990, it succeeded once more in recruiting millions of voters, but in the individual voting districts this considerable base was mostly enough for second place which, in the current Hungarian election system, has very little benefit. Thus, they had to be content with fewer seats in parliament than before. Is this result a success or a failure? After a sober evaluation of the events leading to the election, they had more reason to be content.

True, four years ago they were in the contest for the final victory almost until the last moment, but they lost a considerable number of their supporters in the period between the two elections. By now it has perhaps been forgotten, and therefore it is not uninteresting to remember, that the Free Democrats doubled the number of their followers in the beginning of 1994, in the course of the two or three months immediately preceding the election. This result was primarily due to the fact that they had the most professional campaign, and that a clear majority of the population wanted to replace the government, and finally that they showed the least animosity towards the Socialist Party which earned a victory beyond expectation.

Thus, the question of forming a coalition, which had only been mentioned sporadically before, became a problem of primary importance, of such a magnitude that it squarely divided the leadership of the more important political camps. Not a few of the Socialists vividly remembered the humiliation they suffered a few years earlier; moreover, having achieved 54 percent, this marriage did not at all seem unavoidable. Among the Free Democrats, the anticoalition camp was also fairly loud in the beginning, but at the highest party forums the overwhelming majority finally voted with an unequivocal "yes." Subsequently, on the opposition side, everyone cried treason, but in the given situation this had no significance, and thus, no influence, either.

The coalition negotiations, and the agreement itself, suggested a promising cooperation. However, not too much time had to pass to demonstrate that the prime minister and the Free Democrats can only cooperate through regularly recurring crises. First, in December 1994, it seemed that the barely tested coalition would be dissolved in no time; another crisis occurred in February 1995, and finally, at the end of the summer it seemed that the coexistence in the government was impossible to salvage. Each time the issue was whether the government head could exercise his sovereignty without the SZDSZ. In each case, they were able to resolve the tense situation by mutual compromise. On the one hand, the SZDSZ had the image of a very disciplined party in these conflicts. On the other hand, one can hardly claim that these disputes helped demonstrate their ability to govern, or that the camp of their voters was especially impressed by the series of their determined but regularly withdrawn threats. (A series of analysts think that the entry of Balint Magyar

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into the government will raise the coalition questions in a completely new light, and will make other contacts possible—today one can only speculate.)

In the course of the one and a half years since the 1994 elections, the image of the SZDSZ has not been characterized by dramatic changes. The most noticeable issue is perhaps that from the position of the second most popular party, they were relegated to the third place. (In the following, based on the monthly reports of the polling agency Szonda-Ipsos, we will compare the data of the period between September 1994 and December 1995.) In the last analysis, their losses are not too great. In the Fall of 1994, they would have received 19 percent if people were to vote for a party, and in December, 17 percent. The overwhelming majority of their former followers increased the camp of nonvoters, and only very few of them went over to the Smallholders and, to a lesser extent, to the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ]. The details of the loss which, at first, does not seem to be too serious, are extremely instructive. For instance, among the 18-33 age group, this decrease amounts to 10 percent, but among people with a college degree and in white-collar and management positions it is even more obvious, 12-13 percent. The growing distance is the "result" of the months after the Bokros package, and goes hand-in-hand with the plummeting popularity of Gabor Fodor. All of this suggests that the leaders of the SZDSZ at that time did not succeed in making the groups which most trusted them accept the constraints of government and their reasons.

However, the Free Democrats continue to maintain their good position among people with a secondary education, the 34-49 age group, and white collar workers in lower positions, which suggests that the shifting of the basis between the two elections signaled a durable trend. Thus, they will continue to have hopes for retaining their position as a party of the middle. This is supported by the data of secondary preference. Although today in this field the SZDSZ is behind the FIDESZ, still, its secondary acceptability is wide. However, it is remarkable that in every social group in which the change of opinion usually augurs trends which will later become widespread, thus, Budapest voters, college-educated people, intellectual leaders, and young people, the secondary party sympathies show an increased competition between the SZDSZ and the FIDESZ.

It is even more advantageous to pay attention to this lurking conflict if we include the indices of party rejections in our analysis. While the disapproval rates of the MSZP and the Smallholders have grown beyond 20 percent by now, those of the SZDSZ remained at a negligible level, only 2 percent (just as those of the Young Democrats).

Even this sketchily described trend is perhaps sufficient to forecast that the Socialist-Smallholder polarization (since these are today the two most liked, or most disliked, parties) might be followed by an SZDSZ-FIDESZ contrast. A finer analysis of support to the parties in the past two years makes the growing significance of this second pair of antagonists very possible.

It is a great question how the SZDSZ would react to such a turn of events. The alliance of 1993 and its quick dissolution left them with an experience which is difficult to process for the leadership and the followers of both parties.

In such a situation, the Free Democrats would have to redefine their own role, and their relationship not only with FIDESZ, but also with all the remaining parties. One can only hope that every concerned party learned enough from the consequences of the futile ideological war of 1990-92. Since then, the SZDSZ has acquired enough government experience to realize that this is not what matters, even if they would prove better in such a fight. The real contests of the coming years will be decided by which party will be able to show a credible and widely acceptable alternative to the government.

Hungary: MDNP Leader Szabo on Party's Position

AU2003171596 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 16 Mar 96 p 8

[Interview with Ivan Szabo, head of the Hungarian Democratic People's Party, by Gabriel Oszy-Toth; place and date not given: "The Opposition Is Destined for Cooperation: Ivan Szabo on the Split, the Wave of Changing Sides, and the People's Party Not Being a Mass Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ivan Szabo is now a politician of the Hungarian Democratic People's Party [MDNP] in Parliament, as he founded a new party and parliamentary group with 14 of his fellow deputies. We interviewed Szabo on the reasons for the separation and the chances of the MDNP's survival.

[Oszy-Toth] During the campaign for the election of the chairman, both candidates emphasized that they did not fear a split in the party, and that the minority would have to accept the majority's will. In the end, this is not what happened, and you left the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and founded a new party. Had you prepared a scenario for the split in advance?

[Szabo] A new situation arose at the MDF's last national meeting; due to the "atmosphere" that evolved

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on Saturday [2 March] evening, spontaneously, some 170 delegates gathered in the MDF's 11th district headquarters. Most of those present were experienced local government representatives or mayors, or chairmen of county and large town organizations. At the meeting, it became obvious that after what had happened, some of these organizations wanted to join the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] or the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [FIDESZ-MPP], and some organizations even considered dissolving themselves. These delegates said that after the election of the new chairman and the executive committee, they would not have any room for political maneuver in the future.

[Oszy-Toth] What do you mean by "after what had happened" they became uncertain?

[Szabo] In a peculiar way, at the national meeting, a political debate did not precede the election of the leadership, and intolerant remarks were shouted in; the list of names for the executive committee only contained Lezsak [new MDF chairman] supporters. A split among the delegates became obvious: We had to decide whether we would allow the left-out politicians to go away, the party wasting their intellectual values, or we would somehow keep them together. On Sunday afternoon, the parliamentary group held a session to decide this issue. Finally, we decided to set up a new party.

[Oszy-Toth] In my view, you would have had the chance to be part of the executive committee. Why did you not use this opportunity?

[Szabo] At the meeting, the delegates tried to vote our people out from among the already elected members of the regional executive committees—and they almost managed, short of one or two votes. Then, the following day, only Lezsak's supporters were listed on the green nomination papers, we did not even have a chance for the participants to vote for anyone else. Only Jozsef Szabo, one of our men, said that he would attempt the impossible, and he remained in the executive committee. He participated in the first executive committee session after the election, managed 10 minutes, then stood up and left. He told us that it is impossible to imagine the atmosphere which dominated that session.

[Oszy-Toth] Why did you not set up a platform within the MDF?

[Szabo] In my view, we would not even have had a chance to have a say in the party's affairs; as a matter of fact, I was against this version. Being in minority in the MDF, I was not going to play the role of the one who disintegrates the party, as had been done by others.

[Oszy-Toth] Many people believe that it was not correct to leave the party and set up a new one, because this weakens the opposition.

[Szabo] This is completely wrong. It is certain that 25 to 30 percent of the MDF would have left the party after the election of the chairman, which would have taken away the voters, too. Today, the biggest problem in Hungary is that half the people do not at all choose a party. If the MDNP can address 25 to 30 percent of these people, then this expands the opposition's voting base.

[Oszy-Toth] Other parties of the opposition also count on the votes of the so-called "nonvoters...."

[Szabo] In the past two years, the range of those who do not select a party has increased; the opposition parties have had a chance to address them but they could not....

[Oszy-Toth] So the MDNP will be the party which is able to lure the nonvoters. Do you not think that you are overly optimistic? Past examples show that those who leave a party become marginalized.

[Szabo] Reactions prove that people are fed up with the six-party structure and are seeking something new. At the moment, we have some 2,000 members and, interestingly, most of them did not come from the MDF. Those who have already settled their affairs in the MDF and wanted to join us are already here. However, many people first want to settle their unfinished business and only join after that. Therefore, we can expect a major wave of changing sides in the coming months.

[Oszy-Toth] According to Gyorgy Gemesi, executive chairman of the MDF, 1 or 2 percent will leave the MDF.

[Szabo] In my view, at least 25 but more likely 30 percent of the MDF's membership will join the MDNP, and this means some 8,000 to 10,000 people. There is a significant movement because whole local governments, together with their organizations, have come to us.

[Oszy-Toth] Who are the major figures in the MDNP?

[Szabo] I would only like to mention a few names from among those who did not come from the MDF and are founding members: Gyorgy Granasztoi, academician Jozsef Palinkas, and Ferenc Rabar [former finance minister]. As a matter of fact, I agree with FIDESZ Chairman Viktor Orban's opinion that the chances of moderate, calm, and predictable opposition policy have increased with the launching of the MDNP. It is by no accident that [FKGP Chairman] Jozsef Torgyan reacted extremely vehemently and irritably to the new party, because his election chances have decreased with our appearance.

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[Oszy-Toth] It is interesting that while Lezsak said that the MDF had to be turned back into a people's party with a broad mass base, you set up this people's party. What makes you a "party of the people"?

[Szabo] The public is confusion in connection with this: People's party and mass party are two different things. Mass parties always appear as parties of a particular stratum; we do not divide society, we would like to address the conservative thinking people in all strata of society. On this basis, even a 100-member party can be a people's party, and an 800,000-member party a party of a stratum: The size of the membership is not decisive.

[Oszy-Toth] Will the MDNP be a party of the provinces or Budapest?

[Szabo] Representatives of all counties are present among the founding members, therefore, we can certainly claim to be a national party. We say that we are a party of the Hungarian citizens' equality of opportunity, in other words, it makes no difference whether someone lives in the provinces or in Budapest. We believe that all citizens must be given the chance to work, be educated, become an intellectual, have steady living conditions, acquire property, and receive health care. Actually, we want nothing other than what we adhered to in the MDF but, preserving the heritage of Antall [former MDF chairman] and Lakitelek [MDF's meeting place], we want to step forward in history; in our calendar, 1996 is followed by 1997 rather than 1987.

[Oszy-Toth] What relationship will the MDNP have with the MDF?

[Szabo] A united center right can be achieved if all parties give up some of their sovereignty; only those can surrender their sovereignty who have it. We did not have this kind of sovereignty while we were within the party. In my view, after the split, it will be much easier to set up an alliance. The opposition parties are destined for cooperation. This is politics, not love: On the basis of our value systems, we have an obligation to cooperate. I am convinced that right-wing cooperation will exist by the time of the next elections.

Hungary: Lezsak Distances Himself From Torgyan

AU2003134696 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 19 Mar 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Lezsak's Answer to the Smallholder Chairman"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Sandor Lezsak, chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], if the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP] considers the country's interests and the replacement of the government to be its most important tasks, then it is possible that its "rhetoric" will not be desirable for very long, even for itself. Lezsak said this in his reply letter written to the FKGP on 18 March. As is known, FKGP Chairman Torgyan broke his contact with the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party, the MDF, and the Hungarian Democratic People's Party last week because of a program of the Duna Television channel. In addition to this, he asked the MDF's chairman in a letter to let him know if he distances himself from what had been said in the ominous program and if he is ready to work together with the FKGP. In his letter, Lezsak said: He is still ready for local-level cooperation between the MDF and the FKGP, and, at the same time, he does not support a political force which recalls the demons of the past decades in its rhetoric. Torgyan's rhetoric, as was mentioned by Executive Chairman Gyorgy Gemesi in the Duna Television's program, is harmful because it can provoke a similar tone by the government parties. At the same time, it is also the opposition's obligation not to assist any kind of extremism, and not to endanger the country's basic stability, Lezsak writes. In his letter, he also said that he is especially sorry that the FKGP's chairman is unable to control his personal passions.

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B-H: Sacirbegovic Voices Disappointment With Ankara Meeting

AU2003144996 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Mar 96 p 5

[Unattributed report on statement by Muhamed Sacirbegovic, Bosnian ambassador to the United Nations, in Ankara; date not given: "Enough of Compromises at the Victim's Expense"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ankara, 18 March—After the United States' miscarried attempt to organize collection of means for arming the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Muhamed Sacirbegovic, personal representative of President Izetbegovic, made a brief statement for NOVA BOSNA.

"Too much armament was not a cause of the war, but it was rather too much armament in the wrong hands. This, I guess, the representatives of the EU should know, who are against arming the federal Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, there were not enough arms for our defense and resistance to the aggression. In order for us to achieve what our neighbors already have, the federal army should obtain technical means and weapons, whereas the Serb and the Croat sides should reduce their capacities at all levels. First, the arming and training program would make it possible for the Federation to demobilize as much as 80 percent of the soldiers who were mobilized in war conditions, while at the same time we would be able to provide accommodation for the reduced number of soldiers in barracks, as the Dayton accord anticipates. So far, we have been able to parry the Serb advantage in arms only by great manpower," Sacirbegovic pointed out.

He underlined that the basis for integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Western defense system, including NATO, should be established.

"Those who view the program of arming and training only in terms of an increase in the overall amount of arms in the region have not proposed any alternative, and even this time their arguments go only at the victim's expense. Citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina made painful compromises when the peace was signed with the aggressor, and I guess they have deserved to be able to say: Never again!," Sacirbegovic said, without hiding his disappointment with the behavior of the EU representatives, who failed to understand the essence of the problem again this time.

B-H: Belgrade Says Izetbegovic Responsible for Camp Crimes

AU2003142996 Paris AFP in English 1414 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 20 (AFP)—Belgrade has named Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic as a war crimes suspect, according to a senior war crimes official quoted in press reports here Wednesday.

The rump Yugoslav government has also compiled a list of 5,362 mainly Serbian victims of war crimes committed in Bosnia and Croatia during the break-up of the former Yugoslavia.

Reports said Zoran Stojanovic, who heads a government commission probing war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, has accused Izetbegovic of twice visiting a camp in Celebic, southern Bosnia, where hundreds of Serbs were detained.

The camp was run in 1992 by Zdravko M., a Bosnian Croat arrested in Vienna on Monday and identified later as Zdravko Mucic by the Bosnian Serb authorities.

The head of the Bosnian Serb war-crimes commission, Miroslav Toholj, said around 30 Serbs had been killed in the camp.

The Belgrade commission said Izetbegovic had "objective responsibility" for war crimes allegedly committed at the camp, according to criteria of The Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

Separately, the commission said it had collected numerous witness accounts accusing the Croatian army of machine-gunning 52 Serbs fleeing Croatia's Western Slavonia region during a lightening attack on rebel Serb areas last May.

B-H: Silajdzic: Peace Process Heading in Wrong Direction

AU2003140096 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Mar 96 p 20

[Unattributed report: "Implementation of the Peace Agreement Is Moving in the Wrong Direction"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 18 Mar—Haris Silajdzic, former prime minister in the Government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, stated yesterday that the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreement is moving in the wrong direction, in the direction of disintegration rather than unification of Bosnia-Herzegovina. "The Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreement has set the borders of the entities and cantons, and not the outside borders

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of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are the guarantee of its survival," Silajdzic said at the forum discussion organized by "Krug 99" ["Circle 99"], a group of independent intellectuals in Sarajevo.

Explaining the preelection program of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Silajdzic said that "this party has existed for 1,000 years, as long as Bosnia has existed."

"Considering that there is no longer any space or time for power struggle, we want to unite the people who strive for a unified Bosnia, a free and normal country. Members of the party are not those who want to see Bosnia-Herzegovina divided," Silajdzic said.

Silajdzic said that as soon as conditions have been created for it, the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina will set up its branches in Banja Luka and all other towns in which the forces favoring a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina could rally together.

B-H: Authorities Blame Serbs for Bombings, Arson

AU2003140396 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by A. Terzic: "Pardoned Serbs Are Carrying Out Sabotage Raids"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the arrival of peace, the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina are facing new deadly dangers that threaten them wherever they go. All over Bosnia-Herzegovina people are getting killed on almost a daily basis by mines and other explosive devices that the [Serb] aggressor left behind. The largest number of victims are children, who, carried away by play, do not look where they are walking. Within just 48 hours in Sarajevo, Sanski Most, and Zenica, there have been three major sabotage bombings. The Bosnian authorities hold amnestied Bosnian Serbs responsible for these.

It seems that, despite the warnings and efficient actions taken by the responsible bodies, accidents still happen. In three different places in Bosnia-Herzegovina within just 48 hours, there have been major explosions.

The bomb exploding in Sarajevo at dawn on 11 March happened at the Ferhadija Mosque. The blast considerably upset the citizens living in the city center. The following day, at the Zenica bus station, a large fire broke out in which five of the most modern buses burnt up, together with part of the bus station, while additional explosions were resounding for quite a while from around a nearby gas station and the railroad station.

A day later in Sanski Most, following the election of retired General Mehmed Alagic as mayor, there were major fires and damage that were most probably the result of sabotage. A number of office buildings burnt down. The Privredna Bank building caught fire, as did many apartment buildings.

After all this, the question arises as to whether the amnesty of all suspicious people was handled all too easily and carelessly.

B-H: Conflict of U.S., Iranian Interests in Bosnia Viewed

AU1903164696 Sarajevo SVIJET in Serbo-Croatian 14 Mar 96 p 9

[Commentary by Vlastimir Mijovic: "Caught in the Middle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Relying exclusively on its own powers, Bosnia-Herzegovina could not resist the powerful aggression against its territory. It had to look for allies, friends, and helpers abroad: political, diplomatic, military, media, financial.... Bosnia-Herzegovina had to strike back at Serbia, which was supported by Russia. In almost all matters, Croatia could rely all the time on its advocate, Germany, which was becoming increasingly strong. Only Bosnia had nobody. It did not have its true protector. Some time ago, it offered its hand to the United States of America and the so-called Islamic world. The problem was that the United States did not want Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the latter were not powerful enough, generally speaking, to offer Bosnia powerful and reliable support.

A natural political selection, so to say, thus turned into a huge problem. It does not arise from Bosnia, but from very complicated relations between Washington and the Islamic part of the world. All this becomes even more complicated once we know that out of the Islamic countries the worst U.S. enemy, Iran, supported Bosnia the most. Bosnia came into a situation in which it very much depended on friends who cannot stand one another. The motives behind the Washington and Tehran activities in Bosnia, as well as the way in which they acted, were different. It is a fact that for the first time after their conflict in 1979, the United States and Iran were on the same side of the front, in Bosnia. They helped it to survive Judgment Day. However, when the great rains passed and the umbrellas were folded up, the old enemies started to recognize themselves. The Bosnian land became too small for the both of them. One of them has to leave.

The West thinks that Iran could take its belongings and leave. This decision was made in Washington, but its implementation was ceded to Sarajevo, which had huge problems with it. Not only politics, but also morality were at stake. On the one hand there is the undoubted U.S. power and dictate, and on the other considerable

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Iranian foundations. Bosnia, which has debts to both of them, is caught in the middle. The time to make a decision has passed already and one does not seem to have been made. Prime Minister Muratovic claims that there are no Iranian mujahidin or military instructors (which were the biggest problems for the United States) in Bosnia any longer, apart from those who became Bosnian citizens through marriage. Washington is not happy, however: Its media disclose secret instructors and terrorist camps every now and then. The Bosnian Government has received repeated requests to solve that problem. The State Department is officially threatening to abandon the announced military help for the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nicholas Burns warns that "the Bosnian Government should reject the idea that every connection with Iran could be useful." Also without prompting from the United States, Bosnia should know that not "every" connection with Iran is good, so that it need not agree to "every" connection.

Washington has nothing against the strengthening of political, cultural, and economic contacts. The question is, however, whether Iran wants to and can stay only at that level. The recent visit of Hasan Muratovic to Tehran was probably used in order to search for an answer to that question. Contradictory military connections were not mentioned at all; both Bosnia and Iran responded positively to the U.S. ultimatum, and waived that kind of cooperation. Does the difficulty lie only in that issue, however?

Obviously not. Washington does not like practically any Bosnian connection with Iran as it lifts the blockade from the country that was put under global political quarantine after the United States pronounced an anathema on it. For the sake of the United States, countries much more powerful [than Bosnia] have no contacts with Iran. And Bosnia is especially sensitive, as the Iranian influence is felt in Europe, an area in which it was not present before. During the time when Persia was the biggest empire on earth, two and a half thousand years ago, King Darius I came as far as Trakia in Bulgaria. But there was no Islam at that time, and there were neither Europe nor the United States in the present sense of the word.

Everything going on today arises from the present circumstances. The United States is the measure for everything; Iran is a synonym for Islamic fanaticism and international terrorism. The United States is afraid that a greater influence by Tehran in Bosnia could be a springboard for greater Iranian influence among the growing number of European Muslims. The United States is fighting against that problem, forgetting Bosnian counterarguments. Politics is, after all, not a battle of arguments, but a battle of interests.

It is not a coincidence that we speak about U.S. calculations and interests in this context. They have become the unalterable framework within which Bosnia can think about some of its own interests, even about his relations with Iran. No country, even if it as small as Bosnia, could be proud of that. But pride is the currency that has never been especially valuable in politics.

B-H: IFOR Occupation of Business Offices Problematic

96BA0146A Sarajevo SLOBODNA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jan 96 pp 12-14

[Article by Adnan Butorovic: "Sarajevo Is Too Small for Two: How IFOR Has Occupied Business Premises in Sarajevo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *At the beginning of the war the B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina] state, having not looked at the teeth of the "UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] given to them," agreed to host its soldiers free of charge, supplying them with electricity, telephones.... Today, with IFOR [Implementation Force] having arrived, the same agreement is in effect, so practically all elite premises in Sarajevo are occupied. Some, nevertheless, have succeeded in charging the costs for renting the premises to IFOR and other international organizations.*

The problem came to the surface only when the Forces for Rapid Intervention—IFOR—began to flood the premises of two entities, at the same time as the demobilization of a large number of members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of B-H, and efforts to move to a market economy. Although the IFOR soldiers came as assistance for the implementation of the peace agreement, they quickly became a burden for some.

Everything really began in the spring of 1993, when the state leadership of B-H agreed with the arrival of a large number of UNPROFOR units, because the assessment of the Supreme Command then was that foreign soldiers would contribute to stopping the brutal attacks of the aggressor, especially around the besieged city. Upon arriving in Sarajevo, the majority of the French, Egyptian, and Ukrainian forces were placed in "caserne"-type facilities, which were also facilities of social, i.e., state, ownership. In addition to the "Jajce" caserne, those in Bistrik, and the "Marshal Tito" caserne, UNPROFOR soldiers, for lack of space, also occupied the Skenderija SKC [Sport and Cultural Center], Zetra, Post 2, the former club of delegates, the Territorial Defense building, the Engineering PTT, the airport with its related infrastructure, and a location near the RTV [radio-television station] of B-H. For this they concluded a number of individual agreements with domestic enterprises.

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The actions of military units were followed by the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees], the International Red Cross, and over 100 humanitarian organizations, which occupied and leased business and production capacities of legal entities. UNPROFOR had a legal basis for occupying facilities of state ownership in an agreement of May 1993, which, in the name of the state of B-H, was signed by the president of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, and under which the Bosnian side assumed the obligation of providing lodging, electricity, water, and gas to the international forces without any compensation. It was probably assumed there was no time to lose, and a plan for placing these forces was not even prepared, so the peacekeepers were able to choose exclusive locations in the very center of Sarajevo.

Living on Rent

We should not forget that economic facilities ceded their free and partly devastated premises, not only to foreign organizations, but also to commands and units of the Army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Naturally, it is not so important to whom enterprises gave their capacities to use and how many they gave, but whose ownership was abused. A large number of Sarajevo businessmen, as well as businessmen in other parts of the republic, entered into social ownership before the war, completely or in a certain percentage, and during Ante Markovic their parts were bought into private ownership or enterprises were converted into share companies.

In the confusion of undefined property ownership relations and without a law on privatization, which the Federal Assembly was about to adopt, state and city structures did not gain insight into the agreements that each enterprise entered into internally with foreign organizations, not taking into account whether there was perhaps a state part in an individual lease.

Neither the city nor the republic government has documentation on these agreements; this has tacitly made it possible for directors and members of administrative councils of enterprises to commit various types of machinations. Where the state "made a profit" from these agreements is taxed rent, while the remainder was left to "internal things in the work collective." And the war situation itself, in which workers and managers ran off abroad, to the aggressor's side, and mostly to the trenches, enabled the smaller number of remaining administrative cadre to reorient themselves to pure profit without work and production. In this way the economy survived!?

In Sarajevo this type of business policy was carried out by, for example, UNIS [Associated Metal Works], UPI [expansion unknown], Feroelektro, Sipad, "Olimpijski Centar" [Olympic Center], and other firms; this can be justified due to the blockade situation, among other things. However, after the Dayton initials and legal provisions on categories of soldiers for demobilization, workers began to seek work in their prewar enterprises.

Therefore, who will employ the approximately 17,000 former fighters of over 45 years in age, whom the Army will soon release, and where will they be employed? Living on rent evidently creates a perspective for the minority that the whole war keeps enterprises at zero.

What the Agency Is Doing

It is difficult to say in what manner monthly rent was paid and how many square meters of space were actually ceded of the number designated in the agreements, but the fact that there has been compensation for rent in other forms is indisputable. First of all, enterprises took rent in the form of oil, which quickly appeared with smugglers in markets, and then, instead of paying money, UNPROFOR soldiers transported bought goods of enterprises when transportation was most uncertain and most expensive, and, finally, themselves brought in various goods and sold them to purchasers. What did the city have of this?

As far as is visible, it was not particularly interesting for them. In contrast to Sarajevo, the Konjic district collected $2 million in monthly rent of about $65,000 and in expenses paid for communal services from a Malaysian battalion in the past two years. In Vitez and Tomislavgrad, as well as in Tuzla, units of a British, Canadian, and French battalion were good payers.

Only in mid-December 1995 did the idea evolve of taking better advantage of the arrival of IFOR, and, during talks between premier Silajdzic and Michael Steiner, it was agreed that all premises within the city area would be rented through a direct city agency.

The "Agency for Renting Premises and Employing Workers in IFOR," whose acting director is Hajrudin Smajic, divided locations for rental into three zones, depending on distance from the city center, and rental per square meter of space varies between 10 and 25 German marks [DM], or according to how "interested parties" agree. From the price reached, the agency takes a commission for brokering, with the aim of meeting the material costs and personal incomes of its workers.

At the moment, the agency has 30 requests for renting facilities, mostly from foreign diplomatic representatives appointed to B-H and from IFOR units, to which it is difficult to respond positively. So far the problem of accommodating the Italian battalion, which pays

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DM35,000 monthly to the Kosevo Clinical Center, has been resolved, as has that of a team of 85 persons of Karl Bildt, who rented the second and third floors of the Feroelektro building. In addition to this, the Olympic Center has extended its agreement with Zetra, so that IFOR soldiers, for now, are remaining in the Olympic facility with an obligation to renovate it. The city is also offering the Bjelava and Nedzarici student homes, whose capacity, with renovation, is 2,000 beds, as well as facilities that must be turned over to the federation on 31 March.

City of the Future

The placement of British in hotels in Ilidza, about which dust has been raised, as if it is welcomed by city council members, except for the fact that the rent, through an illegal agreement, will go to the Serbian side, because exclusively facilities on still temporarily occupied territory can be offered to accommodate 6,000 IFOR soldiers and 1,500 international policemen. But a deeper problem in this is that the city has no conception how, after the departure of IFOR, it will change the purpose of the numerous "caserne"-type facilities. No one knows how to answer whether they want to open commercial complexes, gambling houses, museums, concert halls, or something else in them. One must remember Eagleton and his statements about how to "plan the future," because of which a number of "experts" have been demobilized who have still not submitted to the Republic Federation Government an accounting of the costs for modifying and building the "future Sarajevo."

In an effort to speed up renovation of Sarajevo and other parts of B-H, about which the German minister of defense, Volker Ruhe, warned the civilian services of peacekeeping troops, the Federation Government has put its signature on a "List of Technical Supplements," or a set of agreements by which IFOR will assist in the area of employment, providing services, telecommunications, health, legal advice, market procurement, mine clearing, bridging rivers, transportation, and compensation for damages that their services have caused. If Bosnia did not use UNPROFOR to the degree that neighboring Croatia did, we should not miss the opportunity called IFOR. According to a spokesman for the Rapid Intervention Forces, Croatia took in 7.5 million dollars just from IFOR on 19 December 1995.

[Box, p 24]

IFOR Must Leave Skenderija—Interview With Sadik Hasanbegovic, General Director of the Skenderija Center Joint-Stock Company, by Adnan Buturovic

[Buturovic] Can you say, Mr. Hasanbegovic, to what extent UN forces have inflicted damage during their stay in the Skenderija facility?

[Hasanbegovic] I won't go into how much the UN helped this city, but I agree that the Skenderija Center has suffered huge damage since soldiers of a French battalion have been lodged on our premises. The three-member commission of the civilian part of UNPROFOR, which came from Zagreb, fixed the damage at $3.5 million that has been caused by these soldiers during their stay. While they carried out an inventory of the damage, commission members were twice apprehended and detained by officers of the 4th Battalion, allegedly because of unauthorized movements and entering parts of Skenderija for which special permission is required. In fact, they wanted to prevent them from confirming the damage.

[Buturovic] What part of Skenderija is the French battalion holding and what are the types of damage?

[Hasanbegovic] UNPROFOR has occupied a part of Skenderija that was festively opened for the 1984 Winter Olympics. In addition, they took part of the economic building and part of a level on which there are about a hundred shops, but which they treat as a secure zone. Our heating plant has been completely destroyed; it was disassembled and the parts taken away, as were electrical and plumbing installations. Some 40,000 square meters of the roof were damaged and 4,000 meters of glass broken, and the premises in which the soldiers are staying are almost open to the sky; water from rain and snow pours into them, damaging floors and walls. The facility is collapsing. In talks with the battalion command, they told us that they "didn't come here to rebuild Skenderija"; we agree with this, but it is not clear to us why they don't protect the property in which they are living from further deterioration. A colonel of the French Army does not want to put glass in the windows of his office, regardless of whether he freezes when temperatures are low.

Nevertheless, Skenderija Center has concluded an agreement with the French battalion according to which they are required to make certain payments to your enterprise.

[Buturovic] Are they paying you rent on the property?

[Hasanbegovic] They aren't paying any rent. They constantly point to an agreement with our state according to which they are guaranteed free lodging and utilities. The UNPROFOR has always defined the property on which they are staying as state property, although there are

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facilities there owned by Skenderija. Under agreement with the French battalion, Skenderija Center employed 31 workers to maintain the facilities whom UNPROFOR pays $200 monthly, which altogether amounts to $6,200. They assumed responsibility for paying debts for electricity, water, and gas used, and to pay for possible damage, but they have not settled even half of that.

[Buturovic] What did you do, in view of this, at the moment when UNPROFOR converted to IFOR?

[Hasanbegovic] At a meeting of the Administrative Council of the Skenderija Center Joint-Stock Company on 29 December 1995, we made a decision that IFOR cannot remain in Skenderija. We advised the Agency for Property Rental and the State Committee for Relations with the UN about this in writing. In our case, both the city and the federation must understand that Skenderija is the only facility in the main city suitable for congresses, trade shows, and sports-recreational and cultural activities.

[Buturovic] How do you plan to take care of the "unpleasant tenants"? When representatives of the JP [expansion unknown] PTT were confronted with a similar problem, Minister Muratovic joked, telling them to seek a solution in court, call the police and the Army, and cut off UNPROFOR's electricity and water in their project, and they'd get out?

[Hasanbegovic] We cannot compel IFOR forces, which have doubled in size so far in Skenderija, to leave. Our agreement with the French battalion expired on 20 December 1995, and we are asking the authorized city agency to intervene for reaching a new agreement with IFOR. If the state says that they must stay, we will seek rent amounting to DM450,000 monthly for 50,000 square meters of open and closed space.

B-H: Manager Says U.S. Troops Seized Farm, Caused Damage

AU1903091696 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 11 Mar 96 p 11

[Article by E. Huremovic: "The Americans Broke In Without Asking Permission"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The implementation of the Dayton agreement in Kalesija is proceeding without any major problems. Federation police have taken control in Memici, Hemlijasi, Bulatovci, Zelina, Jelovo Brdo, and Vis, territories that were militarily held by Serbs and have now reverted to the Federation. The Kalesija municipality leadership's relations with IFOR [Implementation Force] were without any major problems, but lately the municipality's authorities and IFOR have not been enjoying such harmonious relations.

"Storm" on a Farm

"The problem arose when members of the U.S. Army in the center of Kalesija, without any consultations and without asking for permission from the municipal or cantonal authorities, seized for their own needs all economic and other objects suitable for their accommodation, which has made our return to Kalesija harder," says Fikret Suljkanovic, the deputy mayor of Kalesija, who adds that the top cantonal and state authorities have been familiarized with this problem.

The example of their occupation of the cattle-breeding farm in Memici, together with all its facilities, shows that the Americans are behaving "like cowboys"; the capacity of the farm is 800 head and it is owned by PP [private company] "Spreca." The Americans fancied having their barracks exactly there and members of the 3d Cavalry Battalion of the U.S. Army, in their own style, enacted a sort of "Desert Storm" to disarm the security guard at the farm. The guard was thrown off the farm, out of his working place, and the Americans proceeded to start building their barracks.

Fahrudin Delic, director of PP "Spreca," has this to say about the problems with IFOR:

Damage to the Value of 1.3 Million German Marks [DM]

"They informed us and the municipal leadership that they would be staying there for only seven days and that later they would be moving to the Serb entity. But it has already been longer than seven days and they are still there; by all accounts, they have no intention of leaving. Our facilities were badly damaged by the war and now they have been completely ruined by these IFOR members. The total damage that they have caused is estimated at DM1.3 million," Delic claims and continues: "We have tried to overcome these problems, but they behave in a very arrogant way. They invoke an agreement with the state on the free use of all state-owned objects. We have let them know clearly that we are a shareholder company and that the workers are the owners of the facilities, machinery, and livestock. To that we were told that, if we believed that we were in the right, we could sue them, and that in Washington. But the fact is that, because of this case, they have engaged an army lawyer and this shows that they are aware of their mistake. This problem must be solved on a higher level."

The only companies from Kalesija to have managed to sign a contract with IFOR and to get any money from them are the DD [shareholder company] "Unis-TOK" and the DD "Plastikal." A contract has been signed for three months with the possibility of an extension.

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B-H: Joint Military Teams Launch Facility Inspections

AU2003203296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with the Vienna agreement of 26 January, the two entities have launched joint military inspections.

One inspection team—led by Germany, with inspectors from Denmark, the Czech Republic, and one member from the Serb Republic—last week started facility inspections on the territory of the Federation. Another inspection team, led by France with inspectors from Switzerland and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is carrying out inspections on the territory of the Serb Republic.

The OSCE and the inspection teams assessed these inspections as successful.

B-H: Army Issues Statement on IFOR-Led Meeting in Ilidza

AU2003193096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The joint military commission for the implementation of the Dayton agreement held a meeting today at the Implementation Force [IFOR] headquarters in Ilidza. The delegation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army was led by Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army General Staff. Gen. Zivko Budimir led the delegation of the Croatian Defense Council, and Gen. Tolimir led the Serb side. The meeting was chaired by Gen. Walker, commander of the land forces.

The meeting concerned the sides' meeting of the D+90 deadline, the movement of troops in the transfer areas and the concentration of the air defense systems. The disbanding of checkpoints was also discussed, as were measures to be undertaken concerning the D+120 deadline.

It was concluded that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army had met its obligations completely, and that cooperation with IFOR was correct and in the spirit of the set rules. The obligation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army to concentrate air defense facilities has been met in full. Certain issues that are relevant to meeting the deadlines in the last stage of the peace agreement implementation were also discussed, says the report by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Press Center.

B-H: Spaniard Reportedly Likely To Replace Koschnick

AU2003193596 Paris AFP in English 1857 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, March 20 (AFP)—Ricardo Perez Casado of Spain, a former mayor of Valencia, is likely to succeed the German Hans Koschnick as the European Union administrator of Mostar, in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, diplomatic sources said here Wednesday [20 March].

"Spain officially presented the candidacy of Mr. Perez Casado on March 18. He is still the only candidate and it is therefore highly likely that he will be asked to succeed Mr. Koschnick," the sources told AFP after a meeting of permanent ambassadors to the European Union.

A formal decision on Koschnick's replacement is to be taken at a meeting of EU foreign ministers on Monday.

Koschnick resigned last month as EU administrator of Mostar, divided by Bosnian Croats and Moslems after a bitter 10-month war between the two communities. He had held the post since July 1994. EU administration of the city is due to continue until the end of the year.

Perez Casado, 50, was mayor of the eastern city of Valencia from 1979 to 1988.

B-H: WEU Denies Increase of Joint Patrols in Mostar

AU2003154296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Mar 96

[Report by Mirsad Behram from Mostar]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After the reports that an agreement was reached yesterday on the increase in the number of joint police patrols in Mostar, WEU [Western European Union] police spokesman Howard Fox made a statement today.

He stressed that the number of mixed patrols had been increased a few weeks earlier from six to eight, and that yesterday two more Croat policemen were sought to improve the work of these patrols, so it was most likely just a mistake in translation.

The WEU office today also said that four persons had been arrested. On Monday [18 March] they had kidnapped two employees of the Tuzla Tehnogradnja company. As the WEU statement says, the two were maltreated, and—according to the Mostar police station—they had 500 German marks stolen from them. As the WEU statement says, the European police and the police from the western part of Mostar worked on this case together. [passage omitted]

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B-H: FRY Allegedly Offers Lease of Bar Port to Sarajevo

AU2003162996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Mar 96

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Ambassador to Croatia Kasim Trnka by Nada al Issa in Zagreb on 20 March—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [al Issa] The interstate agreement with the Republic of Croatia on the leasing of the port of Ploce to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be signed by the government of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I ask Mr. Kasim Trnka, Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador in Croatia, why the agreement cannot be signed by the Federation government?

[Trnka] We have to recall that two years ago, when the [words indistinct] Washington agreement, was an agreement on leasing a part of the port of Ploce to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina [words indistinct]. Of course the same agreement said, and this can be verified, that this agreement would be made on behalf of the Federation by the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This has become more obvious after the Dayton agreement. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the international legal subject. From Dayton on it has been called just Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the powers of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been clearly stated [words indistinct].

[al Issa] However, in the Croatian public, at least, there are claims that the leasing of the port of Ploce to Bosnia-Herzegovina will jeopardize the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia.

[Trnka] I would like to take this opportunity to say that tensions have been unnecessarily heightened, particularly in the Croatian public, over this issue allegedly jeopardizing the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia [passage indistinct]

[al Issa] As we have said, Bosnia-Herzegovina wants the agreement on the leasing of the port of Ploce signed as soon as possible, otherwise some new solutions might be sought. In this connection, I have just learned from the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] bureau in Zagreb that the FRY is ready to lease the port of Bar to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: IFOR Says Bosniaks Deterred From Returning to Jajce

AU2003142396 Paris AFP in English 1406 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sipovo, Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 20 (AFP)—At least three empty Moslem houses have been set on fire in villages near the Croat-dominated town of Jajce in central Bosnia, deterring the return of Moslem refugees, an IFOR official said Wednesday.

Major Doug Wallace of IFOR's civilian affairs office said the houses just outside Jajce and in Smionica 30 kilometres (30 miles) to the northeast were burned down late Monday, he said.

He would not speculate on who was responsible but said the vast majority of Moslems hed fled the formerly mixed area.

NATO-led peacekeeping troops had stepped up patrols in the area to deter further arson attacks, he said.

"Military patrols have been sent to try to deter further attacks. It's not something we want to see. Many of the houses have been badly damaged but if there are any half-way decent ones, we don't want them destroyed so their owners can't come back," he said.

However he said "it does not appear to be a systematic programme of destruction."

Moslems could in theory return to the area under the terms of the Dayton peace accords for Bosnia, he added, "but at the moment the risks are obvious."

B-H: Zivinice IFOR Liaison Condemns Destruction in Area

AU2003210396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 20 Mar 96

[Report by Naida Hasimbegovic from Zivinice]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. Hamzalija Bajric, chief of the Zivinice office for cooperation with the Implementation Force [IFOR], sees a lack of possibilities for establishing better cooperation in the fact that IFOR was deployed even before the office was formed, in their takeover of land and facilities—particularly the Dubrave airport and the mines of Djudjevik and Visca—and their lack of readiness to cooperate more closely.

IFOR is stationed in seven camps on the territory of the Zivinice municipality. They are well away from one another, so the already poor roads have been completely destroyed. Because the main road is constantly being used, 13,000 citizens of the seven communes between Basegovci and Turkovici has to use an inadequate detour road to get to the city, while the villages of Kupirusi, Otorovici, and Sahici would have been cut off, had not the Visca mines stepped in.

Takeovers of land and even private property have now become commonplace in Zivinice. If Tuzla, as the center of the mining area, profits from the use of the facilities and land, Zivinice, whose roads and facilities

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are being systematically destroyed, is not getting any compensation. Financial compensation has only been agreed upon with 12 citizens of Dubrave, as the people could not only not enter the area, but could not even approach the surrounding facilities.

The municipal office for cooperation with IFOR was tasked to mediate in employment, but then the U.S. organization (?Brown and Rudd) appeared, so now the office and the municipal employment bureau do not even have access to employment of people by IFOR. Of all the Zivinice municipal business, only the zoning institute contracted a modest deal for the construction of a plateau in the Visca camp.

B-H: RS's Kasagic Seeks Guarantees on Return to Sarajevo

LD2003204696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1710 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Obrenovac, Yugoslavia, March 20 (TANJUG)—Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb Republic—R.S.) Premier Rajko Kasagic said Wednesday Serbs could be expected to return to Sarajevo only if they were assured the Muslim-Croat federation would guarantee them life in peace and full freedom, which it has not done so far, even in so many words.

Speaking to the local radio station in the town of Obrenovac near Belgrade, Kasagic said there should be no illusions that Serbs would return soon.

According to figures of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees about 50,000 Serbs fled from Sarajevo's five Serb municipalities, and only about 10,000 remained there, fearing life under the jurisdiction of the Muslim-Croat federal authorities as of March 19.

According to R.S. figures, about 140,000 Serbs have moved out of Sarajevo since the war began in April 1992. There were 155,000 Serbs in Sarajevo according to the 1991 census.

Kasagic said his republic expected a greater engagement on the reconstruction of the devastated country in the second phase of the implementation of the Dayton peace accords.

He pointed out that the international community was asking that two conditions be met before it approved funds for reconstruction—privatization and elections.

'Regarding the first (privatization), we shall very soon propose a series of system-related laws, and, regarding elections, there is no reason not to meet the set deadline (from June until September this year),' he said.

The Muslim side would like to extend this deadline, but Republika Srpska would like elections to take place even before this deadline, so that a chance could be given to fresh forces and even fresher ideas, people who have not tired of all this, Kasagic said.

Kasagic said he believed the ruling Serbian Democratic Party and the R.S. Socialist Party stood the best chances of winning the forthcoming elections in Republika Srpska.

B-H: Belgrade Weekly Views Elections in Bosnia

96BA0205A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 96 pp 10-13

[Article by Srboljub Bogdanovic and Nenad Novakovic, and interviews with Dr. Biljana Plavsic, of the SDS, by Jovan Janjic, and with Dr. Dragutin Ilic, of the Socialist Party of the RS, by Velimir Bozic; places and dates of interviews not given: "Sloba in Pale"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *It will be a contest between three teams shooting two balls at three goals in which, as things stand right now, both Mladic and Karadzic will participate, and where, in the RS [Republic of Srpska], the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], the SRS [Serbian Radical Party], and the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] are regarded as having the best chances.*

The Dayton agreement has seen to it that the Serbs will not endure ruin this year, at least not as far as the elections are concerned. According to it, elections to the governmental institutions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as elections for the two "entities," must be held by no later than September. It is being predicted, however, that the deadline will be extended because the international community itself will not be able to complete the preliminary work necessary to ensure that the elections are adequately fair.

The best way to conjure up an image of the elections to the parliament of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (which is what the Dayton agreement calls this political creation) is to imagine a soccer match with three teams shooting two balls at three goals. In addition, the players have the right to wear whatever color jersey they want. When the agreement was signed in Ohio, naturally the most important thing was "to stop the war," but now that the time has come to implement some of the provisions formulated back then in order to achieve some sort of compromise, those who are supposed to implement them can do nothing but wring their hands.

"Torpedoed"

The basic legal, but also technical, problem that the organizers will encounter is the compilation of the

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voter registration lists. The Dayton agreement does not explicitly require that a census be conducted, but it is very likely that one will be. The census would include all of the refugee population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, wherever they are now. Refugee citizens would vote in the elections for the entity in which the municipality that they left is located. The goal of this process is no doubt to anticipate the refugees' return to the places from which they fled.

What does this mean in practical terms? Imagine the elections in "purely Serb" Glamoc, which geographically is part of the Muslim-Croat Federation, which means that its refugee citizens are supposed to vote in the elections in the Muslim-Croat entity. It is not important whether they wish to return to Glamoc, and whether they wish to return at all: They have a right to vote regardless of that. According to Vesna Petrovic of the Center for Human Rights, who is also an expert in the field of international law, experience thus far indicates that no more than 30 percent of the refugee population has returned to its homesteads.

According to the agreement, the organizer of the elections is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which is also supposed to set out the "rules for the elections," but it is already known that those rules will stipulate a proportional electoral system as well as elections held on the same day for the two "entity" assemblies (the Republic of Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation), plus the joint parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The standard-bearer of international subjectivity is the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the institution with the greatest authority is the Republic Assembly, comprising what the Dayton agreement calls a House of Representatives of 42 people's representatives, of which one-third are representatives from the RS, and a House of Peoples with 15 members, of which five are from the RS. One particular absurdity pointed out by Vesna Petrovic is the fact that this otherwise very "civic" constitution, the very essence of which is that it treats all inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina as citizens and thus does not divide them according to national affiliation, stipulates that the Muslim-Croat Federation delegation to the "House of Peoples" must comprise five Croats and five Muslims.

Two-thirds of the deputies elected from each "entity" to each of the houses will be able to block any resolution by the Assembly, even if it was adopted by a qualified majority.

If everything discussed thus far seems too complicated to the NIN reader, we would note that the Croats and Muslims have it even harder, because their federation (and this is probably why it is called a federation) consists of cantons with their own separate assemblies and with a defined relationship toward the federation. Fortunately, it is not essential that we delve into that. Suffice it to say that even the biggest civic enthusiasts are predicting that even if the Serbs do not torpedo the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that state will inevitably be sunk as a result of the relations within the Muslim-Croat "entity."

Psychological Battalion

Nevertheless, the operation to save Bosnia-Herzegovina undertaken by the international community and triumphantly concluded in Dayton and Paris presupposes the survival of this country as a multinational community, and future efforts will clearly be aimed at achieving that goal. The international community's possibilities in this regard are not negligible, if we recall that the election commission and the entire election process will be organized by the CSCE. With the help of IFOR [Implementation Force], teams of journalists will be allowed to travel throughout the entire territory of the country, with numerical parity. The media will be prohibited from propagating hatred and inciting war and nondemocratic methods of struggle. For those who ignore this, the CSCE Commission has the option of removing them from the list of political organizations. Political organizations will be registered by the election commission formed by the CSCE.

The international community has made plans to set up its own electronic media. It is making no bones about the fact that priority will be given to those options that support a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also on the scene is a "psychological-propaganda" battalion of NATO, whose goal is to encourage and direct public opinion in the desired direction.... Otherwise, as regards those who can run for office, the agreement stipulates that those about whom there exists "well-founded suspicion," according to the findings of the Hague Tribunal, that they are responsible for war crimes may not be candidates. It is interesting that as things stand now, this does not apply to Mladic and Karadzic, since legally their behavior is still under investigation and they have not yet achieved the status of "well-founded suspicion." In this regard, the signing of the Dayton document signifies definitive recognition of the legitimacy of the Hague Tribunal by the RS and FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], so that all subsequent relativization and evasion is absurd.

Of course, the announcement of elections in the RS is inducing feverish activity by political parties in Serbia. Those who did not have political organizations in the Republic of Srpska in the past have begun to form

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them. At their Belgrade headquarters, various parties are attempting to demonstrate the decisiveness of their presence in the RS. The common denominator of all parties from Serbia is that their ultimate goal is to integrate the RS into the political structure of the Serb motherland, which is, in fact, a possibility that the Dayton agreement does not mention, but that it also does not rule out, according to some interpretations.

The SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] recently announced the seemingly bizarre idea of participating in the elections in the Muslim-Croat Federation as well. This decision might have looked like a symbolic contribution by that party to support a multiethnic and civic Bosnia, but party spokesman Ivan Kovacevic says that in no sense should this be regarded as a renunciation by the SPO of a common geopolitical framework that would include Serbs on both sides of the Drina. "There are large numbers of Serbs still in the Muslim-Croat Federation, and we want to be present everywhere that there will be people who will support our program." All the more so since, as we have indicated, the voters in the Muslim-Croat Federation will include those who physically fled it head over heels.

"For understandable reasons," Ivan Kovacevic cannot say what political groupings the SPO is negotiating with in terms of a possible coalition, but he does say that there are many such groupings, especially in the Banja Luka area. A little more information is provided by SRPSKA REC, the unofficial publication of the SPO, where the chairman of the Liberal Party of Banja Luka, Miodrag Zivanovic, whose party is regarded as a representative of the political center in the RS, says: "Naturally, as parties of the democratic center, the Serbian Renewal Movement and the Civic Alliance have the best chances."

Detrimental Unification

It must be said that the creation of preelection coalitions will be a political imperative in the "Dayton" elections. Precisely because he wanted to avoid atomizing the electorate, the foreign lawmaker (they say that the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was written by a Finn) provided for a parliament with a much smaller number of popular representatives, in which Serbs from the RS will have all of 14 of their own people (in the House of Representatives).

Aleksandar Vucic of the SRS discusses the political picture in the RS: "There are three relevant political factors. The first and strongest—here I would say most serious—is the Serbian Radical Party. For that reason, there is not even any reason for us to enter into preelection coalitions, while after the elections that is possible. After us are the SDS and then the SPS—the latter only because of the media publicity that they enjoy and the force that they apply."

This rough survey of the situation fails—perhaps—to take into account the parties of the civic center, which, after all the troubles that have befallen Bosnia-Herzegovina, would nevertheless attract some more significant numbers of voters. The assessment of SPS strength is also confirmed by the aforementioned Miodrag Zivanovic, who links Milosevic's influence to the people's forebodings: If war breaks out again, let us have someone to rely on. The "parties of the center" will certainly be nearer and dearer to the hearts of the international organizers, which means that they will be able to count on their support. That is also something that the SPS of the RS is counting on, because President Slobodan Milosevic emphasizes that "the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina must be strengthened." On the other hand, the Socialists of the Republic of Srpska say that their ultimate goal is to unite with Serbia. Milosevic's statement is intended for the international public, while the statement by the SPS of the RS is intended for the domestic public. From this one must conclude that the "eventually unified" variant is more competitive on the domestic scene.

Even now, there are strong indications that the attitude toward unification with the motherland will certainly not be unambiguous. In his interview, Zivanovic says openly that such integration would not be in the interest of the citizens of the RS. To quote him in somewhat greater detail: "We will be a region—let us accept the possibility that this entity unites with Serbia—destined exclusively for war. For the umpteenth time, we will be a military frontier. Our sons will be singled out only for carrying guns. We will be a region that is unattractive for any sort of investment, especially for the inflow of foreign capital, because we do not have our own capital.... The result will be the situation in Serbia itself, i.e., in the FRY, which is certainly not great, and ultimately we will end up deceiving ourselves. When I say that it is certainly not great, I am thinking most of all of the state of the economy, which has been exhausted by the many years of sanctions and by the regime itself, which even without sanctions took plenty of negative steps. And then, of course, there are the numerous unresolved political problems of Kosovo and Vojvodina."

Goran Vesic, the coordinator of the Democratic Party [DS] for the RS, says that his party decided to form in the RS as well because it felt that "there is room" for it there. The program of that party (or of those parties; technically, since they are two separate states there should also be two separate parties with their own separate structures) regarding the RS presupposes the

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creation of a unified area in terms of the economy and culture and in all other regards, so that, as Vesic says, "unification can occur at an auspicious time." Vesic's assessment of the local population's attitude is that "these people have a national orientation, and that is normal."

It is interesting that, as the DS coordinator revealed to us, the Americans have already carried out a survey of public opinion in Bosnia-Herzegovina and concluded that right now the national parties would do well in the RS and in the Croat part of the federation, which does not please them. Vesic believes that this is one of the reasons why the elections will not be held by the planned deadline, which is in September. Vesic says that the DS, "of course, is not thinking about how it can come to power in the RS," but it is interesting that he regards as one of the main motivations for the RS populace to lean toward the Democratic Party the fact that the DS would be a "window on the world" in the Republic of Srpska, because of that party's "European orientation." In other words, the DS should be the guarantor of national goals ("integration"), but in a "European" manner.

When it is pointed out that this seems contradictory, because for now Europe and the world are not showing any inclination to support the variant of Bosnia-Herzegovinian disintegration, Vesic responds: "Why would it be contradictory? Remember that for decades the Federal Republic of Germany did not acknowledge the existence of East Germany, because it did not want to accept the fact that Germany was divided into two different states."

Despite its unquestionable similarities to the DS in terms of its proclaimed ultimate goal, the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS] has its own reasons for why it will not expand its activities to the territory of the RS. "Dispersing Serb political strength would be counterproductive, and regardless of all the mistakes that the SDS has made, it has been the legitimate representative of the Serb nation for all this time," says Predrag Protic, the vice chairman of the DSS. Still, Protic says, the DSS will not be completely absent from that region, "where it has a good reputation"; instead, it will support all national and democratic parties that advocate strengthening all ties with the motherland and weakening ties with the Muslim-Croat Federation, in hopes that "one day there will be national integration."

Socialist Veto

Nevertheless, the Dayton agreement must be regarded most of all as a document whose primary intention was to bring peace. The internal contradictions and things left unsaid in that document are such that a literal interpretation of it will probably be abandoned, in certain parts, by the very people who insisted on it most, in that very form. As Vesna Petrovic says, the sort of state that it provides for "is not impossible, but there is no practical example of that sort of thing." Because of that, our politicians, too, should not be ashamed to admit that there is much about the elections in the RS that they are not clear about—even those who are supposed to conduct the elections are not clear about them.

Nevertheless, the parties have already defined their political priorities in the RS, and if nothing else, these elections should be regarded as an instrument of the struggle within Serbia itself. Perhaps the postponement of the decision to call for elections here (they were expected in the spring) was motivated by the desire for the ruling party to first establish itself as a political factor in the RS as well? Regarding the SPS strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Goran Vesic says that that party is not very interested in the elections to the "entity" assemblies, which do not have any significant authority; "rather, it is interested most of all in capturing one-third of the Serb votes in the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina." With that one-third, Vesic believes, the Socialists could keep the other Serb deputies from blocking resolutions by the Bosnia-Herzegovina parliament, which is a possibility that the Dayton constitution provides for.

That is how things stand in this early phase of the Dayton agreement. There is more, but there is also plenty of time to talk about that. For now, it is enough for us to begin preparing psychologically for the soccer match mentioned at the beginning of this article.

[Box, p 11]

Serb Affairs

According to information provided by the Basic Court in Banja Luka, there are 24 officially registered political parties and organizations in this territory. They are: the Farmers Yugoslav Party, Gradiska; the Unified Socialist Party of Yugoslavia, Jajce; the Farmers-Workers Party, Kozarska Dubica; the Serbian Renewal Movement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Banja Luka; the Green Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina for Banja Luka; the Party of Democratic Reforms of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Banja Luka; the Serbian Democratic Party "Fatherland Front," Banja Luka; the Liberal Party, Banja Luka; the Serbian Radical Party, Banja Luka; the Serbian Patriotic Party, Banja Luka; the Serbian People's Party, Banja Luka; the Socialist Party of the Republic of Srpska, Banja Luka; the People's Radical Party of the Republic of Srpska, Banja Luka; the Workers Party of the Republic of Srpska, Banja Luka; the New Serbian Idea of the Repub-

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lic of Srpska, Banja Luka; the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia of Bosnia-Herzegovina; the Party of Serbian Unity of the Republic of Srpska, Banja Luka; the Party of Serbian Orthodox Harmony, Celinac; the Party of Serbian Patriots, Kozarska Dubica; the Krajina Democratic Party, Banja Luka; the Party of Economic Rebirth, Banja Luka; the Republic Committee of the United Left of the Republic of Srpska, Banja Luka; the People's Party of the Republic of Srpska, Banja Luka; the Radical Party "Nikola Pasic," Banja Luka; and the Party of Independent Social Democrats of the Republic of Srpska, Banja Luka.

[Box, pp 12-13]

Salvation in the National State—Interview With Dr. Biljana Plavsic, of the SDS, by Jovan Janjic

With the introduction of the multiparty system in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the three leading national parties each became movements, because each of the three nations voted for "its" party. Thus, even people who would be more inclined to support some other alternative ended up voting for those three parties (the SDS, the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]), or joining them. Dr. Biljana Plavsic is one of the founders of the Serbian Democratic Party.

[Janjic] What is your view of the party situation in the Republic of Srpska?

[Plavsic] Parties are shooting up like mushrooms in this territory. That is not unusual. It is also happening in the FRY. In fact, we are talking about the same nation here. You know the old saying, "two Serbs, three parties," so this sort of thing could be expected. The opposition parties are making big preparations for the elections that are supposed to be held in the fall. That is especially noticeable here in Banja Luka. In fact, we had planned to hold elections once the war was over. What is symptomatic is the fact that some of them are in a big hurry.

[Janjic] Whom do you mean specifically?

[Plavsic] The parties of the leftist bloc have become more active in particular. Why, just today I read in the newspaper a statement by Mr. Dragutin Ilic, the chairman of the Socialist Party of the RS. He says in POLITIKA that the nationalist parties currently in power in Bosnia-Herzegovina lost their legitimacy not only by opting for war in 1992, but also through their opposition to holding elections one year ago, in keeping with constitutional provisions. He lumps the SDS together with those other nationalist parties who provoked the war! He did not even try to understand all the troubles that the SDS endured, on the eve of war, in its mighty efforts to prevent war. You know what all we did to keep it from happening. We put forward a bunch of proposals to avoid the looming atrocities, but they accepted none of them.... To accuse the SDS and lump it together with the other two parties who were preparing for war even as we were negotiating with them to prevent war means that he (Ilic) is thus repudiating that which is clear to everyone, that the war was forced on the Serbs.

Or the other charge—that we have opposed the holding of elections for a year! Please try to imagine what it would have been like if elections had been held a year ago, at the height of the war! It would have been chaos, it would have been a massacre.... Forcing such trouble on one's own people—that would have been horrible. You can imagine how the Serb nation would have reacted. I am convinced that many of them would not have even gone to the polls, which would have been justified, because when someone is holding a knife to your head, when the whole world is attacking us, Mr. Ilic would have us organize elections!

[Janjic] What do you think of statements by Socialists to the effect that putting the state structures in Serbia and Republic of Srpska on the same level would pave the way for Serb unification?

[Plavsic] The Serbs here would be the happiest about the motherland taking us in. There exists something above these ideologies that is much more valuable—the awareness that we belong to one nation. That is the basic approach and ultimate goal of the SDS. But how can that be when the motherland, or rather its regime, does not want us?! Among Serbs today there is a somewhat abnormal attitude to the question of national affiliation. The cosmopolitan parties emphasize as their advantage the fact that they show understanding and love toward the entire world, while giving vent to overwhelming hatred of their own people. I do not know how any sort of unification can be achieved in view of that sort of attitude toward one's own people?!

[Janjic] It appears that the blockade on the Drina does not apply to Socialists and Communists in their visits to the Republic of Srpska!

[Plavsic] (Laughs.) It appears that route has been open the whole time.

[Janjic] Is the SDS preparing for the elections?

[Plavsic] It is. And we must prepare well. I think that is the most important thing now, because only a national party, if it wins the upcoming elections, can preserve what has been achieved. The Dayton agreement offers us major opportunities as well. Everything depends on

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how things are done. Will we watch out for Serbdom, will we make sure to extract as much as we can from the Dayton agreement, will we consider the victims who have fallen for all this, the victims who fell in the struggle against our enemies, but really also for the Serb state.... It is clear to any illiterate old woman that the lives of Serbs are protected only in a Serb national state. I think we are all aware of the situation: If the leftist parties win the elections, it will be horrible. Everything that has been created will be ruined, just like that. We no longer have any confidence in them. They had 45 years to show what they can do.

The SDS must first of all thank certain people who did not exactly behave as they should have and according to the law, even if it was amid this vortex of war. Every war has generated some profiteers. Many of them are convinced Serbs. There were some of them who helped the SDS, the military, at the front.... If necessary, plaques should be erected for them, with their names in gold letters, but just let them go away so that they are not an "eyesore" to the people, let them be more far-removed from the SDS, state affairs, and the state....

With its program, which is the same as it was at the outset, the SDS can win the elections. It is a pure program, it is a program with a strong social component, and the finishing touches are still being put on that social component so that it is up-to-date, because there are indeed many terrible social problems, although they can hardly be called social problems, because when one says that a humanitarian catastrophe is obvious throughout the entire territory, then it is not a standard social program that is called for.

[Box, pp 12-13]

Capitalism Will Not Be Accepted—Interview With Dr. Dragutin Ilic, of the Socialist Party of the RS, by Velimir Bozic

The fifth meeting in a row of the Main Committee of the Socialist Party of the RS [SP RS] has been held in Banja Luka, where decisions were adopted regarding that party's preparations for the upcoming parliamentary elections in the Union of the RS and the Muslim-Croat Federation. The meeting was also attended by Dragutin Brcin, a member of the SPS Executive Committee and the federal minister for information in the FRY Government.

What are the Socialists of the RS planning for 1996? According to decisions adopted on the eve of, but also after, the elections, the possibility of coalition ties with all parties of a similar orientation in the RS is held out, but this can also extend to parties outside the Serb state, including parties in the Muslim-Croat Federation. We have learned unofficially that the Liberal Party has already made contact with like-minded groups in the Muslim-Croat entity. Thus, the race is on, and Dr. Dragutin Ilic assesses his own party's chances and circumstances.

[Ilic] I hope that all of us, and thus we and the other political parties that are active in the RS, will be able to achieve together the minimum interest of this nation, because we must not forget that we will have plenty of difficulty in the political struggle, in the joint parliament with the Muslim-Croat Federation.

But there should be no repeat of what we have had the opportunity to see, that we block things, that we are constantly accused of being uncooperative, while naturally I hope that the largest number of deputies in that parliament will be from socialist parties, and we will energetically defend the interests of our nation. We expect that there will be other forces there that behave similarly. I am not convinced that the nationalists will win the people's trust there again, with the possible exception of the Croat part of the people, because of the exceptionally strong influence of the Catholic Church and because of the influence of the Zagreb HDZ.

[Bozic] Can you say anything more concrete about the program of the SP RS?

[Ilic] The program that we will offer to the citizens will be founded on support for a democratic, rule-of-law state in which all citizens will be equal, the judicial system will be independent, and citizens will defend the law, in which legislative and executive power will be separated. We want to create a prosperous, democratic state in which its citizens will want to live and to which those who have left will return. Territory without people in it means nothing and offers no prospects.

We will support the equal status of all forms of ownership. We will not force privatization at any price, but we will create the conditions for all forms of ownership to be equal and for the form that will yield the best results to survive. The state will have to regulate some things, because that is renewal and development, so that individual regions can develop uniformly. We will not permit any plunder of public property nor any return to liberal capitalism, which Europe completed 200 years ago. Thus, anyone who has capital will have to bring it and spend it, not take away from the people that which the people have created in the past.

We will support freedom of religion and faith. As regards the churches as institutions, we will take a civilized approach to them, and in particular we will acknowledge what our Orthodox Church has contributed in preserving the identity of the Serb nation. We will

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help the church with regard to its religious functions, but the church must be separated from the state. We cannot support the state and the attitude toward the church that the current government has had, because then we would be another Iran.

[Bozic] After five hard years of war, there is a great deal of suspicion among the Serb nation that the policy of brotherhood and unity, which proved to be bad for the Serb nation, will be resumed within the framework of restoring the former Bosnia-Herzegovina or the current union of the RS and the federation, in the future joint parliament. Do the Socialists of the RS have a solution to that problem?

[Ilic] The Socialist Party's position is that this war was forced on the Serb nation, that the Serb nation did not want it; but the issue of whether this war had to be waged in the way that it was and whether we could have done things with many fewer casualties is something that I will not comment on, because all citizens were able to see for themselves how the previous government operated and what the consequences of its rule and policy were.

We believe that what should have happened was for these three nations to split up so that we could see who was making what mistakes. Only after that is it possible to establish some sort of normal cooperation. Thus, only dreamers can be thinking about creating some sort of Bosnia as it was, or a Yugoslavia. People who take a realistic look at things believe that such a thing is impossible.

Since the Socialist Party is in power in Serbia, it is logical to expect that a Socialist victory here as well will lead to integration with our motherland, and I emphasize to you that the first goal in our program is to achieve national and state unity with Serbia. If the Radicals were in power in Serbia, for example, my party would support a win by that party in the RS too, because that would be the most direct way to achieve what the citizens of the RS desire.

You can rest assured that with the Socialists there will never be integration with Bosnia, but rather with Yugoslavia.

[Bozic] Is your party willing to enter into coalitions with existing or new parties?

[Ilic] We will assess that situation when the time comes, and I think it is too early to talk about that right now. The principle we have adopted is that we cannot enter into a coalition with parties that advocate hatred and chauvinism, intolerance, that have in their program elements of revanchism, destruction. We can join with parties that have chosen the course of democracy, prosperity, humanism, and a happier, more humane, and more just society than the one in which we have lived for four years now.

B-H: Serbs To Deploy 1,000 Troops in Central Region

AU2103080896 Paris AFP in English 0343 GMT 21 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sipovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 21 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb forces were due Thursday to deploy nearly 1,000 troops in a key area of central Bosnia handed over from Moslem-Croat federation control, a NATO spokesman said.

Some 2,000 NATO-led peacekeeping soldiers in the region around Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo have been put on alert to monitor the troop movements and ensure the Serbs' entry into the district passes off peacefully, Major Alasair Ross said.

Under the terms of the Dayton peace accords, the former warring factions were allowed to move troops back into transferred areas on Wednesday, but Ross, spokesman for the NATO-led peace Implementation Force, told AFP the Serbs had informed them they would move 970 soldiers in at around 0800 a.m. (0700 GMT) Thursday.

The vast majority would go to barracks at Kula, west of Mrkonjic Grad, while small detachments of around 40 soldiers each would be deployed in four outlying areas.

IFOR [Implementation Force] checkpoints have been installed since Monday on all main roads in the district, known to the British troops in the region as "the Anvil" but Ross said they were not expecting any trouble and it was only a precautionary measure.

The region was held by Bosnian Serb forces until September last year when it was seized in a sweeping Moslem-Croat offensive. Around 20,000 of its original population of some 45,000 civilians have already returned.

B-H: Serb Forces Move Troops Into 'Anvil'

AU2103130196 Paris AFP in English 1226 GMT 21 Mar 96

[By Kevin McElderry]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Mrkonjic Grad, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 21 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb forces moved into a key area of central Bosnia for the first time in more than six months Thursday, under the watchful eyes of some 2,000 NATO-led peacekeeping troops.

Four columns of Serb troops and equipment moved into the area around Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo, known

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as "the anvil," shortly after 11:30 a.m. (1030 GMT). [passage omitted]

Colonel Milenko Lazic, deputy commander of the Bosnian Serb army's 30th Division, said: "The local population did not say anything as we moved in, but we know they are happy because we are here and they will feel much safer.

"Feelings among us are mixed, but everyone is glad to come back to their house. But then they see the consequences of the war in this area.

"We just wanted to get back to the way we were before the war. It's important that this area comes back to the Republika Srpska," one of two largely autonomous entities created by the Dayton peace accords within a Bosnian Republic.

"This area was always mostly Serb but they have taken Sarajevo from us," said Lazic.

Another Serb officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said: "It's a historic day for IFOR [Implementation Force] but for us it's just like any other day. Tomorrow will be the same as yesterday. This makes no difference.

"All we are doing is complying with the Dayton accord. This is nothing special."

Lazo Sesic, a Serb resident of Mrkonjic Grad, watched the convoys go past and said: "This is our right because there is an army and police in every country in the world.

"They should have done this earlier. We just want to start working and living in our own homes again." [passage omitted]

Lazic said his Serb army unit had extremely good relations with IFOR, especially British troops who provide the bulk of the NATO-led peacekeeping forces in the anvil area.

He said that they would keep IFOR informed of troops movement in the area ahead of April 18, the date when all forces are to be back in their barracks. [passage omitted]

B-H: Bosnian Serb Republic Army Takes Over Mrkonjic Grad

LD2103151496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1359 GMT 21 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mrkonjic Grad, 21 Mar (TANJUG)—By flying the [Bosnian] Serb Republic flag in the barracks in Kula, a few kilometers west of Mrkonjic Grad, the Serb Republic Army [SRA] marked today's takeover of the area which has been returned to the Serb Republic in line with the Dayton agreement.

The SRA's return [into the area], based on the Dayton agreement, which envisions the takeover 91 days after the signing of the agreement, began this morning.

The SRA's takeover was carried out in the presence of and controlled by IFOR [Implementation Force]. [passage omitted]

Slavko Culic, commander of an SRA unit, said that another part of the implementation of the Dayton agreement is being carried out today. "People can live peacefully now and we hope that they will be satisfied. We know our obligations in implementing the peace plan and we surely will not disturb the peace," he added.

Culic said that on the whole he is satisfied with the implementation of the military part of the peace agreement, but "IFOR does not treat all sides equally. This can be seen primarily in the issue of POW's, members of the SRA, who are still in Muslim and Croat prisons."

The SRA is to take over the area of Sipovo and Ribnik in the Kljuc municipality tomorrow.

B-H: Mass Graves of Serbs Reported in Sipovo, Mrkonjic

LD1503180496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1549 GMT 15 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 15 Mar (SRNA)—The military prosecutor's office in Banja Luka today said that the exhumation of a mass grave in the Mrkonjic Grad municipality [western Bosnia-Herzegovina] is to be delayed for a short time. A letter addressed to the United Nations says that there are several mass graves of [Bosnian] Serb soldiers and civilians in the Sipovo and Mrkonjic Grad municipalities.

One hundred and fifty Serbs were buried in one of these graves. The Yugoslav committee for gathering of data on crimes against humanity and international law has been asked to help as there are not enough forensic experts in the Serb Republic.

B-H: Many Sarajevo Serbs in Trebinje Not Registered

AU2003205496 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Vesna Rudan has a report on the accommodation of Sarajevo Serbs in Herzegovina:

[Rudan] Municipal commissions have registered in Herzegovina a little over 5,000 people displaced in the

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latest great migration of Serbs. The greatest number of displaced persons have registered with the municipal accommodation committee in Trebinje. Nearly 2,000 have been accommodated, while over 2,000 requests for accommodation have still not been responded to.

Since the abandoned housing facilities were occupied during the previous mass settlement, most of the refugee Sarajevo Serbs are accommodated in the houses whose construction is not yet complete, while several hundred people are in collective accommodation facilities.

There are three collective accommodation points in Trebinje: the refugee center, the elementary school in the (?Zgonjevo) suburb, and the former student dormitory. All the refugees accommodated in this way have been provided with mattresses and blankets, and the municipal Red Cross organization provided one-time humanitarian aid for them.

The exact number of displaced persons who have stopped in Trebinje during the latest exodus is difficult to determine, as many persons accommodated with their families have not registered with the authorities. It is precisely this category of new inhabitants of Trebinje who may in time create problems for the commissions—regarding the regulation of their refugee status—as well as for the utility companies and other services, and health and education institutions.

Displaced Sarajevo Serbs also arrived to the Gacko and Bileca area. The Gacko office for refugees has registered nearly 500, and the Bileca Red Cross about 300.

B-H: Serbs To Remove Checkpoints Near Brcko by End of Week

LD2003154596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1456 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Brcko, 20 Mar (SRNA)—All checkpoints of the Serb police at exit points of the so-called pink zones along the separation lines with the Croat-Muslim federation around Brcko are to be removed by the end of the week, SRNA has learned.

The removal of the checkpoints will establish full freedom of movement between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and the Serb Republic, guaranteed by the first article of the Dayton Agreement.

IFOR [Implementation Force] will control armaments in the separation zone and the Serb police will be patrolling the depth of the territory and carrying out controls. It has the power to arrest all armed individuals on the territory of the city.

B-H: Banja Luka Court Tries HVO Member for War Crimes

AU2003195996 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 19 Mar 96 p 6

[Article by "Sl.P.": "He Killed 27 Serbs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Under the charges of war crimes committed against Serb civilians in Posavina, before the Grand Jury of the Court Martial in Banja Luka, chaired by judge Captain Nikola Tomasevic, the trial began yesterday against Ivan Stjepanovic (25) from Bosanska Bijela near Brcko and member of 106th brigade of HVO [Croatian Defense Council] of Herzeg-Bosnia.

According to the indictment filed by Captain Branko Mitrovic, Stjepanovic first killed unarmed civilians Milan Sekulic and his mother Mara and then Veselin Lukic, Jovanka Micic, and Dusan Lukic from the village of Cerik near Brcko. He then went on killing people indiscriminately and, according to the indictment, the number totals 27, of which three are women. He committed these crimes in 1992.

After the indictment was read, Stjepanovic confirmed the allegations. He killed the victims using a knife and firearms while crimes took place in the villages of Bosanska Bijela and Cerik near Brcko. At yesterday's session, witnesses testified and the jury announced that a verdict could be passed the next day.

B-H: Bosnian Serbs Extend List of War Criminals

LD2003164996 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The arrests of Zdravko Mucic and Zejnil Delalic, who are accused of war crimes against Serb civilians, have attracted the attention of the national and international media these days. Marko Draganic has some new information on the criminals in his report:

[Draganic] The news that Zdravko Mucic-Pavo and Zejnil Delalic, accused of war crimes against Serb civilians in Konjic, were arrested in Vienna and Munich, has met with enormous interest among the surviving prisoners from prisons in Celebic and Musala Sports Hall in Konjic and also amongst the civilians who had been expelled from this municipality in north Herzegovina.

Of around 7,000 Serbs who lived in this municipality before the war, after the unprecedented ethnic cleansing only 200, mainly elderly, still remain.

In addition to the two criminals mentioned above, the following two also have to be brought before the

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tribunal: Azim Delic, who was the security chief in both prisons and who is personally, and as the main participant, responsible for all killings, tortures, and maltreatment of prisoners; and Esad Landzo-Zenga, who took part in all killings.

According to the information we have, these two are somewhere in a Muslim prison, serving a several-year term for the murder of a Muslim soldier.

Dr. Rusmir Hadzihuseinovic, former mayor of Konjic, and Jasmin Guska, former chief of a public security station in Konjic, also have to be brought before the tribunal as the principal organizers of genocide against Serbs in the municipality of Konjic.

During Zejnil Delalic's time as the commander of prisons in Celebici and Konjic, 32 Serb civilians were killed. These were Delalic's private prisons which were, of course, run with the consent of top Muslim authorities in Sarajevo, led by Alija Izetbegovic with whom Delalic had close ties.

B-H: Serb Official: Prisoners' Release Possible by 23 Mar

LD2003215396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2006 GMT 20 Mar 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, March 20 (TANJUG)—President of the state commission of the Republika Srpska (R.S.) for the exchange of prisoners of war Dragan Bulajic announced on Wednesday that all the detained in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH) might be set free before the Contact Group meeting in Moscow on March 23.

Bulajic and President of the Assembly of the R.S. (Serb entity in the BIH) Momcilo Krajisnik conferred at Pale on Wednesday with the team of the international community's high representative Carl Bildt about the release of the remaining prisoners of war still held by the Muslim and Croat sides although the Dayton agreement deadline for their release expired on January 19.

Bulajic said that two of the Bildt team members promised that they would later today establish contacts with representatives of the Muslim-Croat Federation (MHF) and on Thursday reach accord on having all prisoners set free before March 23.

The R.S., as Bulajic put it, did not accept a proposal by members of the Bildt team to partially solve the problems of releasing the prisoners of war, maintaining that this would be improper politically.

Bulajic stressed that the R.S. demanded that the Zagreb authorities should also be brought under obligation to set free soldiers of the Serb entity in the BIH who were kept in jails of neighbouring Croatia.

The release of prisoners was the topic also at a talk held on Wednesday between Bildt's deputy Michael Steiner on one hand and the representatives of the local authorities in Doboj, the town in the northeast of the R.S., and of the local associations which rally relatives and friends of the soldiers and civilians held prisoner.

Steiner promised that the international community would do its utmost for more than 2,000 Serb soldiers and around 800 civilians held prisoner to be released immediately, but he observed that one should have no illusions that this process would be brief.

Steiner said that none of the three sides—Muslim, Serb, Croat—had respected the provisions in the Dayton agreement and set free all the detained.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) called all the three sides in the BIH that, pursuant to the Dayton peace agreement, they should at once and unconditionally set free 160 prisoners not suspected of war crimes, the ICRC Belgrade office said on Wednesday.

The ICRC said that the three sides were holding around 220 prisoners, 60 of them suspected of war crimes. The ICRC called the three sides to clarify the legal situation of those detained for the purposes of further investigation into alleged war crimes.

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Croatia: Commentary Views U.S. Arms Shipments to Bosnia

AU2003135296 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 15-20 Mar 96 p 34

[Commentary by Emil Vidusic: "The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO Will Be Given Weapons From Vietnam!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What will happen with the military cooperation of Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the United States [next line missing] some 15 days ago, the EU and nine associate members from eastern and central Europe agreed that "it is in the interest of peace and stability to maintain the arms embargo on the territory of former Yugoslavia"?

The most probable answer is that the cooperation will (nevertheless) continue. The EU and its nine associate members have adopted a position which is not a binding resolution that the United States should obey. It is an opinion, appeal, recommendation of a group of countries whose role is no stronger than that of the United States on peace in former Yugoslavia. Therefore, it is to be expected that there will be no sudden collapse of the military and technical cooperation that has just been agreed, but the rhythm of how it is implemented could nevertheless be slowed down as a result of the statement of the EU Council of Ministers.

Departure of the Mujahidin

From the measured, almost reserved statements of Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak, following his visit to Washington, about plans for possible U.S.-Croatian military and technical cooperation, as well as from more specific public statements in Washington by General Rasim Delic [commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] and Gen. Zivko Budimir [commander of the Croatian Defense Council, HVO] about the Bosniak-Croat-U.S cooperation agreed with U.S. Defense Secretary Perry and privately owned military companies in the United States, it is clear that the Americans have set two separate preconditions to the three [as published] delegations. To Susak, to have the Croatian Danube basin reintegrated without armed force and to Delic to have the mujahidin withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina immediately. Otherwise, there will be no military and technical cooperation. Since the problem of one state, Bosnia-Herzegovina with its two armies, is much more difficult than Croatia's diplomatic options, it is understandable that the main attention of U.S. military policy is drawn, to some extent, to the Bosnian question, in which the reorganization of the two armies has an important role in future actions.

The General Staff of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO General Staff have been busy working on plans for the reorganization of the armies, but before the final formation of military forces can be made, apart from ephemeral political difficulties, at least three preconditions will have to be met. The first one is that the Defense Law, which is in its final phase of drafting, goes through and is then definitely passed. The second precondition is that, despite the stand of the EU, the agreed shipments of arms and equipment are delivered to the two armies. Finally, the third precondition is that the reorganization of the armies must be based upon a completely new concept, doctrine of war and military strategy, and operational tactics.

The final shape of the Defense Law, how it proceeds and is passed, is an internal matter of the internationally recognized state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the other two preconditions, the purchase of weapons and the training of the officers at American military academies, are not internal problems of the Federation. The purchase of weapons and personnel specialization of the two armies depends upon the Americans' readiness to cooperate, irrespective of opposition from other quarters, such as the EU and Russia. Therefore the delivery of arms and the training of officers are the central problem on which the organization and capability of the armies in Bosnia-Herzegovina will depend.

Arms Free of Charge

According to statements by Gen. Delic and Gen. Budimir when they were still in America, the equipping of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO will be carried out in stages over three periods:

—In the first short period, from 90 to 180 days after the signing of the peace agreement, "light equipment, such as light arms and communications systems, could [previous word in italics] (as pointed out by Gen. Delic) be delivered."

So this means arms and equipment for large-scale operations by small-scale tactical formations up to battalion size:

—In the second, to some extent more medium-term, period certainly the most important one, between 180 days and one year after the signing of the peace agreement, it is envisaged to equip higher tactical units ranging from regiments to light brigades. According to the same general's statement, "It is very important to us to get aircraft, helicopters, and antiaircraft weapons, not only for low, but also high altitudes, as soon as possible."

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—In the third, long-term period beyond the one year mark and after the successful accomplishment of the IFOR [Implementation Force] peace mission and the reintegration of the Croatian Danube basin, it will be possible to purchase tanks, artillery, and other kinds of heavy equipment. The last to be equipped will be the biggest operational-tactical formations.

With such a schedule for equipping the armies, one must wonder what the quality of the weapons will be. Foreign military analysts are unanimous in thinking that the latest generation of equipment is out of the question, but it could be equipment from the Vietnam War or some items from the West's war against Iraq. If one thinks about this view, there is not much reason to reject it. This is because:

—The two armies should be given most of the military equipment free of charge. If the United States does not cover the expenses of the privately owned military companies, they will not provide their products free of charge, when they can earn a huge amount for them on the international market.

—Arms are expensive. An obsolete Lance (surface-to-surface) missile without its accompanying power generators costs $60,000, an Abrams tank between $2.5 million and $3 million, a Patriot antiaircraft missile without its radar and other combat blocks $8.5 million, while the prestigious Apache [helicopter] or F-16 costs between $25 million and $27 million. Neither Bosnia nor the Federation has the money for such purchases.

—The United States does not sell such technology even to admitted "Partnership [for Peace]" members, so it is somewhat unlikely that it will be precisely the armies in Bosnia-Herzegovina that will be given such weapons.

Iran and Libya

Nevertheless, there is no reason to be disappointed or dissatisfied. Even the previous technological generation of weapons, mostly for defensive purpose, will be of much better quality than those currently being used by the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. In order to get the maximum out of them in combat, the "federal" armies will have to qualify as many officers and noncommissioned officers as possible, and as soon as possible, in handling such weapons, in applying them tactically, and in commanding units at different levels.

The goal of their training is also of interest to the Americans. Thus one common type of command personnel will be created after the American model, not after the European or Islamic countries' army models, which could help avoid a repetition of armed conflicts such as that in 1993. The officers will be qualified for military operations to deter and repel external aggression, but the most important thing will be that the education to American standards allows the admission of these few remaining countries into the Partnership for Peace and, later on, NATO, too.

Therefore, while the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO General Staff work on reorganizing the armies and combining to form a common command structure at the top, the Americans would very much like to know precisely to whom, how much, and what kind of weapons they are to supply. They do not want at all Iran or Libya becoming the suppliers. And Secretary Perry must certainly have had plenty to say to his guests at Washington.

Croatia: Gen Klein's Ultimatum to Slavonia Serbs Viewed

AU2003202096 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 19 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by Petar Stanivukovic: "Klein's Ultimatum"]

[FBIS Translated Text] General Jacques Klein, administrator for the Srem [Serbian variant of Srijem] and Baranja region, has given an ultimatum to the local Serbs—they have to lay down their arms by 1 May. If they do not meet the deadline, the general threatens, he will leave Vukovar together with the Blue Helmets, making it possible for the Croats to resolve the question of reintegration by the sword. A Croatian military victory is in that case certain because the local Serbs do not have anybody who could help them, as Serbia has too many problems with Bosnia, Klein assesses.

So far this administrator has visited the Srem-Baranja region three times, and on the basis of those inspections he claims that the Serbs are very frightened, and are just nodding to everything he says.

That the whole matter has to do with pressure put on the Serbs (from eastern and western Slavonia) is shown by his additional statements that NATO promised him air support, and that even the Bosnia-based Implementation Force would come to his aid. German Phantom aircraft are already sowing fear over this fertile plain, and over the Serbian people who have been living here for ages.

"I told the Serbian leaders that there was an easy and a difficult way of solving the problem. My way is the easy one. If you cooperate with me, I will achieve on your behalf the best possible deals with the Croatian authorities. However, if you offer resistance (this term is used by Croatian President Tudjman as well), you will use up all your credit. The UN forces will withdraw, and the Croats will do the job alone. There is no third option," Klein said.

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What kind of peace mediator is he,who is not using the institutions he represents for settling reintegration problems but the reputation of Croatian Army, the bestiality of which the Serbs in Croatia felt during two genocidal offensives? How are they supposed to trust such a peace mediator to achieve on behalf of the Serbs the best possible deals with the Croats?

The Serbs in eastern Slavonia are interested in autonomy, a referendum under UN auspices, and Croatian and UN guarantees that revanchism will be prevented. General Klein does not mention this and only demands the unconditional disarmament of the Serbs.

Croatia: Local Refugee Commissioner on Serb Refugees

AU2003135596 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1530 GMT 18 Mar 96

[Interview with Baranja Refugee Commissioner Dusan Jerinic by Jovan Vlajkovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The program for the settlement of Baranja is being carried out with success and the current situation indicates that even more than 5,000 refugees and displaced persons from the western parts of Krajina will settle in Baranja within the set term. Refugee Commissioner Dusan Jerinic will tell us more about that in an interview with our colleague Jovan Vlajkovic.

[Vlajkovic] Apart from economic activities, the settlement program is the most important task of social and political organizations of the Srijem-Baranja district. The municipality of Beli Manastir is no exception and, in the past couple of months, much has been done about that. According to Dusan Jerinic, in the past couple of months, from New Year's Day until the present...

[Jerinic] ...3,461 persons came to Baranja and were given refugee status.

[Vlajkovic] Do you have information about the age of refugees arriving to the district?

[Jerinic] Yes, we do have that information. Out of 3,461 refugees who came to Baranja, 296 are children under six years of age; 273 are between seven and 14; and 302 are between 15-19 years of age. So those are children and teenagers. There are 921 refugees over 55 years of age, while others are working-age people. Their average education is very high, as a large number of highly qualified workers from all walks of life came to Baranja, such as farmers, foresters, metal workers. Furthermore, 76 persons with two-year postsecondary and university qualifications settled in Baranja in this period. So we have three medical doctors, seven lawyers, several economists, and other highly trained professionals.

[Vlajkovic] There is probably a shortage of such professionals in the area. Is that taken into account when refugees are assigned to a particular area?

[Jerinic] We look at the papers of refugees coming to Baranja and distribution is done on the basis of that information. Consequently, metal workers are sent to municipalities with metal industries, foresters are sent to fringe areas of the Drava River and the Danube River, which abound in forests. People with university qualifications are assigned to the municipalities of Beli Manastir, Darda, and Knezevi Vinogradi.

[Vlajkovic] If I am not mistaken, the Beli Manastir municipality comprises 39 neighborhood communities. Could you tell us which of them accommodate the most refugees?

[Jerinic] We are trying to settle an approximately equal number of refugees in every neighborhood community in Baranja. Of course, most of them settled in Beli Manastir and Darda, and then in Bilje. Behind me you can see files containing the data for every neighborhood community. For example, I checked the data for the Bilje neighborhood community in which 526 families or 1,632 persons settled since 1991. We expect that some houses will soon be adapted and rebuilt, so that the numbers are bound to change.

[Vlajkovic] Rebuilding broaches the subject of problems. What are the main problems in the realization of the program?

[Jerinic] Refugees show much interest in settling in Baranja. Our office receives numerous phone calls from refugees asking about the possibility of settling in Baranja. However, the amount of available housing is the restricting factor. Some houses and apartments were razed in the five years of war. Now we are trying to rebuild them and give them to refugees.

[Vlajkovic] Do you get any help?

[Jerinic] We are trying to find sponsors to subsidize the rebuilding. Unfortunately, international organizations have still not invested a penny into the rebuilding of houses for refugees.

[Vlajkovic] Have you had any promises of a more active involvement, from the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] and other international organizations, for instance?

[Jerinic] International organizations have been informed of the number of families and refugees on the territory

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of Baranja. They were asked to help us, but so far they have only made promises.

[Vlajkovic] Once refugees cross the bridge and arrive to Baranja, they are sent to the Batina reception center. How long do they stay there on average?

[Jerinic] The municipal office for housing and public utility is in charge of finding accommodation for refugees in Baranja. Refugees wait for proper accommodation anywhere from two or three days to 20 days, even up to a month. Their stay in the reception center depends on the number of family members and the profile of each family.

[Vlajkovic] Are there any restrictions regarding the accommodation of refugees? Who is allowed to settle in the region, i.e. can everyone get refugee status?

[Jerinic] Yes, there are restrictions. Under Article 7 of the Erdut Agreement, only persons who used to live on the territory of the Republic of Serb Krajina or Croatia are allowed to settle here. Many people from the Serb Republic want to settle in this region, but the Erdut Agreement prevents us from granting them access.

Croatia: Rail, Road Traffic With FRY To Resume Soon

LD2003144996 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Croatian Foreign Ministry yesterday received a note demarche from the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Montenegro confirming the agreements of 11 March reached during the visit of FRY Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic to Croatia. The note marks the beginning of the 30-day period prior to the resumption of railway and road traffic between Croatia and the FRY.

Croatia: Tudjman Rejects Election of Zagreb Mayor

LD2103120696 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 21 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On the basis of Article 21, Paragraph 3, of the law on the city of Zagreb; and Article 32, Paragraph 3, of the law on local self-administration and administration; and at the proposal of the Government of the Republic of Croatia dated 15 March, the president of the republic passed a decision on 20 March to reject confirmation of the election of Ivo Skrabalo as Zagreb mayor and prefect of the Zagreb county, says a statement issued by the president's office.

The decision was adopted in light of the fact that the assembly of the city of Zagreb, acting in contravention of Article 22, Paragraph 2, of the law on the city of Zagreb, and Article 39, Paragraphs 1 and 2, of the law on local self-administration and administration, could not pass a vote of no-confidence in Marina Matulovic-Dropulic, newly appointed mayor of the city of Zagreb, by which legal conditions were not met for the election of Ivo Skrabalo to this duty. Hence, Marina Matulovic-Dropulic is continuing to perform the duties of Zagreb mayor and prefect of the Zagreb county.

On the basis of Article 21, Paragraph 3, of the law on the city of Zagreb, and in accordance with a proposal put forward by the Government of the Republic of Croatia on 15 March, the republic's president also rejected confirmation of the election of Vjekoslav Silic and Antun Sporer as deputy Zagreb mayors.

Croatia: Regime 'Victims' Hold First Session in Vukovar

AU2003212796 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1530 GMT 18 Mar 96

[From the "Vise od Vesti" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first assembly of the union of victims of the Croatian regime 1990-91 was held on Saturday [16 March] in Vukovar. The assembly was attended by representatives of the Union of Baranja Soldiers and municipal authorities. Our colleagues from Vukovar have a report:

[Unidentified correspondent] The union's main function is gathering and processing information about the victims of the Croatian regime until the beginning of the war and forwarding complete files to domestic and international institutions. According to Milos Vojnovic, the testimony and statements from union members are to be used to complete the data about the number of people killed, arrested, tortured, and harassed in the workplace, as well as about other violations of the basic rights of Serbs by the Croatian regime. Furthermore, union members will gather evidence about missing Serbs, primarily from the Vukovar area, as well as from other Serb areas that used to form a part of the Socialist Republic of Croatia.

Addressing the present union members, Budimir Kosutic, ambassador in the FRY Foreign Ministry, pointed out that the Serbs did not fight for a greater Serbia, but for their basic right to a civilized life. Kosutic added that it is unprecedented that one nation be branded by the media while enduring the utmost torture. According to Kosutic, along with the Croatian profascist authorities the international community is also partly responsible for the suffering of the Serbs.

[Kosutic] It turned out that the international community could have kept the peace by investing 1 percent of the

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effort it now allegedly expends to restore peace. It did not do that.

[Correspondent] Even if the world is not interested in Croatian crimes, it is our duty to inform it about them. Those who suffered as the result of that terror can best inform the world, emphasized Kosutic.

Conveying the good wishes and support of the Serb Assembly Information Center of Belgrade, Vojin Dadic emphasized the importance of testimony about the crimes committed by the Croats. One should testify before international institutions, including the Hague tribunal. Dadic exemplified the importance of testimony before international institutions by telling a story about a Serb mother and her testimony about the death of her son.

[Dadic] Talking about her son, back in 1991, about how he was arrested and by whom, she obtained a warrant, and now those who arrested, killed, who ordered the killing of her son, can be honored in Croatia but cannot cross its borders. They might cross its borders soon, but only to go to The Hague.

[Correspondent] The mothers of killed Serbs also advocate due presentation of the truth to the world through the activities of the union. The testimony and presentation of documentation with concrete evidence of the scope of the Croatian terror is our only chance for equal treatment and objectivity by the international community.

A report on the work of the committee for exchanging Srijem-Baranja district war prisoners, as well as information about the missing, were submitted at today's session. Lack of cooperation by the Croatian side was blamed for the fact that many prisoners of the Croatian regime have still not been set free, and that many bodies of dead Serbs have still not been delivered, despite our willingness to cooperate. The first goal of the union is to cover the period until the beginning of the war, although it will not stop there. According to Borislav Drzajic, president of the district government, there have been no significant changes in the Croatian position over the past five years, and the events of six months ago are a case in point. Croatian aggression against western Slavonia and the western part of Krajina, as well as individual acts of Croatian terror, are also in the union's interest. By investigating this domain the union intends to prove to the representatives of the United Nations and other international institutions that the Serbs want nothing more than what they have had in this region for centuries.

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Poland: Rosati on Talks With Christopher About NATO

LD2003193896 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has given an assurance that the expansion of NATO will be continued. The U.S. secretary of state met the foreign ministers of Central and East European countries in Prague. Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati said that the confirmation by Warren Christopher in Prague of the U.S. resolve to expand NATO went some way toward fulfilling Polish expectations. Rosati emphasized, however, that we would like this confirmation to become a fact and not remain in the sphere of declarations.

During his meeting with Christopher, he said that he expected specific decisions to be made toward the end of this year or at the beginning of next year as to when, how, and in what direction NATO would expand. He noted that Poland also did not want the expansion of NATO to stop at its eastern frontier.

Poland: Preparations for NATO; U.S. 'Becoming Impatient'

WS2003133596 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 19 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Wojciech Luczak: "Who Is Delaying the Dialogue With NATO?; Overseas Allies Suggest the Times of Courtesy Visits Are Over"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Because of procedural delays, Poland has not yet presented NATO with theses for talks with the NATO Council scheduled to take place in April with representatives of the 16 member states.*

Slovakia submitted its "discussion paper" [preceding term published in English throughout the text] for the 16 plus 1 consultations on Monday [18 March]. The Czech Republic submitted its topics for discussion earlier. Poland was the first state to be advised by the U.S. Administration to apply this method of exchanging opinions on the technical and financial aspects of joining NATO. To this very day, however, we have failed to complete our discussion paper.

"During separate talks with representatives of the 16 NATO states, Poland will have an opportunity to present convincing arguments for being accepted as a member. It will be possible to disclaim statements that NATO will have to pay an exorbitant price for integrating the Polish military system with that of the alliance," we were told by a diplomat who asked to remain anonymous.

We learned from well-informed diplomatic sources that our discussion paper will not be ready even by the end of this week. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already prepared the political part of the document. The section devoted to military issues, the most detailed and crucial, is stuck at the Ministry of National Defense [MON]. Only a few officers from the International Security Department are working on it. A special department for servicing contacts with NATO is only being formed. Moreover, our high-ranking sources suggest that work on the discussion paper will not be finalized until it is approved by Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka. The deputy minister, however, will be accompanying Prime Minister Cimoszewicz on a tour of Southeast Asia until 24 March. The crucial question that MON still has to answer is whether we should offer to abandon our sovereign defense system now, before receiving any prior guarantees from the alliance.

Our diplomats have been receiving signals for some time that the Americans are becoming impatient and are clearly encouraging us to step up our dialogue with NATO. Our potential overseas allies suggest that the time of courtesy visits and decorous dialogue are over. The time has come for the ascertainment of technical and military details and hard administrative work. It does not seem, however, we are ready for that just yet.

Poland: Daily Comments on Situation in Taiwan Strait

WS2003160896 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 16-17 Mar 96 p 2

[Commentary by Grzegorz Brycki: "Unnecessary Quarrel"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the time being, the Chinese military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait are bringing results that are different from what their initiators intended. Despite Beijing's pressure, in the first democratic presidential elections on 23 March, a large number of Taiwanese would like to back incumbent President Li Teng-hui, an advocate for Taiwan's independence. It was the fear of a declaration of independence on the island that made the Chinese begin their maneuvers.

It is difficult to predict how the "Taiwan quarrel" will end. Judging by the contradictory signals that are coming to us from Beijing, the Chinese do not fully realize the consequences their actions may cause. It is possible that China's strategy is as follows: We will dive into deep water and then see what happens next.

What other interpretation can there be of the fact that on one day Foreign Minister Qian Qichen threatens that President Li's victory in the elections will lead

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to a "real catastrophe," whereas on another occasion the Shanghai authorities give assurances that Taiwan's capital investment in China (over $20 billion so far) will remain intact even if the island is invaded? What do the Chinese mean when they announce that there will be more military exercises during which live ammunition will be used, and then they assure that they do not intend to attack Taiwan? On one occasion, Beijing warns the United States to "stay away from the Taiwan issue," whereas, on another, it cannot see anything wrong in the fact that U.S. warships will be off its coast. Finally, how should one assess the statement by a Chinese general, who said yesterday that the basic duty of the Army is to defend the country's economic achievements and to ensure possibilities of its further development?

Before deciding to begin the maneuvers near Taiwan, Chinese politicians must have weighed the possible advantages and losses that such an operation entails. The developments that have taken place in the past few days show that their calculations proved to be wrong.

Beijing most certainly was taken aback by the stand taken by Washington, which unequivocally backed Taiwan. Meanwhile, the Chinese thought that the United States would continue pursuing the policy of appeasement [last word publish in English] toward them, just like they had been doing for the past few years.

Severing economic relations with China for the United States means a loss of a few dozen billion dollars a year; it also means a loss of jobs for thousands of U.S. workers. No wonder the United States was quiet and lenient in criticizing Beijing for violating human rights. It never imposed sanctions to combat these practices. Also, every year the Americans tried to scare China with the prospect of withdrawing the so-called most-privileged-nation status; however, whenever the issue was actually discussed, there was always some reason to extend the status.

A year ago we nearly witnessed a U.S.-Chinese trade war because China violated copyright agreements on compact discs and software. The Chinese backed off at the very last moment, agreeing to close down the factories. The issue ended in a few ostentatious inspections. Then the affair blew over.

Why is China intimidating Taiwan? Observers say it is because of nationalism. There is also increasingly more talk that, as market reforms were initiated, politicians in Beijing forgot communism in favor of nationalism. The Chinese still remember the "century of humiliation" that began in the middle of the 19th century together with the so-called opium wars. It cannot be ruled out that they finally felt strong enough and decided to take revenge. However, they are at least a few dozen years too late.

The era of empires, which decided the order in the world with the help of their armies, ended after World War I. Now politics is being played differently and China must accept this as well. Even a successful invasion of Taiwan would spell a debacle for China. Foreign capital would stop coming in, or at least it would not come in such quantities as it does today—that is, $100 million a day. This would mean a lost chance for modernization and would lead to a gradual degradation of the economy. The case of the former Soviet Union shows that the world is able to go on quite well even if a large part of it is on the economic periphery.

The display of U.S. power in the South China Sea—that is, the fact that two aircraft carriers have been sent there to defend Taiwan—shows that Washington does not intend to let itself be led by the nose forever. This is good news. The quarrel in the Taiwan Strait is most certainly yet another step taken to test the hypocrisy of the West, for which the possibility of doing business with Beijing is still more important than the defense of 21 million Taiwanese, who accept our Western rules of the game: democracy and a free market. This hypocrisy can be partially understood because states are guided not by sentiment but by interests. However, this may at some point lead to a catastrophe.

There is one more aspect of the crisis over Taiwan—improvement in the relations between Russian and China. The countries that a dozen or so years ago were arch enemies are becoming increasingly closer. Moscow has recently declared that the Taiwan issue is an internal Chinese problem. President Boris Yeltsin will pay a visit to Beijing in April. For the time being, it is only known that he will sign "several important agreements." Both Moscow and Beijing are pursuing imperial policies that are not approved by the West: Russia in Chechnya and Central Asia, and China in Tibet. Things might be easier for them if they stick together.

Poland: Sweden Offers Joint Production of Gripen Aircraft

LD2003223596 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 2000 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sweden has offered the Polish defense industry coproduction of Gripen planes. Swedish fighter planes, in addition to U.S. Hornets and F-16's and Russian MiG-29's, are taking part in a tender for a multirole combat aircraft for the Polish Air Force.

[Correspondent Wieslaw Stefaniak] The Swedes want to sell us RBS antishipping missiles. The Polish Navy needs them for its new fast patrol craft. For the Huzar helicopter, they prepared optoelectronic sights

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and navigation equipment. They want to arm Huzar with Hellfire antitank missiles. The Swedes do not rule out a move to Mielec of the whole production line for their fighter.

[Begin recording, Andrzej Dacyl, Swedish defense industry representative, in Polish] Poland cannot afford to purchase expensive planes and generally cannot afford to buy things. The Polish industry is a competent one, is very good and large, and people need employment. We are extending our hand. We want to give Poland an opportunity to build this plane. [end recording]

[Stefaniak] The American F-22 plane, the French [Dassault] Rafale, and the European Eurofighter belong in the same category as the Gripen.

[Begin recording, Bengt Halse, president of Saab, in English with superimposed Polish translation] We are offering a fighter of the fourth generation, the most modern plane of all those currently being made in the world. [end recording]

[Stefaniak] The Russians and the Americans have offered to transfer a part of the production of their aircraft. The Russian offer has only a slim chance because of the political aspect of supplies. The Americans, with their F-16's and F-18's, have a better chance because Poland is making efforts to join NATO, and American equipment is in general use there.

Colonel Eugeniusz Mleczak, the Ministry of National Defense press spokesman, gave assurances that nothing has been decided as far as the selection of the plane for the Polish Air Force is concerned. A special team is still working on it.

Poland: Multipurpose Planes for Air Force Being Considered

WS2003133496 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 20 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by Z.L.: "New Aircraft Should Lead Us to NATO; Superwings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The new multipurpose aircraft that we will buy for the Polish Armed Forces will be closely related to the military equipment used in NATO. That decision was made during the past few days in the circles of the highest-ranking decisionmakers in the National Defense Ministry [MON] and the President's Chancellery, we learned unofficially. In the immediate future, a series of meetings will be held with representatives of manufacturers, during which the foundations of future contracts will be prepared. It is likely that final decisions will be made and publicly announced within a month.*

Out of the four offers that have been analyzed for a long time now—the Russian MiG-29, the French Mirage-2000, the Swedish Jas-36 Gripen, and the American F-16 and F-18 aircraft—only the last one satisfies the criteria for general use of such planes in NATO member states. As we found out, as bilateral political meetings are held and as the highest Polish authorities pay official visits to neighboring countries, discussions are under way on the coordinated purchase of future combat aircraft for the countries of our region. Consent to such a "joint option" would make it much easier to negotiate a better price for the planes as well as the price for creating the entire infrastructure that is needed in the case of aircraft that are entirely different from the planes used by the Warsaw Pact. It is envisioned that the replacement of equipment in the important sphere of multipurpose aircraft will take at least 15 years. Although we intend to hold negotiations to get Polish industry involved in the manufacturing or assembling of some elements of the purchased planes, experts estimate that modernization of Polish combat aviation, because of the price of aircraft and their equipment, will be the most costly operation in the Polish Armed Forces over the next few years.

The MON Finance Department forecasts that creation of a well-equipped and well-trained army between 1995 and 2010 would require 212.2 billion zlotys. This would entail the necessity of steadily allocating between 4.5 and 6.5 percent of the gross domestic product [GDP] for the MON budget (right now this budget is 2.4 percent of the GDP); it would depend on the projected rate of economic growth. The utopian character of such a plan was stressed in a report drawn up by the National Security Office [BBN] in the President's Chancellery. The author of the BBN report estimates that, even if spending on defense increased to 3 percent of the GDP (which was proposed by the Sejm), the needs of the Armed Forces, involving maintenance, training, and equipment, would remain unsatisfied. The Armed Forces consist of approximately 250,000 soldiers and, in the event of war, would be made up of 500,000 or 600,000 soldiers. Special conditions would have to be met to increase defense spending to more than 3 percent of the GDP; they primarily include the need to obtain social consent to spending less money on other areas, which is difficult to imagine—unless special circumstances occur, such as a real threat to national security.

Therefore, the BBN predicts that current spending will continue for another five or six years, and improvement will be possible only in the event of a considerable market situation [as published]. Under these circumstances, there is only one way to oppose military threats: making

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armament efforts and joining a large collective security system—that is, NATO.

[Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish on 20 March publishes on page 2 a 200-word report by Wojciech Luczak entitled "Deal of the Century, a Fight for Planes." The author reports that, according to unofficial information, "a special military commission headed by General Robelek has selected two aircraft" as possible equipment for the Polish Armed Forces. The order was as follows: the American McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 and the Swedish Saab J-39 Gripen [as published]. As Luczak points out, however, "Saab is not going to surrender easily and will present the managers of the Polish arms industry with far-reaching cooperation offers."]

Poland: New Chief of Vistula Military Units Interviewed

WS2003145696 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 19 Mar 96 pp 1-2

[Interview with Colonel Bronislaw Mlodziejowski, chief of the Vistula Military Units of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, by Colonel Tadeusz Mitek; place and date not given: "I Act Within the Framework of the Law"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bronislaw Mlodziejowski, 47, colonel and professor, was appointed chief of the Vistula Military Units [NJW] on 26 January 1996. A university graduate, he obtained his doctorate and defended his thesis at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan. His scientific career was devoted to the "identification of man" [as published]. He has been working for the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the past 25 years in various positions. He is considered an expert on training.

Most recently he was chief of training at the Office of State Protection. He took part in the proceedings leading up to the disclosure of the Katyn crime. Since 1991 he has been dealing with crimes against life and health. He likes classical music. His hobbies are his home and family. [passage omitted]

• • •

[Mitek] Has the concept of [transforming the NJW into a] National Guard been abandoned?

[Mlodziejowski] No, it is still being considered. It must be stressed, however, that the repositioning and restructuring of a unit as significant as the NJW has to be carefully planned and rational—from legal and organizational changes to logistics, etc. A realistic horizon is two or three years. After all, we have to prepare the men, replace equipment, perhaps even dislocate.

[Mitek] As the new chief of the NJW, what changes do you intend to introduce in the immediate future?

[Mlodziejowski] They will have to do with the undeniable overgrowth of staffing. [passage omitted]

[Mitek] The NJW is mentioned relatively frequently in the media. However, it remains a very enigmatic unit to the public. Could you tell us what the NJW really does?

[Mlodziejowski] I hope the readers of POLSKA ZBROJNA will understand that a certain degree of mystery will always remain and that there are many things I cannot speak about. I can say, however, that, together with military unit 2610, we protect and provide guards of honor for the highest state office buildings and provide security services for more than 100 diplomatic missions in Warsaw. This also applies to international organizations. We are fully responsible for anything that may happen there.

[Mitek] Can you provide any details?

[Mlodziejowski] We guarantee, for example, that if someone calls demanding that a Sejm debate be adjourned because a bomb will go off at any minute, I will be able to say that no bomb will go off in the Sejm because the building was thoroughly searched. We also convoy the delivery of letters containing state secrets.

[Mitek] The NJW has subunits outside of Warsaw. What are their tasks?

[Mlodziejowski] They are prepared to take part in operations in case of natural calamities or against criminal and sabotage groups. More than 10,000 officers and servicemen are in a state of permanent combat readiness. We are part of the state security system and cooperate very closely with units of the Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces.

[Mitek] Is the word "military" in the name of your units thus purely notional? Do you and your men consider yourselves soldiers?

[Mlodziejowski] There is no doubt about that. We do feel like soldiers. We observe the same practices and staffing policies. We consider ourselves neither better nor worse. We are elements of the same system. We complement each other very precisely in our duty of protecting the citizens and the state.

[Mitek] Thank you for the interview.

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Poland: Minister on Creating Safe Zones in Large Cities

LD2003193096 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0700 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski has said that he will increase the number of police staff in Warsaw by 1,000. He has also said that he will make communications and transport equipment belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs' Nadwislanskie Military Units available to the police.

The minister has instructed Chief Police Commander Jerzy Stanczyk to examine the possibility of setting up so-called safe zones in seven large Polish cities. The number of police patrols will be increased there. Chief Inspector Stanczyk said on Polish radio this morning that such measures will be implemented soon.

[Begin Stanczyk recording] This principle is applied in Europe, and we want to introduce the same thing in Poland in all of the largest cities. There are safe zones in cities—everywhere where there is a sufficient number of police. Criminals are simply out of bounds in those areas. Every city has its center, and at least in the center one should have order and peace. Every city has its dormitory [as heard]. Everything should be done as part of the Safe House operation. This operation should be supported by police so that the dormitory is safe. The safe zone will be as large as we can manage it. [end recording]

The minister of internal affairs has made decisions that are to improve security after the murder on Sunday of a student, 20-year-old Wojciech K., who was a chance witness to a robbery. The robbery happened in bright daylight in the center of Warsaw.

Poland: Leaders of OPZZ, UP Discuss Closer Cooperation

WS2003140096 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 20 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by P.W.R.: "OPZZ Met With Union of Labor; Anything May Happen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Leaders of the All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement [OPZZ] met with the leadership of the Union of Labor [UP] yesterday. [OPZZ Chairwoman] Ewa Spychalska gave assurances that there were no political undertones to the meeting. However, the information we obtained suggests that there was an exchange of views on a possible alliance between UP and the OPZZ.*

UP Spokesman Tomasz Nalecz gave assurances that his party knows perfectly well which club the OPZZ belongs to. "We have not come here to act as political poachers," he told RZECZPOSPOLITA. "However, we will be satisfied with anything that brings the union and UP closer together." Ewa Spychalska stressed that no changes in alliances were discussed: "There is no political undertone to this meeting." She added that she had informed her colleagues of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic about her planned talks with UP.

Despite these assurances, we managed to find out that both sides exchanged views on the possibility of closer cooperation—not only issue-related, but also political. [UP Chairman] Ryszard Bugaj reportedly said that UP is open, but at the present stage it does not want to develop any special links to some union.

According to our informer, Ewa Spychalska said that formation of political alliances—before the elections, for instance—is within the power of the OPZZ Council, not the union's leadership. She also reportedly admitted that the OPZZ is facing a dilemma about whether to keep its representatives in the next term of the Sejm.

The official communique reads that "the main subject of the discussion was the possibility of launching joint employee-oriented legislative initiatives in the Sejm." Both sides exchanged views on the following issues: Package 2000, combating unemployment, the state's policy toward senior citizens and pensioners, and participation of public-sector employees in privatization.

The OPZZ and UP leaders established that they would hold consultations on issues important to employees. More working meetings between UP and the OPZZ are to be held in the immediate future.

It is worth recalling that recently the OPZZ met with representatives of the Polish Peasant Party. Stanislaw Wisniewski, deputy chairman of the OPZZ, told GAZETA WYBORCZA after that meeting that the union's meetings with various political forces might result in a platform agreement.

Poland: SLD Head on PSL, UP, Catholic Wing in Party

WS2103122196 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 16-17 Mar 96 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Jozef Oleksy, chairman of Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, by Ewa Rosolak and Dariusz Szymczycha; place and date not given: "From Polls Out to the Streets"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [TRYBUNA] At the convention of Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP], the participants expressed the

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opinion that now that the party has waged its great political campaigns and become part of the administration structure, it should finally devote more attention to itself—to its condition, platform, cadres...

[Oleksy] [Passage omitted] As a result of the history and distortions of the Polish United Workers Party, the Polish Social Democracy and left wing are said to be antireligious. It is a baseless allegation, although more could have been done not to give grounds for it.

I also am thinking about the need to establish a "wing" of the Christian left, which would complete the human mosaic and complete what the social democratic model offers people for today and tomorrow. Various discussions are under way on this subject. I would gladly take part in them.

[TRYBUNA] Does this mean that the party wants and is able to open itself to new circles—to believers and churchgoers?

[Oleksy] Yes, it does. Millions of Catholics and members of other churches vote for the left wing. Thus, there is no reason the party should principally confine its circles or stay away from some others only because the moral-religious dimension is more important to them than pragmatism and organizational efficiency. More often it is a matter of emphasis.

Finally, the SdRP must skillfully create its own image of a party that promotes openness to the rest of the world, a party that understands what the everyday European character means. [passage omitted]

[TRYBUNA] On the one hand, the SdRP is open to cooperation; it wants to find things that unite. And, on the other, the SdRP's relations with the Union of Labor [UP], which is a left-wing party, after all, are not very good. There are a lot of malice and reviewing...

[Oleksy] This sad state of affairs is a result of many things. First, some UP leaders indeed tend to review the SdRP's activities too much. Incidentally, their reviews are rather biting and shallow; UP politicians do it just to show off. On the other hand, they are not willing to hold joint talks on what we could really have in common. The leftist UP often raises the right issues, the same issues as those brought up by the SdRP, and sometimes it even speaks about them more loudly. The fact that there is no readiness to jointly deal with areas that might unite us is a loss. This party, which is undoubtedly a leftist and militant party, sticks to its views. However, I am not the right person to make statements on its ability to communicate with the public.

[TRYBUNA] Does this mean that there will not be a coalition with UP?

[Oleksy] Why not? A coalition with UP is quite a possibility. This has already been discussed, and we were even close to forming it. It was not the SdRP that took UP out of this coalition; it was withdrawn by [UP Chairman] Ryszard Bugaj. In addition, the reason for this was not that there were great differences; they were actually very insignificant, and we could have reached agreement.

[TRYBUNA] If you look at the party's platform, the SdRP is closer to UP than to the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. However, the coalition with the PSL is still in place and is continually being reanimated.

[Oleksy] I said firmly that I see no reason the SdRP should not form a coalition with UP. Recalling that it was to be a joint coalition, consisting of the PSL, the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], and UP, I want to say the following: I do not know, but perhaps it would be better if the coalition really were made up of three partners. If there is a third partner, he exerts a certain influence on the other two sides. Now, if there are only two partners and if differences of opinion appear and both sides are adamant, then this is always followed by a tug of war, which is detrimental to the real issues.

[TRYBUNA] Recent developments—I am now talking about how the PSL voted in Sejm subcommissions and commissions—show that a platform gap is widening between the two coalition parties. What does the future of the coalition look like, then?

[Oleksy] I would not use the word "gap." It is just another difference in approach to the same issue. Of course, there is a certain limit to those differences. Each additional dispute may actually cause a split. However, one thing must be said clearly: The PSL does not conceal that it is trying to find a new place for itself on the political scene, not only in a coalition with the SLD. PSL representatives say openly that they are seeking a place in the right wing as well. It is no secret that the PSL sees itself in the center-right. Our position, in turn, is leftist and left of center, so the joint area must be handled with special care. Unless it is handled with care, there will be no real contact between the SdRP and the PSL. I do not overestimate those internal disputes as long as the program is implemented and the main principles of the economic reform remain unquestioned. After all, our disputes are chiefly over how to put ideas into effect, over instrumental elements, not over the nature and direction of the reforms. This reassures me. [passage omitted]

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Poland: Trade Unionists Reach Agreement With SdRP

WS2103123696 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 21 Mar 96 p 3

[Report by "POZ,PAP" under the "In Poland" rubric: "Will the OPZZ Get Along With the SdRP?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Presidium of the All-Poland Trade Unions Agreement [OPZZ] has approved a draft agreement with Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland [SdRP]. The document provides for, among other things, the participation of unionists who are members of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] in coalition talks, and states that voting discipline within the SLD will not be misused. In January, OPZZ Chairwoman Ewa Spychalska suspended her duties as deputy chairwoman of the SLD parliamentary club until an agreement was signed.

Poland: Walesa To Return to Shipyard, Seeks U.S. Investor

WS2103122096 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 21 Mar 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Lech Walesa's Shipyard"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 2 April Lech Walesa will resume work at the Gdansk Shipyard. "I have always said that, unless the issue of remuneration for former presidents is settled, I will return to the shipyard. Aside from working in the workshop, I will spend Mondays on duty at Solidarity headquarters in Gdansk." The former president has announced that he will help the shipyard and seek an investor in the United States.

In the weekend edition, we will carry a report on the Gdansk shipyard.

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Romania: Melescanu on Talks With Christopher in Prague

AU2003184096 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting took place today in Prague between U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and the foreign ministers of the 12 countries who are candidates to join the North Atlantic alliance, among them Romania, too.

In an exclusive interview granted to our reporters following the conclusion of the talks in the capital of the Czech Republic, Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu said that Secretary of State Warren Christopher was the bearer of a message from the U.S. Administration, according to which the latter is determined to continue supporting NATO's eastward expansion process. At the same time they intend to make efforts to further relations between the North Atlantic alliance and the Russian Federation, so that a durable and efficient security system could be established on our continent.

Talking about Warren Christopher's speech, as well as his private talks in Prague, the Romanian foreign minister assessed that he reached the conclusion that not all countries wishing to join NATO structures will obtain that status simultaneously, but the process will continue and admission will depend on the compliance with a set of requirements necessary to join that alliance.

Furthermore Mr. Teodor Melescanu expressed his belief that Romania, by the stance it displays, as well as its abilities, is one of the countries having the greatest chances to join NATO.

Romania: Spokesman Reasserts Decision To Join NATO

AU2003201696 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Romanian Foreign Affairs Ministry appreciates the realistic and responsible position of Russian Federation officials who emphasize publicly that the 17 March decision of the Duma does not and cannot have legal consequences, stated Sorin Ducaru, spokesman of the Romanian Foreign Affairs Ministry, during the weekly news conference today. He also said that the Russian Federation ambassador handed over an official message to the Romanian Foreign Affairs Ministry, which, under the authorization of President Boris Yeltsin, presents the position of the Russian executive, which rejects the Duma decision.

The MAE [Romanian Foreign Ministry] spokesman reasserted the government's firm decision to join the euro-atlantic political, strategic, and economic structures, as well as promote joint relations with NATO, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

Ducaru also emphasized the Romanian Government's determination to further the friendship and cooperation with the Russian Federation and other former Soviet Union countries.

Romania: Tinca on NATO, Troops in Hungarian Counties

AU2103102496 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2030 GMT 20 Mar 96

[Interview with Romanian Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca by Bucharest radio correspondent Nicu Pop in Bucharest on 20 March—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Pop] Mr. Minister, during your news conference today for foreign journalists accredited to our country you broached several issues. My question refers to our wish to integrate within euro-atlantic security bodies and chances of doing so. What are your expectations?

[Tinca] Let me tell you first that I wanted to meet the representatives of the foreign press because I wanted to know them. I thought that they might raise different kinds of questions and more obscure points than you do, and I wanted to help them in this respect. However, I found that the issues they are concerned about are identical to the ones the representatives of the Romanian media are concerned about, which is shown by the question you have just asked me.

Most of their questions were about our integration within NATO. I must say, this issue is quite simple, as our determination has been very clearly stated. It is a firm decision, and I do not think there are any doubts at all about this issue.

They also asked me questions about the practical aspects of the integration process, which are connected with the reform process currently under way in the Army. Well, I tried to clarify these issues by repeating that the reform in the Romanian Army is not necessarily connected solely with our integration within NATO. The costs of the reform in the Romanian Army, and its completion, despite the sacrifice we have to put up with, are in relation to the need to carry out our duty of defending the country. So I would like to say again, as clearly as possible, with or without NATO there has to be reform in Romania's army, because this is what is required by the necessity of defending our homeland. This is our interest.

Talking about more general things, I also told them that probably the most appropriate thing for us to do now

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is, as someone once said, to shut up and keep digging. That is, we need fewer declarations and discussions, because as far as Romania's option is concerned the situation is clear, and what really matters now is what one does. And let me tell you, there is a lot to be done on various planes, such as interoperability, schooling and education, and military training, that is, the drills we are participating in. No less important is to change our mentality, in the more general sense, that is, to reconsider and rebuild the relations between the military institution, which is a fundamental institution of the state, and the other state institutions, the democratic, civilian, or, political control, if you so wish, exerted over the Army, as well as the relations of the Army with civilian society. By the latter I do not mean the society comprising the individuals wearing civilian clothes, but rather the civilian society as a fundamental, reliable structure of the state in various situations.

[Pop] Mr. Minister, at your news conference today you reasserted certain attributes of the law-governed state, rejecting certain dishonest interpretations, if I may put it thus, referring to the spreading of the Army over the entire territory of the country, as required by the reform.

[Tinca] I took the liberty of replying to those who asked me this that I find such speculations boring. I told them that at first I thought that those who raise such issues were acting in good faith, but lately I have found that this is solely done to create a certain situations. I also told them that such problems might exist in other places, but not in Romania. It is quite clear that a limited number of military units—a number that, as a matter of fact, is insufficient—cannot alter the ethnic structure of two counties; I am referring to Covasna and Harghita Counties, in which the ethnic Hungarian citizens of Romania claim to be the majority population and they really are. Therefore, fears about this issue betray a certain feebleness that I cannot comprehend. Let alone the fact that the troops deployed there have an entirely different mission than that of watching over the ethnic Hungarians. Their mission there is part of a concept that goes way beyond such petty disputes.

[Pop] One more element: Today you reasserted your wish to promote economic and political relations, the very good military relations with all our neighboring countries.

[Tinca] This is a constant feature of our political orientation, because, you see, one cannot only profit from security, but rather must also contribute to security as well. And if one wants to contribute to security, the first thing one should do is establish good relations with one's neighbors, which is what we are trying to do. We wish to develop relations as good as the ones we have with Bulgarians, with the Hungarians, Ukrainians, the Republic of Moldova, and so on, because being neighbors is not merely a geographic issue, it also has a political meaning. The things we have achieved so far seem to be appreciated and we will go along this line because it is a contribution to the stability of our region, as well as a contribution that leads to stability on the entire continent.

Romania: Melescanu Views Russian, Ukraine Treaties

AU2003213696 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 14 Mar 96 p 1

[Report on a statement by Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by "R.C.": "The Iliescu-Yeltsin Meeting Is Conditioned by the Signing of the Romanian-Russian Treaty"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "About 95 percent of the basic treaties with Russia and Ukraine have been finalized, but what is still due to be negotiated is very important," said [Romanian Foreign Minister] Teodor Melescanu yesterday, 13 March. The head of Romanian diplomacy met with members of the Foreign Policy Commission of the Senate, and briefed them on the stage of discussions regarding bilateral treaties with Ukraine, Russia, and the Republic of Moldova. Although the signing of these three documents is not an essential condition for integration into the European Union, nevertheless, the western partners will take them into account. The treaties with Russia and Ukraine are at a very advanced stage. However, the sides must agree on a formula through which the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact could be condemned, and on the place this point will have within the treaty. Neither Russia nor Ukraine (with which there is also another disputed issue, namely Serpents Island) seem in a hurry to condemn the pact through which Bessarabia and Bukovina were taken away from Romania, while the Romanian side, sources in the commission claim, would be ready for a compromise on this issue. The treaty with the Republic of Moldova is in the "stage of exploratory discussions," with Romania wishing to sanction through the treaty the "special relations" with that country.

In other words, nothing new on the eastern front. However, it would be desirable to have the treaty with Russia concluded before the presidential elections that are to take place in June. It is possible that a meeting between the foreign ministers of Romania and Russia will be held in April. During that meeting the sides will decide on the final form of the treaty. Subsequently, the treaty would be signed by President Iliescu and President Yeltsin at a meeting that Romania is already working on. The issue

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of Romanian-Hungarian relations, which should have also been discussed yesterday, was postponed to some other day.

Romania: Conference Held on Conciliation With Hungary

AU2003124596 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 18 Mar 96 pp 1, 3

[Article by Otto Neumann: "President Iliescu's Interview With MAGYAR HIRLAP—Catch 1201"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From the viewpoint of the two countries' rapprochement, Romanian President Ion Iliescu called important the conference on the possibilities of Hungarian-Romanian historic conciliation held at the weekend in Bucharest. Iliescu gave an interview to MAGYAR HIRLAP at the conference.

He said that an abnormal situation has evolved as regards high-level meetings because, since the change of the regime, state and government heads of the two countries have not yet come together for specifically bilateral talks, although the Romanian side is completely open to this. Iliescu had told both Hungarian President Arpad Goncz and Prime Minister Gyula Horn that he was willing to receive them at any time, and he would also immediately accept a possible invitation from them. According to Iliescu, our relations would be favorably influenced by such talks. Iliescu said that the influence of extremists was expressed in Budapest's reserved attitude—although he considers Horn much more flexible than the previous government heads. We could sign the basic treaty tomorrow if the Hungarian side abandoned having to include Recommendation No. 1201 of the Council of Europe, Iliescu indicated to MAGYAR HIRLAP.

We asked Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu if a Romanian-Hungarian political agreement was possible before this year's Romanian elections. Melescanu said that it was not true that Bucharest would keep delaying the texting of the basic treaty and the conciliation documents until the elections. On the contrary, the delay might result in a negative election campaign in Romania from which the extremists would benefit.

When the conference was announced, the organizers planned to invite Romanian, Hungarian, German, and French personalities active in areas of public affairs other than politics. However, Romania's leading politicians took an active part in the exchange of views. In his opening speech, Melescanu explained that he considers the 1963 German-French historic conciliation exemplary from two points of view. Adenauer's and de Gaulle's agreement applied to the two countries' whole system of relations, and the German-French handshake had a positive influence on the whole European process of integration. Foreign State Secretary Marcel Dinu underlined that it is a mistake to believe that time has not yet come for Romanian-Hungarian conciliation. On the contrary, the historic moment and foreign support are both favorable. However, none of the Romanian politicians indicated that the unresolved situation of the Hungarian minority living there could be an obstacle.

Participants of the conference thoroughly analyzed the German-French model and concluded that some of its elements can indeed be used. Nevertheless, Hungary and Romania have to find their own way to the solution. Zoltan Szasz, deputy director of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Historical Science Institute, emphasized that, rather than speculations by intellectuals, it is joint actions that can forward bilateral cooperation. He also warned that the latest provocations by the Cluj mayor slow down this process. Engineer and academician Laszlo Kapolyi underlined that economic cooperation between Romania and Hungary is vitally important because of the collapse of the "socialist market." Kapolyi invited the conference's participants to continue the consultation in Budapest.

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Slovenia: FRY Said Trying To Stop Debt Agreement

AU2103082696 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 14 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by "G.R.": "FRY Is Threatening Lawsuits, but Our People Say: 'They Will Not Succeed'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 13 March—Slovenia has recently made an agreement with commercial banks regarding its portion of the debt from the New Financial Agreement [NFA]. The Slovene Ministry of Finance claims that the accusations raised by the National Bank of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and a few other Serb banks that this agreement violates their rights are completely unfounded. Marjeta Sketa, press representative for the Bank of Slovenia, said: "We have hired the best legal advisors, and I therefore doubt that they [the Yugoslavs] will manage to do what they are planning to do."

As we have already reported, the Reuters press agency yesterday reported that the Yugoslav Central Bank had hired the New York law firm Kirkland & Ellis, and through it accused Slovenia of circumventing the NFA regulations. They have threatened to take legal proceedings if the agreement between Slovenia and the foreign creditors goes through. Richard Levy, from the aforementioned New York law firm, told Reuters: "If our demands are not met, we will sue. We will sue them. We will sue everybody. We will sue the Slovene banks and the creditors and thus prevent the agreement from being adopted." Mark Walker, a lawyer of the New York law firm Clearly Gottlieb, which represents Slovenia, answered him by saying that Slovenia intends to go forth with the transaction with the creditors. The transaction has already begun. He believes that Serbia cannot stop adoption of the agreement. "These are attempts by someone who has no legal rights to do something. Moreover, they are interfering in other peoples affairs. Such attempts cannot be successful," Walker said.

The Slovene Ministry of Finance emphasized today in their public statement that Serb banks are using their statement to ruin the agreement between Slovenia and the creditor banks. The Serb banks, like the Slovene banks, are debtors but have not been paying off their debt since 1992 and have not shown the will to do so, as the Slovene banks have. It is therefore unusual that the Serb banks should threaten their creditors with legal action just because they have made an agreement with Slovenia; especially considering that this agreement means that part of the debt will be paid back. This irresponsible activity on the part of the Serb banks will not stop Slovenia from going forth with the transaction, which is in the interest of the NFA creditors as well as the international financial community, said the Finance Ministry's statement.

According to the agreement, Slovenia will pay 18 percent of the debt mentioned in the NFA agreement. The amount of total debt is a little more than $4 million, the amount of Yugoslavia's debt before the breakup. Croat representatives are also holding talks in order to sign a similar agreement, and according to foreign bankers, the Croats have also demanded the exclusion of Serbia from any new agreements. Serbia claims that the planned Slovene agreement is in opposition to the agreement on the distribution of debt among the successor countries of former Yugoslavia from 1988. This agreement foresees Serbia taking over 40 percent of the debt.

"Under the current conditions, our clients will have no other choice but to sue. That is unfortunately the case, but it definitely is not what our clients wanted," the lawyers of the Kirkland & Ellis firm said in a message sent to Slovene creditors. The price of the former Yugoslav foreign debt has been changing during the past few weeks, partially also because of the fear that Serbia might prevent the adoption of the agreement between Slovenia and the foreign banks. At the moment, the debt is worth only 36 cents for every dollar of nominal value, whereas it was worth 50 cents a few weeks ago. Bank representatives say that the adoption of the agreement will probably not be postponed. The agreement could be signed in a few weeks.

In Belgrade we were unable to find any official reactions to yesterday's threat to Slovenia. Today's issue of VECERNJE NOVOSTI published an article that emphasizes that the Yugoslav side will not permit a separate distribution of the common debt of the former SFRY [Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia] without consulting the group of successors, which is what Slovenia and Croatia are pursuing. The Belgrade daily also published a statement made by the intellectual Kosta Mihajlovic, head of the Yugoslav delegation, in which he states that the political situation regarding debt distribution has lately been changing. He believes that there exists, in Belgrade, a new model for the distribution of the common debt, which could solve the problem quickly. He did not, however, reveal in what way this could be done.

As our correspondent in Belgrade Slobodan Dukic reports, it is clear that Belgrade will do something in order to reply Ljubljana's intentions, although they have not confirmed the message from New York. They will do this in order to protect their own interests in negotiations with foreign creditors. Could this already be a sugges-

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tion from the FRY National Bank Governor Dragoslav Avramovic, not to distribute the joint Yugoslav gold reserves, but to deposit them abroad in order for the former Yugoslav republics to obtain a $3.2 million dollar loan from foreign banks?

Slovenia: Italian Judge on Slovene WWII Crimes

96BA0209A Maribor VECER in Slovene 20 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Stojan Spetic: "How Will Slovenia React?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *As happened almost everywhere in Europe, revenge claimed some innocent victims.*

Rome (from our correspondent)—Exactly 20 years ago, the Trieste court sentenced to death in absentia the German commander of the Trieste Rice Mill, where at least 6,000 Slovenes, Croats, Jews, and Italian antifascists were killed and cremated. At that time the judges promised to continue investigations of the Italian war criminals who had helped the Germans do it. They were supposed to search through the underground of Trieste collaborationism, which was already serving new masters during the cold war years and is still acting today as a "dike against the Slovene danger." Nothing at all came of it. The dusty documents of the investigation are lying in some drawer, and the crimes are becoming more distant, until they become completely forgotten.

Rizarna is a taboo subject in Trieste, however. If it is ever mentioned, it is only in order to compare it with the "*fojbe*," the karst pits where, during the 40 days of the Yugoslav partisan administration, several hundred fascists and their collaborators were dumped. Italian historian Giovanni Miccoli clearly wrote: "It was brutal revenge. The evil of revenge, however, was initiated by innumerable crimes of fascism against the Slovene people over a quarter of a century."

As happened almost everywhere in Europe, revenge also claimed some innocent victims. The official Italian phrase, however, is that "genocide" was conducted at that time against the Italians in the Giuliani province and in Istria. In short, it was supposedly "the first ethnic cleansing, the kind that the people of the Balkans carry out every half century."

Although the perpetrators of the most brutal retaliations were shot by the partisans themselves, after the war an Allied court conducted a judicial investigation and also sentenced several individuals.

Now Judge Giuseppe Pittito is in Rome, and at the suggestion of several figures among the Istrian diaspora he has reopened the investigation of the "*fojbe*," namely under the judicial assumption that it was "genocide," i.e., a crime against humanity, for which there is no statute of limitations under international law.

Judge Pittito has now concluded the investigation, and is announcing a warrant for several dozen accused people. The names have not yet been officially announced, but it is known that they include Slovene and Croatian officers in the Yugoslav Army and Italian antifascists who ended up on the Slovene coast after the war. This, however, is opening up an unpredictable scenario with a clearly political background.

We assume that Italy will demand the extradition of the accused individuals, who are now Slovene citizens. How will the Slovene judicial authorities react? What will the political reactions be like? Is it possible that this will bring about a new dispute among the Slovene political parties? What will Slovenia do: Will it extradite the accused individuals to Italy, or will it launch its own investigation of Italian crimes on our territory?

At any rate, one thing is certain—the Rome judge's investigation could cause a serious exacerbation of bilateral relations precisely while Italy is presiding over the EU.

It was probably planned just that way.

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Federal

FRY: War Crimes Committee Lists Izetbegovic as Suspect

AU2103114996 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by M. P. Brkic: "'The Hague Tribunal Has Lost Its Credibility'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—At its news conference yesterday, the Yugoslav commission for collecting evidence on war crimes presented to the public a report on the results of the work of this body on gathering evidence about criminal acts of genocide and war crimes committed against Serbs on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since the beginning of the war. According to Prof. Zoran Stojanovic, head of the commission, the commission has investigated 171 cases of violation of international conventions and the international war law. The number of those who have committed crimes and victims is significantly higher. There is specific information on 5,362 murderers, and 181 missing persons.

"The task of the commission since its founding has been to collect proof that can be used in criminal proceedings. Our approach is therefore causal, which means that we are not involved in guesswork but are dealing with precise data. In doing so, the commission is not acting as a judicial organ. Its work focuses on pretrial procedures," Prof. Stojanovic explained.

According to him, the report is meant to inform the public at home and abroad, and therefore does not contain any information on the key issues—proofs.

"The report contains statements by witnesses given before investigation judges, video and photographic documentation, analyses by some experts, personal documents.... However, we have many reasons not to present proof to the public, especially because we need to protect witnesses. The report contains code numbers under which certain cases have been deposited," Prof. Stojanovic says.

Among the many names—which range from those of the people at the bottom, the direct executors, to the names of the top politicians and military men—is also the name of Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, as members of the commission say, according to the principles of objective responsibility that the Hague Tribunal is constantly applying against the Serbs.

FRY: Defense Minister Concludes Visit to China

LD2103104596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0936 GMT 21 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Beijing, 21 Mar (TANJUG)—Federal Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic today concluded his official visit to China and with other members of the Yugoslav Army delegation left for Belgrade on a special plane.

The Yugoslav minister and other members of the delegation, which also included Lieutenant Colonel General Rodojica Kadijevic, assistant federal defense minister, and Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, assistant Yugoslav Army chief of General Staff, paid a seven-day visit to China at the invitation from Chi Haotian, Chinese defense minister and deputy president of the central military commission.

During their successful and friendly talks, both sides expressed interest in restoring and improving cooperation in all fields, particularly in military industry and in the sphere of science and technology. [passage omitted]

Serbia

Serbia: Regime Criticized for Accepting Croatia's Borders

AU2003155696 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 16 Mar 96 p 6

[Unattributed report: "They Are Turning Heroes Into Terrorists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbian Radical Party assessed yesterday that by "accepting Croatia's borders, defined by the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia, the ruling regime in Serbia was negating every statehood quality of the Republic of Serb Krajina and was thus turning Serb troops, who until yesterday had been heroes, into terrorists."

"The recent arrest of Dusan Dejanovic from the village of Dejanovici in the Sisak area represents the continued persecution of long-suffering Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia, whose only fault is that they cannot reconcile themselves to the occupation of the westernmost Serb land, yet the Socialist regime in Belgrade has failed to condemn these events," the SRS statement reads.

The Serbian Radicals "sharply condemn the cowardly behavior of the Socialist Party of Serbia, which, unprepared for the historic moment, is making error after error."

The statement further states that "real, peaceful, and democratic steps for the liberation of the temporarily

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occupied part of the Serb state will only be taken once the Serbian Radicals take over in Serbia."

Serbia: Militia Chief Arkan Takes Over Radio Station

AU2003175796 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Mar 96 p 24

[Article by D.P.: "Arkan Has Bought Radio Penguin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, the chairman of the Party of Serbian Unity and a Belgrade businessman, several days ago bought one of the most popular Belgrade radio stations—Radio Penguin, according to some well-informed sources of NASA BORBA. Again according to our sources, Borislav Pelevic is supposed to be appointed the new editor in chief of this radio station. He is the party's spokesman, editor of SRPSKO JEDINSTVO and RING newspapers, and the chairman of the Association of Kick-Boxers of Yugoslavia.

Our sources claim that there will be no major changes in the editorial policy of Radio Penguin, except that political content will be totally excluded from the program, while much of its space and time will be assigned to music and entertainment. Since Pelevic is too busy with all the aforementioned functions, it is expected that he will appoint his deputy in charge of the operational part of the job. His name is still not known.

Arkan is the third owner of Radio Penguin since its foundation. The first owner was Radojica Nikcevic, a businessman who was killed on a parking lot in Vase Pelagica Street three years ago. He was replaced by Giovanni di Stefano, a friend of Nikcevic's and Raznatovic's, who took over the Sumadija housing cooperative as well, of which he is the head still today.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Social Democrats on FRY View of Prevlaka

AU2003164096 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 16 Mar 96 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Nothing Has Been Settled Yet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Rade Bojovic, president of the Montenegrin Social Democratic Party's Executive Council, said that the Granic-Milutinovic meeting in Zagreb had shown that the status of Prevlaka has been pushed into the background, and that an agreement on the peninsula will not be easily or speedily reached. "It is obvious that here we have a conflict of interests between Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro, which in this case has once again sided with the Serb national interest," Bojovic said.

He assessed that the way Serbia was treating the Prevlaka issue in negotiations with Croatia was "particularly humiliating" for the Montenegrin national interest.

"On the one hand we have Croatia's clear interest in Prevlaka, while on the other hand we have the fact that the Republic of Serbia, embodied by the federal foreign minister, is treating Prevlaka as a second-rate issue, which is particularly humiliating from the point of view of Montenegro's national interest," Bojovic said.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Serb Police Raid Homes, Plunder Albanian Firms

AU2003172296

[FBIS Report] Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English Nos. 836 and 837 on 18 and 19 March carry several reports citing cases of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo being maltreated and harassed by the Serbian police.

It is reported that over the past weekend, the Serbian police "raided" several video-cassette shops in Pristina, "seizing" copies of an Albanian film entitled "A Coat for My Convicted Father" by a Kosova actor and director. The Albanian director told the Kosova Information Center that "he had been ordered by the police to withdraw all copies of his film, for it allegedly incites ethnic hatred." He said that "the film, which was shot last year, portrays the life of children in Kosova under Serbian occupation and the Serbian police practices against the Albanian children."

The Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) sources in Prizren report that the Serbian police on 17 March "raided" the home of Skender Berisha, an MP from Prizren, "requiring from him and his brothers to turn in weapons they allegedly were in possession of." After the raid, the Serb policemen "forced" Berisha into the police car and "threatened" him "to turn in a weapon, no matter what kind."

It is reported that, "on 16 and 17 March, the so-called Serbian financial police, backed up by police forces, undertook a vast campaign in the private firms and shops, owned by non-Serbs, and plundered and fined them large amounts of money." The LDK Information Commission reports that they also closed many shops, while the Serbian inspectors fined 23 Albanians with 800 dinars or 250 German marks (DM) each, two others with 1,600 dinars or DM500 each, another Muslim Albanian with 1,000 dinars or DM300, and two other

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Albanians with 600 dinars or DM200 each. There were cases when large sums of money were fined on them, such as one Albanian was fined with DM1,800, another one with DM1,200, and a Muslim Albanian with DM13,500. It is reported that one Albanian was fined DM4,400 and was also subject to "police torture."

The report further says that on 16 March, the Serb inspectors and police "plundered" a total of DM19,400. The report further says that the Serbian police and inspectors "looted" also the wood and timber market and "collected" some DM65,100 and 48,150 dinars, as well as grain and milk product market, where they fined six Albanians with a total of 9,400 dinars.

Another report from Mitrovica says that, under the pretext of "arms possession," a secondary school teacher in Mitrovica was "summoned to report" to the Serbian police station in Mitrovica on 15 March. On 10 March, two Serb policemen "halted" an Albanian in Mitrovica and "beat him unconscious, for no reason whatsoever."

Reports from Prizren confirm that over the past days, the Serbian police "arrested" two Albanians from Bilushe village under the "alleged charges of illegal arms possession." It is reported that the Serbian police "seized the mobile phones of the residents of this village, providing no explanation for their seizure."

It is reported from Pec that the police on 15 March summoned an activist with the Kosova Citizens Association and a former municipal governor and teacher at the Pec high school to so-called "police informative talks." While in detention, they were "questioned" about their activities.

Between 13 and 14 March, the Serbian police in Urosevac arrested one Albanian from Urosevac and four others from Mirash village under the "pretext of arms possession."

The Serb police in Suva Reka on 15 March detained an Albanian from the village of Dragaqine while "coming back home from the hospital." The police "searched him thoroughly," seizing DM50 he possessed, and subsequently sending him to the police station in Suva Reka.

Under the "pretext of arms searches," the Serbian police on 13 March "raided" the homes of one Albanian from Muqiverc village and three others from Roganice village, who were all "summoned to report at the police station" and "bring with them the weapons allegedly they were in possession of." Reports say that while in custody, they were subject to "severe physical torture."

Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English No, 837 on 19 March also carries a number of reports on Serbian police violence against Albanians.

Sources in Istok say that the Serbian police on 15 March arrested Rame Berisha, an LDK activist in Istok, and questioned him "about his activity with the LDK party."

Another report from Klina notes that the Serb police on 17 March "halted" two Albanians from Rigjeve and Maxharre villages, who "were subsequently taken at the police station in Kijeva and brutally beaten up."

LDK sources in Rahovec report that, on 15 March, a Serbian police expedition "arrested" an Albanian "in front of his home" and "forced him into their car." It is reported that the police "took him to a forest between Drenoc and Ratkoc villages and beat him up severely." The report says that the Albanian "is a handicapped person" and that "he is in very critical health situation as a result of torture."

Reports from Obiliq say that the Serbian police on 18 March "detained" three Albanian brothers from Sibovc village "for the second time" allegedly "in connection with arms possession." They were all reported subject to "police torture while in custody."

Under the same pretext, the Serbian police on 13 March "detained and beat up severely" another Albanian from Sibovc village.

Sources in Podujevo report that the Serbian police on 14 March "searched for arms" into the homes of 12 Albanians. "No arms" were reported found, yet "family members were harassed by Serb police."

Under the same pretext, the Serbian police on 17 March "raided" the homes of three Albanians in Potok village. Under the pretext of "arms searches," the Serbian police on 18 March "raided" the home of another Albanian in Llausha village, arresting him and his son after the raid. They were both subject to "physical torture."

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